The Effects of Market Fragmentation Around Corporate Events by Cox, Justin Steven
University of Mississippi 
eGrove 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 
2019 
The Effects of Market Fragmentation Around Corporate Events 
Justin Steven Cox 
University of Mississippi 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd 
 Part of the Finance Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cox, Justin Steven, "The Effects of Market Fragmentation Around Corporate Events" (2019). Electronic 
Theses and Dissertations. 1565. 
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/1565 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at eGrove. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more 
information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu. 
THE EFFECTS OF MARKET FRAGMENTATION AROUND CORPORATE EVENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
JUSTIN COX 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION PRESENTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF  
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTORATE OF  
PHILOSOPHY IN BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,  
UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI 
 
 
 
 
 
MAY 2019
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright Justin Cox 2019 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Part 1, I investigate the effects of market fragmentation in the liquidity formation of initial 
public offerings (IPOs). Recent exchange officials cite increases in market fragmentation as a 
hindrance to the liquidity formation in IPO trading. We find that IPOs are less fragmented at the 
start of IPO trading relative to later periods in the IPO secondary market. We also discover that 
more underpriced issues experience greater fragmentation, both lit and dark, at the start of IPO 
trading. Our study also examines the level of undisplayed liquidity in IPOs, finding more hidden 
trading at the start of IPO trading and in more underpriced issues. Finally, we provide evidence 
that algorithmic, hidden, and lit fragmented trading improve offering day IPO liquidity. In Part 2, 
I use the current fragmented market structure to test and an update theoretical limit order models 
on trading aggressiveness and order submissions around liquidity deadlines such as a stock’s ex-
dividend date. We use a stock’s ex-dividend date as a deadline for liquidity traders to examine if 
dividend-seeking traders use dark and/or taker-maker venues as these two venues allow traders 
to bypass waiting costs and spread constraints to capture dividends. Our evidence indicates that 
taker-maker (dark) venue market share decreases (increases) on cum-dividend days, reverting 
once the stock trades ex-dividend. In Part 3, I use off-exchange retail trading data to examine the 
relevance of stock splits in attracting retail participation. Historically, stock splits help align 
prices in an optimal price range, resulting in disperse ownership and greater retail investor 
participation. We cite Minnick and Raman’s (2014) contention that changes in direct retail 
ownership contribute to the decline in stock splits. We provide an empirical analysis of retail 
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trading around stock splits, forward and reverse. Our results indicate a transitory increase 
(decrease) in both retail trading and retail trading imbalances around forward (reverse) splits. 
Our results cast doubt on the optimal price range hypothesis in that stock splits align prices to an 
optimal range and confirm the declining significance of stock splits in attracting permanent retail 
ownership.  
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PART 1: THE DARK SIDE OF IPOS: EXAMINING WHERE AND WHO TRADES IN 
THE IPO SECONDARY MARKET 
 
2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines the levels of dark and lit fragmentation in initial public offerings 
(IPOs). Dark fragmentation or dark trading refers to off-exchange trading where order flow is 
either internalized by broker-dealers, matched via crossing networks, or executes over-the-
counter. Dark trading allows subscribers to use anonymous, undisplayed orders away from the lit 
market. Dark trading venues such as dark pools provide investors both better execution costs and 
pre-trade anonymity yet higher execution risk. Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu (2017) recently 
document that overall dark trading accounts for nearly 30% of equity trading volume in the U.S.1 
Further, Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2017) document that over 50 alternative trading systems such 
as dark pools exist in the U.S. Lit fragmentation refers to the fragmentation of order flow across 
several open and publicly transparent limit order book exchanges such as the NYSE and 
NASDAQ. Lit trading is currently fragmented across 13 limit order book exchanges in the U.S., 
offering various fee- and rebate- model pricing venues. Gresse (2017) documents that for stocks 
in the S&P 500, nearly 50% of trade volume is executed away from their primary exchange. The 
literature studying both lit and dark fragmentation suggests that fragmented trading may affect 
market quality and liquidity formation in stocks.   
Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000), Corwin, Harris, and Lipson (2004) and Bessembinder, 
Hao, and Zheng (2015) all document the importance of liquidity formation in IPO secondary
                                                          
1 Data provided by Fidessa shows that off-exchange or dark trading accounts for nearly 35% of daily volume in the 
U.S. 
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markets since liquid secondary markets help reduce the cost for market making, lower volatility, 
improve access in securing future capital, attract analyst coverage, and mitigate potential IPO 
failure. Two recent developments focus on the potential impact of market structure on IPO 
liquidity formation. In a presentation to the Securities and Exchange Commission, NASDAQ 
chairman, Robert Greifeld, suggests that increases in market fragmentation hinders the capital 
formation of small cap stocks, concluding that IPOs should have their own liquidity concentration 
program whereby the capital formation of the stock is less fragmented.2 This sentiment is further 
mentioned in a Wall Street Journal article published on November 28th, 2017, where current 
NASDAQ chairman, Nelson Griggs, states:  
“The current fragmented structure penalizes small companies for their low daily trading 
volumes; investors are deterred from making big bets on those companies because of the lack of 
liquidity to fill bigger trades. Concentrating disaggregated liquidity on one or two exchanges 
would allow investors to better source liquidity and make those stocks more attractive. Allowing 
issuers the choice to aggregate their liquidity on a single exchange—with limited exceptions—
would result in better trading for the investors who believe in these companies.”3 
Another prominent exchange leader, NYSE President Thomas Farley, voiced a concern 
that both market fragmentation and undisplayed liquidity have made it more challenging to bring 
IPOs to market. In June 27th, 2017 testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee 
Financial Services Capital Markets, Farley commented: 
“Our markets have changed significantly over the past 10 years since the adoption of 
Regulation NMS. Equity markets are now intensely competitive and innovative. Unfortunately, 
these positive attributes have also brought with them added challenges of increased fragmentation, 
                                                          
2 See https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-050113-greifeld-slides.pdf 
3 See https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-more-concentrated-market-would-help-ipos-1511910303  
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lack of obligated liquidity provision, and a decrease in displayed liquidity, particularly in less 
liquid stocks…..We hear concern from NYSE listed companies and investors regarding increasing 
complexity and fragmentation in the U.S. equity markets, and the resulting challenge in finding 
sufficient liquidity….Smarter regulation of today’s equity market structure will ease the burden 
for entrepreneurs and innovators to access the capital markets.” 
Despite the voiced concerns that fragmented markets as well as undisplayed liquidity 
hinders capital formation in IPOs, little evidence exists as to the current fragmentation of IPOs. 
Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000), Aggarwal (2000, 2003) and Corwin, Harris, and Lipson 
(2004) analyze the development of the secondary market for IPOs, providing insight as to how 
trading takes place around the offering and how firm characteristics impact IPO secondary 
market liquidity. Other studies including Ellis (2006), Edwards and Hanley (2010), and Chan 
(2010) look at who trades in IPOs as it relates to market makers, short sellers, and retail 
investors. However, no study contributes as to where IPO secondary market trading and liquidity 
formation occurs. Given the concerns of the current exchange presidents, we investigate and 
contribute to the literature as to the role of fragmentation and undisplayed liquidity in IPOs.  
 We focus on multiple issues related to IPO secondary market liquidity. First, we analyze 
the levels of dark and lit fragmentation in IPOs. The start of IPO trading is typically associated 
with high uncertainty and asymmetric information risk (Corwin, Harris, and Lipson, 2004). 
Further, the start of IPO trading is often accompanied with large trading volumes (Ellis, Michaely, 
and O’Hara, 2000). These abnormal trading conditions may have significant effects on the level 
of dark and lit fragmentation since the large trading volume around the offering date is likely to 
increase the probability of execution, particularly in dark trading venues (Buti, Rindi, and Werner, 
2017). However, consistent with Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu’s (2017) venue pecking order 
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hypothesis, traders may prefer execution immediacy over the lower costs and price improvement 
provided by fragmented markets during a high uncertainty trading environment. We argue that the 
venue pecking order hypothesis applies to IPOs as IPOs are often associated with both large price 
moves and non-execution risk at the start of IPO trading. As a result, we expect lower levels of 
fragmented trading across both lit and dark venues at the start of IPO trading. Moreover, to the 
extent that uncertainty and informational asymmetries reduce in the IPO secondary market, 
fragmented trading is expected to increase as lower execution costs outweigh the benefits of 
execution immediacy. Second, we determine the levels of dark and lit fragmentation in IPOs, 
sorted on the level of IPO underpricing. Since underpriced or “hot” IPO issues are associated with 
even greater price uncertainty and asymmetric risk (see Rock, 1986; Amihud, Hauser, and Kirsh, 
2003), markets are likely to fragment as traders seek other trading venues, particularly off-
exchange, to reduce their exposure to adverse selection risk. In addition, the higher trading 
volumes associated with more underpriced IPO issues are likely to increase the execution 
probability for traders in dark venues (Buti, Rindi, and Werner, 2017). However, to the extent that 
the higher execution risk in underpriced IPOs (see Corwin, Harris, and Lipson, 2004), traders may 
prefer execution immediacy over execution costs, resulting in less fragmented trading in 
underpriced issues.   
Third, we analyze the changes in algorithmic trading around IPOs. Ellul and Pagano (2006) 
assert that the asymmetric information environment associated with IPOs may induce investors to 
rely on other investors’ trading behavior in determining their own strategy, resulting in a potential 
information cascade. Recently, Weller (2017) shows that algorithmic traders are more active in 
acquiring information around periods of high information asymmetry. Weller studies algorithmic 
trading around earnings announcements and finds that algorithmic trading deters information 
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acquisition despite impounding information into prices. Fourth, we examine the levels of hidden 
liquidity in IPOs given the concerns that the lack of displayed liquidity hinders the liquidity 
formation of IPOs. Hidden liquidity or the ability to use hidden limit orders in the limit order book 
are likely targets of algorithmic or latent traders since Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar (2015) 
document that many algorithmic traders employ “pinging” strategies (i.e., placing and cancelling 
orders simply to discover hidden orders in the limit order book). To the extent that underpriced 
IPOs are associated with higher informational asymmetries, algorithmic traders (AT) may find it 
advantageous to trade in more underpriced IPOs to acquire pertinent information from hidden limit 
orders. Furthermore, we analyze if uncertainty in the IPO secondary market results in more 
algorithmic trading as algorithmic trading is associated with reducing search and monitoring 
frictions, primarily in periods of high uncertainty. We also determine if changes in the IPO 
secondary market result in traders switching between hidden limit orders and submitting orders to 
the dark venue. 
Finally, we analyze the effects of market fragmentation, undisplayed trading, and 
algorithmic trading on market liquidity in IPOs. First, we investigate if these market innovations 
impact market liquidity for IPOs on the offering day. Second, we analyze if the impact of 
fragmentation, undisplayed liquidity, and algorithmic trading influence liquidity formation in the 
extended aftermarket. Our analysis examines both the offering day and extended aftermarket 
separately since changes in informational asymmetries as the IPO trades may affect the relation 
between IPO liquidity (i.e., transaction costs, price efficiency) and our measures of fragmented, 
undisplayed, and algorithmic trading.  
 Our main findings are summarized as follows: First, we find that IPOs are less fragmented 
at the start of IPO trading relative to the extended IPO secondary market as IPOs become more 
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fragmented, both lit and dark, over time. Second, we show that more underpriced issues are 
associated with higher levels of both dark and lit fragmentation. For hot IPO issues, we find that 
off-exchange or dark trading accounts for nearly 30% of all executed volume on the offering date. 
This finding indicates that the large price moves and non-execution risks in underpriced issues are 
likely offset by the large trading volumes in underpriced issues, resulting in higher execution 
probabilities for traders in fragmented markets. Third, we provide evidence that dark and hidden 
trading are substitutes in the IPO secondary market. Although dark and hidden trading appear to 
complement one another around the offering date, the two forms of undisplayed trading exhibit 
inverse patterns in the IPO secondary market. Simultaneously, we show that algorithmic trading 
increases in post-IPO trading. The increases in both dark and algorithmic trading as well as the 
decrease in hidden trading are consistent with Degryse, Tombeur, and Wuyts (2015), who argue 
that both market and trading conditions impact the level of smart order router algorithmic trading 
which reduces the execution probability of hidden orders but connects more traders to dark venue. 
Fourth, we document that algorithmic trading is higher in underpriced issues – consistent with the 
notion that algorithmic traders are more active during periods of increased adverse selection risk. 
We also provide evidence that hidden, algorithmic, and lit fragmented trading improves offering 
day liquidity. Finally, we show that off-exchange or dark fragmentation adversely impacts IPO 
liquidity while lit fragmentation improves IPO liquidity in the extended aftermarket. 
 Overall, our study contributes to the literature in analyzing lit and dark fragmentation, 
particularly in IPOs. We argue that our findings are of interest to regulators and policymakers in 
understanding how IPOs trade in fragmented markets. Further, we suggest that our evidence 
provides new information to policymakers in understanding how undisplayed or opaque liquidity 
(i.e., dark and hidden trading) comprises IPO trading and impacts overall IPO liquidity. 
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II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
LIT FRAGMENTATION AND IPOS 
 The market fragmentation literature generally focuses on the positive and negative effects 
of market competition. Earlier studies such as Hamilton (1979) and Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) 
document that adverse selection risk increases with more decentralized trading. Other papers 
(Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara, 1996; Bessembinder, 1997) demonstrate that new market competition 
results in more cream-skimming for order flow, resulting in greater adverse selection risk on the 
primary market. However, O’Hara and Ye (2011), Degryse, Tombeur, and Wuyts (2015), and 
Gresse (2017) provide evidence that market fragmentation has positive effects on liquidity 
including lower execution costs and greater trading depth. While these papers provide valuable 
contributions in understanding the consequences of market fragmentation, other studies outline 
why market fragment. Fong, Madhavan, and Swan (2001) provide answers as to why markets 
fragment, showing that institutional trading interest, liquidity constraints such as the bid-ask spread 
in the primary market, and the ability to execute large trades are determinants of why markets 
fragment. Further, Fong, Madhavan, and Swan suggests that continuous markets with the existence 
of the bid-ask spread presents a dilemma to traders. Traders with a low trading immediacy may 
prefer alternative markets that provide lower execution costs yet experience greater potential risk 
for nonexecution. Menkveld, Yeushen, and Zhu (2017) provide a similar explanation in analyzing 
how markets fragment or consolidate around urgency shocks. Menkveld et al. propose a venue 
pecking order hypothesis in which urgency or informational shocks force traders to sort through
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trading venues based on the level of execution immediacy and execution costs. They provide 
empirical evidence that trading consolidates to high-immediacy, high-cost lit trading venues 
during urgency shocks.       
The unique trading environment associated in IPOs provides us the opportunity to examine 
how markets fragment. First, several IPO studies (Aggarwal, 2000, 2003; Ellis, Michaely, and 
O’Hara, 2000; Corwin, Harris, and Lipson, 2004) find that the initial trading volume over the first 
several days following an IPO is abnormally high. This is particularly evident in underpriced or 
hot IPO issues in which trading volumes can exceed the allocation shares (i.e., oversubscribed 
issues). Second, initial IPO trading is associated with high uncertainty and informational 
asymmetries, especially for hot IPOs. Together, we posit that these trading conditions may result 
in varying levels of lit fragmentation. Consistent with Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu’s (2017) 
venue pecking order hypothesis, we suggest that the urgency to execute in the initial IPO secondary 
market results in less market fragmentation than in later periods of the IPO secondary market. 
Therefore, we expect the following prediction to hold:  
H1: Lit fragmentation increases in the IPO secondary market.  
Further, we posit that the large price moves and resulting nonexecution risks in underpriced 
or “hot” IPOs, results in less lit fragmentation as IPO investors restrict their trading intentions on 
immediacy as opposed to finding low-costs venues.  
 
UNDISPLAYED LIQUIDITY AND IPOS 
The initial IPO secondary market is often associated with higher levels of asymmetric 
information risk and uncertainty. In motivating our next hypotheses, we focus on the literature 
describing the relation between dark trading and high periods of uncertainty. First, Ye (2011) and 
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Zhu (2014) provide conflicting explanations as to the level of dark trading expected around periods 
of high uncertainty. Ye argues that informed traders experience a stronger incentive to conceal 
information in the dark pool during periods of high uncertainty. Ye concludes that increases in the 
fundamental value uncertainty increases the informed trader’s activity in the dark pool and reduces 
her activity in the lit exchange. Conversely, Zhu suggests that due to execution risk faced by 
informed traders due to increases in competition in the dark venue, lit exchanges are more 
attractive to informed participants. Zhu accounts for the role of uncertainty by suggesting that an 
increase in volatility leads to increases in informed trading in dark venues but ultimately reduces 
dark venue market share since informed traders tend to cluster on the same side of the book and 
experience greater counterparty risk.  
Ready (2014) provides empirical findings that indicate institutions are less likely to route 
orders to dark pools during period of higher uncertainty or adverse selection risk.4 Likewise, Buti, 
Rindi, and Werner (2011; 2017) document that dark trading is negatively related to measures of 
uncertainty. Buti, Rindi, and Werner document that dark pool activity decreases in the limit order 
spread which serves as a proxy for trader valuation dispersion. Recently, Hatheway, Kwan, and 
Zheng (2017) find that stocks with higher adverse selection risk are associated with less dark 
trading activity. Hence, the theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that volatility and adverse 
selection risk increases execution risks in the dark venue, resulting in lower dark venue market 
share. Using the initial trading periods of IPOs as a setting of high adverse selection risk and 
volatility, we expect that dark trading increases as the level of uncertainty and adverse selection 
risk reduces in the IPO secondary market. 
                                                          
4 Ye (2011), Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2011), and Menkveld et al. (2017) provide corroborating evidence that dark 
pool market share is inversely related with the level of uncertainty as measured by volatility.  
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To the extent that execution risk in the dark venues increases as informed traders cluster 
on the same side, we predict less dark trading on the offering date. However, as post-IPO 
asymmetric information risk and uncertainty reduces, counterparty risk in the dark venue declines, 
and dark trading market share increases. Therefore, we expect the following prediction to hold:  
H2: Dark trading increases in the IPO secondary market.  
While hypothesis two states that dark trading increases in the IPO secondary market as 
informational asymmetries and uncertainty is resolved, the literature analyzing the determinants 
of dark trading via limit order and trading volume suggests an alternative explanation. First, Buti, 
Rindi, and Werner (2017) argue that dark trading levels are an increasing function of both lit venue 
limit order book depth and trading volume. Examining limit order submissions in IPOs, Corwin, 
Harris, and Lipson (2004) document unusually high limit order book depth at the IPO offering 
date, extending several weeks beyond the offering date. Corwin, Harris, and Lipson mention, 
however, that limit order depth scaled to overall trading volume is relatively low in the early 
periods of the IPO secondary market. Likewise, both Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000) and 
Corwin, Harris, and Lipson document that IPOs are associated with unusually large trading 
volumes around the offering date. If IPOs, particularly underpriced IPOs, are characterized by both 
large trading volume and limit order depth then we predict dark trading to increase around the 
offering date, reducing in the post-IPO secondary market.  
Hypothesis two focuses on how dark trading evolves in the IPO secondary market. We also 
address if dark trading levels vary in IPOs, conditioning on the level of IPO underpricing. To the 
extent underpriced issues engender greater volatility, price swings, and higher execution risks, then 
IPO traders may prefer trading immediacy offered by the lit venues, resulting in less dark trading. 
However, to the extent that dark venues enable traders to avoid certain adverse selection risks and 
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to mitigate some informational exposure, dark venue market share may be larger in underpriced 
issues. Which of these determinants will dominate is an empirical question. 
 It is important to distinguish between hidden liquidity and dark liquidity. Hidden orders 
are limit orders that are placed on lit venues but are not visible to other participants. Harris (1996), 
Aitken, Berkman, and Mak (2001), De Winne and D’Hondt (2007), and Bessembinder, Panayides, 
and Venkataraman (2009) confirm the notion that hidden orders reduce the cost of order exposure 
and allow traders to disguise information. Boulatov and George (2013), however, demonstrate the 
hidden liquidity does not necessarily favor informed traders and hidden liquidity enhance market 
quality. Both Aitken et al. and Bessembinder et al. argue that despite the advantage of using hidden 
orders to disguise information, hidden orders are given low execution priority – exposing traders 
to higher execution risk as well as pick-off risk from faster traders. We explore the role of hidden 
liquidity in IPO trading since concealing value-relevant information is important for traders given 
the high uncertainty and asymmetric information risk associated with IPOs.5  
 We analyze if hidden trading on lit venues exhibit similar patterns to trading that takes 
place on dark venues around IPOs. Both Degryse, Tombeur, and Wuyts (2015) and Menkveld et 
al. (2017) provide evidence as to the interaction between hidden and dark liquidity. Degryse, 
Tombeur, and Wuyts show that while hidden and dark trading are substitutes, they are not perfect 
substitutes. Further, there are market conditions in which traders prefer hidden orders over 
accessing dark venues and vice versa. For example, Degryse, Tombeur, and Wuyts suggest that 
Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu’s (2017) pecking order theory of trading venues can extend to hidden 
orders, where informed traders demanding a higher level of trading immediacy may prefer using 
                                                          
5 Early studies such as Rock (1986) Gale and Stiglitz (1989) develop models accounting for the informational 
content of IPOs. Empirical studies such as Kim and Ritter (1999) and Hanley and Hoberg (2010) provide evidence 
as to how investors can properly evaluate the informational content of IPOs.  
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hidden orders on lit venues rather than using dark venues. If this relation holds for IPOs, then we 
expect that hidden activity comprises a considerable portion of overall trading activity around the 
offering date due to the high informational sensitivity surrounding the event.  
As trading persists in the secondary market and adverse selection risk gradually declines, 
we expect that hidden order usage will decline. Further, as time extends beyond the offering date, 
hidden trading is likely to decline since the execution probability of hidden orders is directly 
related to overall trading volume (Degryse, Tombeur, and Wuyts, 2015). As trading volume in 
IPOs typically declines from offering day levels, hidden liquidity is also expected to decline. 
Degryse, Tombeur, and Wuyts further suggest an opposite pattern for dark trading, in which higher 
lit trading volume results in a decrease in execution probability in dark platforms consistent with 
our second hypothesis. Therefore, we expect an inverse relation between hidden and dark trading 
in the IPO secondary market, confirming that notion that the two forms of undisplayed trading are 
substitutes rather than complements.  
H3: Hidden trading decreases in the IPO secondary market.  
 Consistent with our previous conjectures, we also analyze whether hidden trading levels 
depend on the level of IPO underpricing. Since hidden liquidity provides informed traders the 
ability to disguise value relevant information, we expect that underpriced issues experience higher 
levels of hidden liquidity. This expected relation follows from the notion that underpriced issues 
are associated with higher adverse selection risks.  
 
ALGORITHMIC TRADING AND IPOS 
We also analyze how algorithmic trading changes in the IPO secondary market relative to 
both changes in dark and hidden trading. Degryse, Tombeur, and Wuyts (2015) suggest that 
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algorithmic trading levels vary with both dark and hidden trading. Specifically, Degryse, Tombeur, 
and Wuyts demonstrate that algorithmic traders using smart order routers may enhance 
competition on lit venues, reducing the execution probability for hidden limit orders. Concurrently, 
these smart order routers can tap into different venues connecting more traders to dark platforms. 
They conclude that the level of algorithmic trading should be positively (negatively) related to 
dark (hidden) trading. In this paper, we follow the pattern suggested by Degryse, Tombeur, and 
Wuyts, and expect that algorithmic trading has a direct (inverse) relation with dark (hidden) trading 
in the IPO secondary market. 
H4: Algorithmic trading increases in the IPO secondary market. 
Several theoretical studies (see Biais, Foucault, and Moinas, 2011; Martinez and Rosu, 
2011) document that algorithmic trading is more informed than human trading. Hoffman (2013) 
shows that algorithmic traders are informed participants, quickly incorporating information into 
prices. Consistent with the notion that algorithmic trading is employed for strategic purposes, 
Weller (2017) documents that algorithmic traders increase their participation and acquire pertinent 
information around events associated with high informational risk. Weller analyzes AT strategies 
using a pre- and post- trading window around earnings announcement dates as a proxy for 
information risk. 
Ellul and Pagano (2006) suggests that traders may have an incentive to capture information 
in formulating their own trading strategy in an IPO given the increased asymmetric information 
risk. To the extent that underpriced IPOs are associated with increases in asymmetric information 
risk, we expect that more underpriced issues to have higher levels of algorithmic trading since the 
profits from information acquisition are larger.  
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III. DATA AND METHODS 
 
 
SAMPLE SELECTION & EMPIRICAL MEASURES 
In Table 1, we provide a description of how we arrive at our final sample count. The initial 
sample consist of all IPOs between 2012 and 2016, totaling 920. Our initial list of IPO firms is 
obtained from the Field-Ritter IPO database including founding and offering dates. We merge our 
initial sample with the Market Information Data Analytics System (MIDAS) data on ticker symbol. 
After matching the initial sample list of IPOs with the list of tickers in MIDAS, the sample count 
reduces to 600. Further, we require that the starting dates in MIDAS to match the offering dates of 
the sample IPOs, reducing the sample to 538 IPOs. After excluding equity-carveouts, closed-end 
funds, ADRs, REITs, financials and utilities, offerings below $5, incompatible data between CRSP 
and MIDAS, the final sample count consists of 451 IPOs.  
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the IPOs by primary listing exchange, industry 
classification, and year. We observe an increase of IPOs in 2013 and 2014 and consistent with the 
emerging growth company (EGC) classification of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS 
Act) enacted in April 2012, most of the IPOs in the sample come from industries such as 
biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and other technology-based industries (i.e., SIC codes 28, 35, 73) 
that are likely to make use of the EGC classification.6 Likewise, we find that many IPOs during 
the sample period use NASDAQ as the primary exchange. In Panel C, we report the offering
                                                          
6 Dambra, Field, & Gustafson (2015) document that biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms comprise the majority 
of the increase in IPO activity following the JOBS Act enactment. They argue these firm types are more inclined to 
take advantage of the changes in reporting and disclosure cost provisions.  
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characteristics of the sample firms. The mean (median) offering price is $14.58 ($15.00), while 
the mean (median) offer amount is $235.60 ($95.40) millions. The average underpricing as 
measured by the percentage change between the offering and closing price is 18.90%. The average 
firm age for our sample of IPOs is 17.6 years and the average underwriter rank is 7.93.  
We examine both trades and trading volume for our sample of IPOs using MIDAS. The 
MIDAS database contains information on all orders for all listed securities across all U.S. 
exchanges. Further, the MIDAS database contains both trade and volume data on order 
cancellations, odd-lots, and displayed and hidden executed orders. The database covers stocks 
dating back to the start of 2012. We use this data to construct our measures of hidden trading, 
algorithmic trading, and lit fragmentation. First, we construct our measure of lit fragmentation 
using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, the sum of squared market shares) based on the 
reported daily trading volumes reported by all exchange venues in the MIDAS data. Following 
Degryse, De Jong, and Kervel (2015), we exclude dark trading volumes from the measure since 
we want to analyze lit and dark fragmentation separately. We adjust the measure by calculating 
LitFrag as 1 – HHI, so that higher (lower) numbers indicate more (less) fragmentation. Our 
measures of hidden trading are constructed using both hidden trades and hidden volume relative 
to the overall trades and volume executed in stock i on day t. Our first measure, Hidden-to-Trade, 
captures the proportion of executed hidden trades relative to all executed trades while Hidden-to-
Volume, captures the relative frequency of hidden share volume to all trading volume. Thus, our 
hidden liquidity ratios reflect the number of trades that execute against hidden limit orders.  
We use MIDAS to construct our four measures of algorithmic trading. First, we calculate 
Cancel-to-Trade, which represents the number of full or partial cancellations relative to the 
number of trades. To the extent that algorithmic traders submit and cancel a high volume of orders 
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relative to executed orders, a high Cancel-to-Trade ratio is expected when algorithmic traders are 
active. Similarly, we calculate Trade-to-Order, which is a ratio capturing the number of trades 
executed relative to overall orders. We expect that a lower Trade-to-Order ratio indicates a higher 
presence of algorithmic trading. Our measure, Trade-to-Order, is the inverse of the order-to-trade 
ratio used in Hagstromer and Norden (2013) who show that latent traders tend to have higher order-
to-trader ratios. Finally, we calculate Odd-to-Trade, which is the proportion of executed odd-lot 
trades to all trade executions and Trade Size, which is computed by scaling the executed share 
volume to the number of executed trades. These last two measures serve as proxies of algorithmic 
trading as O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2014), Hendershott and Riordan (2013), and Menkveld (2014) 
document that algorithmic traders use odd lots and smaller trade sizes to conceal information. A 
higher (lower) Odd-to-Trade (Trade Size) measure indicates more algorithmic trading. Our 
measure of dark trading is derived from TAQ using exchange code ‘D’. We scale the number of 
trades and trading volume reported via exchange code ‘D’ to the overall trades and trading volume 
reported on TAQ for the day. In verifying the number of trades and trading volume, we compare 
the overall the numbers reported on TAQ with those reported by CRSP. The numbers are not exact 
but are close. Similarly, we sum the number of trades and trading volume reported on MIDAS 
with those reported only for exchange code ‘D’ to verify that the total trading volume resembles 
the aggregate trading volume on CRSP.  Our first measure, Dark-to-Trade, captures the proportion 
of executed dark trades relative to all executed trades while Dark-to-Volume, captures the relative 
frequency of dark venue share volume to all trading volume. 
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IV. RESULTS 
 
FRAGMENTATION AND IPO UNDERPRICING 
Our first objective is to compare where trading is taking place across IPOs conditional on 
the level of underpricing. Table 3 reports the univariate differences across IPO quartiles formed 
via the level of underpricing where quartile 1 (quartile 4) represents the least (most) underpriced 
issues. Throughout the paper, we denote IPOs that fall into the lowest quartile of underpricing as 
“cold”, the highest quartile of underpricing as “hot”. We refer to quartiles 2 and 3 as “cool” and 
“warm”, respectively. First, we report in Panel A that IPO trading characteristics such as the 
percentage float, offer turnover, trading turnover, and our measure of volatility using the daily 
price range. In Panel A, we find that both offer (96.31%) and share turnover (30.43%) as well as 
volatility (15.83%) are higher in the most underpriced issues (i.e., quartile 4). In Panel B, we show 
that hidden trading as measured by Hidden-to-Trade is higher in the most underpriced IPOs (i.e., 
quartile 4) at 26.00%. Further, our measures of dark trading using both our trade ratio (29.19%) 
and volume ratio (29.05%) indicate that more underpriced IPOs experience more dark trading. 
This result contrasts with the venue pecking order hypothesis which suggests execution risk in the 
dark venue may deter overall dark trading activity during periods of high uncertainty. In Panel C, 
we show that more underpriced issues are highly fragmented, with issues in quartile 1 (quartile 4) 
having a LitFrag score of 63.91 (72.67). This result implies that despite increased asymmetric 
information risk in underpriced issues, trading does not consolidate as put forth by the venue 
pecking order hypothesis. Further, we show that algorithmic trading is higher in the most
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underpriced issues. In Panel C, we find that Odd-to-Trade (15.25%) is higher among the most 
underpriced quartile. We also report in Panel C, that Trade-to-Order (13.72%) is lowest in the 
most underpriced quartile, indicating that order submissions dominate the number of executed 
trades, consistent with algorithmic trading. Underpriced issues also have the highest Cancel-to-
Trade (7.18) measure, indicating the underpriced issues experience more cancellations relative to 
the number of executed trades – another indication of algorithmic trading. Finally, underpriced 
issues have the lowest average Trade Size (175.67). Thus, our initial evidence supports the notion 
that underpriced issues are associated with higher levels of algorithmic trading. 
 In Figure 1, we provide a visual representation of how measures of hidden and dark trading 
vary across our quartiles sorted via underpricing. We show that both warm and hot IPOs contain a 
larger share of both hidden and dark trading activity relative to cool and cold IPOs on the offering 
date. In Panel A, we display the monotonic increase in hidden trading as a proportion of all reported 
trading. In Panel B, we provide a visual showing that dark trading levels are higher on the offering 
date for both warm and hot IPOs. Overall, Figure 1 indicates that the level of undisplayed liquidity 
is conditional of the level of IPO underpricing.  
In Figure 2, we show both hot and warm IPOs are associated with higher levels of lit 
fragmentation on the offering date. Similarly, we show that the measures of algorithmic trading, 
for the most part, are higher in hot and warm IPOs. In Panel A, we show that underpriced issues 
are heavily fragmented on the offering day. Compared to less underpriced issues, both warm and 
hot issues experience greater market competition on the offering day. This result is not surprising 
given that both warm and hot IPOs are also fragmented in the level of off-exchange trading 
reported to dark venues that we document in Figure 1. In Panels B through D, we provide three 
measures related to our proxies of algorithmic trading. We do not report the visuals for Trade Size 
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to save space although the results indicate that Trade Size monotonically decreases in underpriced 
issues. The visuals associated with Panels B through D indicate a higher presence of algorithmic 
trading as both Odd-to-Trade and Cancel-to-Trade measures are increasing underpriced issues. 
Overall, the panels in Figure 2 demonstrate that underpriced or “hot” IPO issues experience more 
algorithmic trading.  
We next examine our first hypothesis that states lit fragmentation is lower at the start of 
IPO trading than in later periods of the IPO secondary market. To identify changes in lit 
fragmentation in the IPO secondary market, we compare the level of lit fragmentation on the 
offering day with the levels of lit fragmentation in the remaining first five trading days as well as 
the remaining first 60 trading days after the IPO. Table 4 provides the results from our analysis 
in determining how market fragmentation changes beyond the offering date. First, we show in 
Panel A that lit fragmentation is higher among hot IPOs. The higher amount of lit fragmentation 
in hot IPOs, relative to cold IPOs, persists throughout the first 60 trading days of the IPO. We 
also document that lit fragmentation increases for all IPOs throughout the first 60 trading days of 
the IPO. In Panel B, we report the difference in lit fragmentation between the offering date and 
the remaining periods. While there are no significant differences in lit fragmentation between the 
offering date and the early periods (i.e., day 5, 10, 20), we find that lit fragmentation is 
significantly higher in days 31-60 relative to the offering date.  
In Figure 3, we provide the changes in lit fragmentation across all four IPO quartiles for 
the first 60 trading days following the IPO. We observe that both warm and hot IPOs are more 
fragmented than cold IPOs at the offering date. Further, the level of lit fragmentation remains 
consistent throughout the first 10 trading days of the IPO across all four quartiles of underpricing. 
However, after ten trading days, both cool and cold IPOs become more fragmented and resemble 
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to some degree, the level of lit fragmentation experienced by both warm and hot IPOs in the later 
periods of trading. Overall, the evidence provided in Table 4 and Figure 3 support hypothesis one.  
Table 4 and Figure 3 show that contrary to our expectation, lit fragmentation is higher 
among underpriced IPOs. We next control for firm- and trading-related characteristics that might 
explain the levels of lit fragmentation around the IPO offering date. The dependent variable, 
LitFrag
i
, refers to our measure of lit fragmentation as defined earlier for stock i on the IPO offering 
date. We include two measures of IPO underpricing. The first measure, Underpricing
i
, is a 
continuous measure of underpricing. Consistent with previous literature, we add one to the 
underpricing percentage and then take the natural log to transform the distribution. This 
transformation removes the skewness of the underlying distribution of our original underpricing 
variable. Our second measure of underpricing, WarmIPOi, is a dummy variable that equals one if 
the IPO firm is in the highest tercile of IPO underpricing. Our firm-related controls include the 
IPOs firm size, firm age, price support dummy variable, and underwriter ranking. Firm Sizei is 
computed by taking the natural log of the firm’s fiscal year-end market capitalization as reported 
in Compustat. Firm Age
i
 is calculated by taking the natural log of one plus the firm’s age, where 
the firm’s age is derived by taking the difference between the firm’s offering year and founding 
year. We include a control for price support, since Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000) show that 
underwriters often act in stabilizing and supporting IPO prices following the IPO. Consistent with 
Edwards and Hanley (2010), we construct the Price Support
i
dummy variable: if the IPO firm’s 
first-day return is equal to zero, or if the IPO is in the top quartile for the percent of trades, using 
TAQ, executed at the offer price on the offering day.  Underwriteri is the underwriter ranking 
associated with the IPO and is classified according to the Loughran and Ritter’s (2004) updated 0-
9 scale of the Carter and Manaster (1990) underwriter rankings. We also include other trading-
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related controls as Gresse (2017) documents that trading volume, price, and number of trading 
platforms in which trades occur can influence the levels of market fragmentation. Volumei is the 
natural log of the entire trading volume on the IPO offering day. Similar to Gresse, we construct  
InversePricei which captures the relative tick size on the primary exchange. Finally, 
Market Competition
i
 is the number of exchanges in which executed trades on the offering day. 
Equation (1) provides the full regression model. We also include IPO year and industry fixed-
effects.  
LitFrag
i
=α + β
1
Underpricing
i
 or WarmIPOi + β2Firm Sizei + β3Volumei
+ β
4
InversePricei+β5Market Competitioni+β6Firm Agei+β7Price Supporti+β8Underwriteri+εi 
(1) 
 The results in Table 5 confirm that underpriced issues are associated with greater lit 
fragmentation. In column (1), we find that a positive coefficient estimate, 0.0245, for 
Underpricing
i
. In column (2), we also report a positive estimate, 0.250, for our dummy variable 
measure of underpricing, WarmIPOi. As for our controls, we find that larger IPO firms 
experience greater lit fragmentation around the offering date. We also find in column (2) that 
older firms and those with more prestigious underwriters experience greater lit fragmentation. 
Further, we find that the parameter estimate for Price Support
i
 is negative in both regressions. 
This result implies that price-supported IPOs, which need price stabilization from underwriters to 
prevent larger initial selloffs experience less market fragmentation across lit trading venues. 
Finally, the sign of the estimates for our trading-related controls InversePricei and 
Market Competition
i
 are the same as those presented in Gresse (2017). Overall, the results in 
Table 5 indicate that the level of underpricing influences the degree of lit fragmentation and both 
firm and IPO-related characteristics influence the level of fragmented trading around the offering 
date.  
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DARK AND HIDDEN TRADING IN IPOS 
 In this section, we focus on the level of dark and hidden trading in IPOs. We first compare 
the level of dark and hidden trading at the offering date with those of the remaining 60 trading 
days. To determine if dark and hidden trading evolves in the IPO secondary market, we compare 
the level of dark and hidden trading on the offering day with the levels of dark and hidden trading 
in the remaining first five trading days as well as remaining first 60 trading days after the IPO. 
First, we show in Panel A that dark trading as a percentage of all trades, Dark-to-Trade, and dark 
trading as a percentage of all share volume, Dark-to-Volume, account for 27.30% (25.74) of 
offering day trading activity. These ratios increase throughout the first five days of trading, peaking 
around day 10, where Dark-to-Trade (Dark-to-Volume) accounts for 41.38% (52.47%) of trading 
activity. Second, we report measures of hidden trading using trades, Hidden-to-Trade, and share 
volume, Hidden-to-Volume, account for 33.42% and 33.81% of offering date trading activity on 
lit venues. These ratios decrease throughout the first five days of trading, plateauing around day 
10, where Hidden-to-Trade (Hidden-to-Volume) accounts for 25.93% (28.51%) of lit trading 
activity. In Panel B, we compare dark and hidden trading on the offering day with the remaining 
periods (i.e., day 5, day 10, day 20, days 31-60). Across all trading day comparisons, the 
differences are statistically significant. Across the entire set of IPOs, we find that relative to the 
offering date, dark trading increases 12.55% (7.78%) when measured five days (31-60 days) after 
the IPO. The difference in Hidden-to-Trade (Hidden-to-Volume) between the offering date and 
31-60 days after the offering is 9.02% (7.87%), confirming that hidden trading declines in the IPO 
secondary market. Overall, the results indicate that dark and hidden trading experience inverse 
patterns in the IPO secondary market confirming the suggestion of Degryse, Tombeur, and Wuyts 
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(2015) that the dark and hidden trading are substitutes rather than complements. This finding is 
also consistent with the notion that traders may prefer hidden orders over submitting orders to the 
dark venue around the offering date since hidden orders offer greater immediacy during a period 
of high informational uncertainty. In sum, the findings provided in Table 6 indicate support 
hypotheses 2 and 3, in that hidden (dark) trading levels decrease (increase) in the IPO secondary 
market. Further, the results indicate that two forms of undisplayed liquidity appear to be substitutes 
rather than compliments in the IPO secondary market.  
 In Figure 4, we plot measures of dark and hidden trading in the first 60 days beyond the 
offering date.7 The visual in Figure 4 depicts how hidden trading declines around the offering date 
while dark trading increases in the first 10 trading days following the offering, accounting for over 
40% of all trading activity around day 10. The existence of high hidden limit order trading around 
the offering differs with prior evidence provided by Corwin, Harris, and Lipson (2004), who 
document that limit order cancellation rates are high at the start of IPO trading as both adverse 
selection and nonexecution risk outweigh the advantages of limit orders. Overall, the visual 
provided in Figure 4 illustrates that traders switch from hidden to dark orders as the IPO trades in 
the secondary market.  
 Our results indicate the dark and hidden trading act as substitutes in the IPO secondary 
market. We next analyze the relative use of dark and hidden trading on the offering date. Further, 
we analyze if asymmetric risk associated with underpriced issues are associated with higher levels 
of undisplayed trading on the offering day. The studies of Harris (1996) and Rindi (2008) posit 
that in periods of high adverse selection risk, traders are more inclined not to expose orders. 
                                                          
7 Figure 2 depicts the changes in hidden and dark trading using the number of trades scaled to all trades reported that 
day. We also have the visual reporting the changes in hidden and dark trading using volume measures that are 
available upon request.  
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Gozluklu (2016) offers similar comments and suggests that in markets where the potential for high 
informational asymmetries exist, undisclosed orders may be used to compete for liquidity 
provision. Similarly, Buti and Rindi (2013) document that large traders are primary beneficiaries 
from “reserve” orders, which are partially hidden orders. Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar (2015) 
claim that hidden liquidity increases the trading profits for informed traders during periods of high 
private information sensitivity. Similarly, Yao (2017) shows that informed traders use hidden 
orders to their advantage, experiencing positive abnormal returns at the intraday level. These 
studies indicate support for the notion that hidden orders allow informed traders to disguise 
information. Further, Ellis et al. (2000), Aggarwal (2000, 2003), Corwin, Harris, and Lipson 
(2004), and Ellis (2006) all document that trading volume is very high in first two trading days 
following an initial public offering, accounting for nearly 70% of shares offered at issuance. To 
the extent that underpriced IPOs are associated with increased volume, hidden order traders are 
also likely to experience a higher probability of execution.  
While our univariate results provide evidence that dark trading is higher among 
underpriced issues, we next account for firm-specific determinants to help control for the observed 
levels of hidden and dark trading in underpriced IPOs. Consistent with our earlier regression 
specification, we control for IPO firm-related characteristics such as the IPO firm’s size, firm age, 
underwriter ranking, and price support. We further control for trading volume, inverse price, and 
market competition as these variables are likely to influence the level of dark trading. Finally, we 
include our two separate measures of underpricing as the main independent variable. The full 
regression specification includes both IPO year and industry fixed-effects. 
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Dark or Hidden Ratioi
= α + β
1
Underpricing
i
 or WarmIPOi + β2Firm Sizei + β3Volumei
+ β
4
InversePricei+β5Market Competitioni+β6Firm Agei+β7Price Supporti+β8Underwriteri+εi  
(2) 
The results in Table 7 corroborate our univariate findings in that more underpriced issues 
experience greater dark and hidden trading on the offering day. Both measures of dark trading, 
trades and volume ratios, are higher for underpriced IPOs. In columns (1) and (2), we show that 
the coefficient estimates for Underpricing
i
 (Warm IPOi) are 0.1059 (0.0423), indicating that more 
underpriced issues have greater off-exchange or dark trading on the offering date. In columns (3) 
and (4), we provide similar results that underpriced IPOs are associated with higher levels of dark 
trading, measuring dark trading as the percentage of dark trades to all executed trades. In columns 
(5) through (8), we document that more underpriced issues possess higher levels of hidden trading, 
supporting the contention that traders are more inclined to conceal their trading intentions in IPO 
issues with greater informational uncertainty. The results for our control variables are notable. 
First, we report that hidden trading is negatively related inverse price. To the extent the inverse 
price captures transaction costs (see Keim and Madhavan, 1997), our results are consistent with 
the notion that the decision to hide liquidity is indirectly related to transaction costs. We also find 
that dark trading activity is inversely related to the level of price support while hidden trading, 
using volume measures, is positively related to price support. These results provide some 
indication that traders withdraw from the lit market for dark trading venues during weaker 
offerings, however, it appears that the hidden option enables traders to supply more liquidity for 
price-supported IPOs. This last finding is also consistent with the premise that price supported 
IPOs reduce the cost of submitting limit orders (Corwin, Harris, and Lipson, 2004). We also 
document that the IPO firm’s age and underwriter ranking are not significant predictors of offering 
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day undisplayed liquidity. In sum, the findings provided in Table 7 confirm our prediction that 
underpriced issues experience more undisplayed liquidity.  
 
ALGORITHMIC TRADING IN IPOS 
 Our next set of tests analyzes the levels of algorithmic trading in IPOs. Similar to our set 
of tests examining how measures of fragmented and undisplayed trading change in the IPO 
secondary, we analyze how algorithmic trading evolves in the secondary market. Table 8 provides 
the comparison of algorithmic trading levels at the offering day against later periods in the IPO 
secondary market. Panel A shows that Odd-to-Trade and Cancel-to-Trade increase as the IPO 
trades in the secondary market, indicating that algorithmic trading is low around the IPO offering 
date relative to later periods in the secondary market. We also document in Panel A that the ratio, 
Odd-to-Trade, is 10.78% of offering day. The Odd-to-Trade ratio increases throughout the first 60 
days of trading, indicating that algorithmic trading increases in the later IPO trading periods. We 
next report in Panel A that both Trade-to-Order and Cancel-to-Trade measures are 15.58% and 
6.36 on the offering day. Further, the Trade-to-Order (Cancel-to-Trade) measure decreases 
(increases) throughout the first 60 days of trading, which implies that algorithmic trading levels 
are lower at the start of IPO trading only to increase in the later IPO trading periods. We also report 
in Panel A that Trade Size declines in the days following the offering, supporting the premise that 
as algorithmic trading activity increases in the later IPO trading periods, resulting in smaller 
executed trade sizes. In Panel B, we compare the measures of algorithmic trading on the offering 
day with the remaining periods (i.e., day five, day 10, day 20, days 31-60). The differences in the 
four algorithmic trading measures between the early and later IPO trading periods indicate that 
algorithmic trading is low in the initial IPO secondary market but increases in the following weeks 
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and months after the offering day. For example, we discover that relative to the offering date, Odd-
to-Trade increases 6.21% (15.17%) when measured five days (31-60 days) after the IPO across 
the entire set of IPOs. The difference in Trade-to-Order between the offering date (31-60 days) 
after the offering is 8.32% (10.75%), confirming that Trade-to-Order declines in the IPO 
secondary market. We also document the difference in Cancel-to-Trade between the offering date 
and the later trading periods, showing that Cancel-to-Trade increases 15.34 (18.81) in the five (31-
60) days relative to the offering day. Likewise, we show that Trade Size decreases 47.89 (97.10) 
in the five (31-60) days relative to the offering day. Overall, the patterns exhibited by the four 
measures of algorithmic trading support our conjecture that increases in algorithmic trading 
coincide with increases in fragmentation in later trading periods of the IPO.  
 In Figure 5, we provide all four measures of algorithmic trading in the IPO secondary 
market, however, this time we include the first 180 trading days. The observed trends provided in 
Figure 5 show that Odd-to-Trade and Cancel-to-Trade ratios are low at the start of the IPO 
secondary market, increasing in the first several trading days after the offering. Interestingly, the 
observed pattern associated with Cancel-to-Trade contrasts with the limit order cancellation rate 
pattern in IPOs provided by Corwin, Harris, and Lipson (2004). Corwin, Harris, and Lipson show 
that limit order cancellations are high around the offering, declining significantly in the first 10 
trading days. In Figure 5, we also report that both Trade Size and Trade-to-Order decline almost 
monotonically in the IPO secondary market. Our finding that Trade-to-Order peaks around the 
offering, declining in the following days also differs from the results of Corwin, Harris, and 
Lipson, who document that order submission (execution) rates are lower (higher) on the offering 
date. Corwin, Harris, and Lipson further show that order submission (execution) rates increase 
(decreases) in the following days – contrasting with the results we observe in Figure 5. Overall, 
29 
 
the evidence provided in both Table 8 and Figure 5 indicate support for hypothesis 3 in that 
algorithmic traders increase their participation in the later periods of the IPO secondary market. 
Further, the patterns we document for hidden, dark, and algorithmic trading are consistent with 
Degryse, Tombeur, and Wutys (2015) who demonstrate the market conditions affect smart order 
route algorithmic strategies, which reduce the level of hidden trading yet provide traders greater 
access to the dark venue. 
 We next examine if the higher adverse selection risk in underpriced issues results in greater 
algorithmic trading activity. In Table 9, we provide the coefficient estimates from our multivariate 
test(s) where our four measures of algorithmic trading serve as the dependent variable. The full 
the model including the independent variables and fixed-effects are the same as described in 
equation (1). Corroborating our univariate findings, we discover that three of the four measures of 
algorithmic trading are directly related to the degree of IPO underpricing. In columns (1) and (2), 
we provide the estimates where Odd-to-Trade serves as the measure of algorithmic trading. In 
columns (1) and (2), we report the mean estimate of 0.0954 (0.0348) for Underpricing
i
 
(Warm IPO
i
). This finding implies that algorithmic trading is more pervasive in underpriced 
issues. Consistent with our expectation, we find the coefficient estimates for Trade-to-Order 
(Trade Size) are negative -0.0273 (-0.1834) when using the continuous measure of underpricing. 
This indicates that underpriced issues are associated with higher levels of algorithmic trading. 
Similar results hold when using the dummy variable measure of underpricing. The estimate for the 
Cancel-to-Trade ratio is insignificant using the continuous (dummy) measure of underpricing, 
suggesting that underpriced issues are not associated with high cancellation episodes that are 
typically associated with algorithmic trading. While this limits support for our prediction that 
underpriced IPOs induce algorithmic traders to capture fundamental information, we do confirm 
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that odd lot executions, smaller trade sizes, and order submissions dominate underpriced IPOs, 
consistent with the likelihood of algorithmic trading.  
 
FRAGMENTED, UNDISPLAYED, AND ALGORITHMIC TRADING ON IPO MARKET 
QUALITY 
In this last section, we examine if our measures of fragmented, undisplayed, and 
algorithmic trading impact the market quality in IPOs. We first examine the effects of 
fragmentation and undisplayed trading on market quality by constructing a two-stage least squares 
analysis. We follow Gresse (2017) and employ similar instruments when constructing the first 
stage estimates for both dark and lit fragmentation. For all reported regressions, the measures of 
Dark, LitFrag, and Hidden are constructed using daily executed trading volume. In the first stage, 
we regress our measures of dark and hidden trading on the stock’s market capitalization, trading 
volume, average trade size, relative tick size, number of actively competing markets with respect 
to executed trades, and the difference between the average trade size on the lit and dark venues. 
For lit fragmentation, the instruments remain the same except that we exclude the differential trade 
size measure. In the second stage, we regress measures of market quality which include two 
measures of transaction costs, quoted and effective spreads to help capture round-trip trading costs 
for investors. We also include price impact as a dependent variable to help measure the effects of 
market fragmentation on the price efficiency in IPOs.   
  In Table 10, we provide the second-stage coefficient estimates where our three measures 
of market quality serve as the dependent variable. The full second-stage model includes controls 
related to firm size, volume, volatility, underwriter ranking, firm age, and our measure of IPO 
underpricing. The second-stage model also includes year and industry fixed-effects. When 
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analyzing the effects of market fragmentation on market quality beyond the offering day, we 
include both firm fixed-effects and cluster standard errors at the firm level. Table 10 provides the 
coefficient estimates for only the offering day.  For each measure, we find that dark trading, Dark̂, 
has no effect on offering day market quality. However, we find evidence that both lit fragmentation 
and hidden trading are associated with both lower transaction costs and price impact. For instance, 
the we find that the coefficient estimate for LitFraĝ  is negative for all three measures of market 
quality, suggesting lit fragmentation is associated with lower offering day spreads and better price 
efficiency. Further, we show that the estimates for Hidden̂  are also negative for all three measure 
of market quality. This finding implies that hidden liquidity improves offering day market quality 
in IPOs. Our controls related to volatility and volume load as expected, however none of the firm-
related IPO characteristics such as underwriter ranking, firm age, and underpricing have any 
impact on offering day liquidity. Hence, offering day liquidity is not influenced by offering 
characteristics that may serve as another source of uncertainty.  
In Table 11, we provide the second-stage coefficient estimates where our three measures 
of market quality serve as the dependent variable, however, we replace our measures of 
undisplayed trading and market fragmentation with three of the four measures of algorithmic 
trading. We do not include trade size as a measure of AT since trade size serves as one of the 
instruments used to predict algorithmic trading. Likewise, we do not include the differences in 
trade size between lit and dark venues as an instrument in the first-stage. To allow the signs of all 
the coefficient estimates to imply the same effect on our dependent variable, we replace our 
measure of AT, Trade-to-Order, with the inverse. Thus, the coefficient estimates of all three 
measures of AT will have the same interpretation – a positive (negative) estimate implies that 
AT reduces (increases) market liquidity. The estimates provided in Table 11 show that all three 
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measures of AT are associated with lower transaction costs on the offering day. For instance, 
Odd-to-Tradê  is negative for all three measures of market quality, indicating that increases in 
odd-lot trading associated with algorithmic trading activity is associated with lower spreads and 
more efficient prices on the IPO offering day. Consistent with the notion that algorithmic trading 
is associated with lower transaction costs, the coefficient estimates for both Cancel-to-Tradê  and 
Trade-to-Order^̂  are also negative. As for the impact of AT on price efficiency, we find that both 
Odd-to-Trade ̂ and Trade-to-Order^̂  are associated with lower price impact levels, implying 
better offering day price efficiency. Overall, these results are consistent with Hendershott, Jones, 
and Menkveld (2011), who document that algorithmic trading narrows spreads and reduces 
adverse selection risks (i.e., price impact).   
 In Table 12, we provide the second-stage coefficient estimates by analyzing the effects of 
market fragmentation and undisplayed trading on market liquidity in the extended aftermarket. 
To better analyze the effects fragmentation and undisplayed trading on market quality in the 
various IPO trading periods, we partition the sample into three stages: first week, weeks two 
through five, and weeks six through ten. We conduct this additional analysis since the level of 
informational asymmetries and adverse selection risks tend to evolve as the IPO trades, the 
effects of market fragmentation and undisplayed trading on market liquidity may vary. To save 
space, we report the only the coefficient estimates for our measures of fragmentation and 
undisplayed trading. The full model does include the same controls as those used in the offering 
day regressions. Table 12 provides some notable results. In Panel A, we find that apart from the 
offering day, the measures of lit fragmentation, LitFraĝ , and hidden trading, Hidden̂ , have no 
significant effect on market quality in the first week of IPO trading. This finding indicates that 
despite improving offering day liquidity, the effects of lit fragmentation and hidden liquidity has 
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no beneficial effect on IPO liquidity in the first week of trading. However, we find the 
coefficient estimate for Dark̂ is positive for all three measures of market quality, indicating the 
higher levels of dark trading increases both spreads and price impact in IPOs. This result is 
consistent with Zhu (2014) who documents that if dark trading venues reduce the number of 
uninformed trades in the lit market, both adverse selection risks and bid-ask spreads increase in 
the lit market. In Panel B, we find that hidden trading, Hidden̂ , has no impact on market quality 
during next the four weeks of IPO trading. Consistent with the results provided in Panel A, we 
document that our measure of dark trading, Dark̂, is associated with wider transaction costs yet 
no effect on price impact. Thus, our results suggest that the adverse effects associated with dark 
trading continues in the first month of IPO trading. We also find in Panel B, that the coefficient 
estimate for lit fragmentation, LitFraĝ , is negative with respect to our two transaction costs 
measures, suggesting that lit fragmentation continues to improve market liquidity in the first 
month of IPO trading. Finally, in Panel C, we find that our two measures of undisplayed trading, 
Dark̂ and Hidden̂ , increase transaction costs and price impact in the later IPO trading periods 
while lit fragmentation, LitFraĝ , reduces both transaction costs and price impact. Overall, Table 
12 suggests higher levels of dark trading increase spreads throughout the later IPO trading 
periods and increase the price impact component of the bid-ask spread in the first week of IPO 
trading, suggesting the dark trading leads to greater illiquidity in the early stages of IPO trading. 
Conversely, we find that lit fragmentation reduces transaction costs and price impact in the later 
IPO trading periods.  
In Table 13, we provide the second-stage coefficient estimates by analyzing the effects of 
algorithmic trading on market quality through the extended IPO aftermarket. In Panel A, we find 
little evidence that our measures of AT impact market quality in the first week of IPO trading, 
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where onlyCancel-to-Tradê   and Trade-to-Order^̂  load significantly on effective spreads. Further 
the coefficient estimates for these two measures are economically smaller than those documented 
in Table 10 when analyzing the effects of AT on offering day market quality. We document 
similar evidence in Panel B in that algorithmic trading has a negligible impact on market quality 
in the following month of IPO trading. However, in Panel C, we find that the coefficient 
estimates for Odd-to-Trade ̂ and Trade-to-Order^̂  are negative across all three measures of 
market quality, consistent with the notion that AT improves not only spreads but also reduces 
adverse selection risks – consistent with the findings of (Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld, 
2011). Interestingly, we show that the coefficient estimate for Cancel-to-Tradê  is positive for all 
three measures of market quality, implying that high cancellation activity is associated with 
wider spreads and greater adverse election risks. Hence, despite of two of the three measures 
supporting the contention that AT aids IPO liquidity, we interpret this last finding to suggest that 
algorithmic trading has mixed effects on liquidity in extended IPO aftermarket.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, we analyze the market fragmentation of IPOs. We find that relative to the 
weeks and months after the IPO offering day, lit fragmentation is low at the start of IPO trading. 
Sorting on the level of underpricing, we find that more underpriced IPOs are associated with 
greater lit fragmentation. We also discover that off-exchange or dark fragmentation is higher 
among underpriced issues. We argue that the greater adverse selection risk in underpriced issues 
results in greater dark trading on the offering date.  
We also analyze if traders use hidden limit orders to disguise relevant information around 
IPOs. We find evidence that underpriced IPOs are associated with greater hidden liquidity. We 
next determine the level of hidden liquidity in the IPO secondary market and show that hidden 
liquidity levels steadily decline in the IPO secondary market. Further, we document that measures 
of dark and hidden trading move in opposite directions in the early stages of the IPO secondary 
market. We interpret this finding as consistent with the argument that dark and hidden trading are 
substitutes rather than complements (Degryse, Tombeur, and Wuyts, 2015).  
 We next investigate how algorithmic trading comprises the initial IPO secondary market. 
Consistent with the notion that algorithmic traders engage in information acquisition around 
informational-sensitive events (Weller, 2017), we find that measures of algorithmic trading are 
higher among underpriced IPOs. Our evidence also reveals that measures of algorithmic trading 
are relatively low at the start of IPO market, increasing over the first several months. Over the first 
60 trading days in the IPO secondary market, we show, consistent with Degryse, Tombeur, and
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Wuyts (2015), that algorithmic trading is positively (negatively) related to the level of dark 
(hidden) trading as smart order router algorithms hinder execution probability of limit orders while 
allowing participants to tap into dark venues.   
 In the final part of our analysis, we examine the effects of market fragmentation, 
undisplayed trading, and algorithmic trading on IPO liquidity. Our results show that lit 
fragmentation, hidden trading, and algorithmic reduce both transaction costs and price impact 
levels of the offering day. Beyond the offering day, we find that dark trading is associated with 
higher levels of illiquidity in the later IPO trading periods. Conversely, we document that lit 
fragmentation is associated with reductions in transaction costs and price impact in the later IPO 
aftermarket. 
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Table 1: Sample Selection 
This table presents a breakdown of our sample selection. The first column provides the filters we apply in 
deriving our final sample of IPOs. The second column provides the number and percentage of firms 
representing our initial list of IPOs. The percentage of firms relative to the initial sample count is 
provided in parentheses.  
Filter Number of Firms 
(Percentage) 
IPOs obtained from Field-Ritter IPO database 
between 2012 and 2016 
 
Matching IPOs with MIDAS via ticker symbol 
 
Compatible offering dates between Ritter IPO 
database and MIDAS 
 
Excluding equity-carve outs, ADRs, REITs, financial 
and utility firms, offerings below $5, and compatible 
offering dates in CRSP 
920 (100) 
 
 
600 (65.2) 
 
538 (58.5) 
 
 
451 (49.0) 
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Table 2: Sample Distribution 
This table presents summary statistics for the data used in the study. Panel A displays the distribution of 
IPOs over our five-year sample period. In Panel A, we also provide the breakdown of IPOs by primary 
exchange listing, NYSE or NASDAQ. In Panel B, we provide the distribution of IPOs by industry where 
industry descriptions are based on two-digit SIC code. In Panel C, we provide summary statistics of the 
firm-related offering characteristics such as offer price, shares offered, share proceeds, firm age, 
underwriter reputation, expenses, and initial returns. Offering characteristics are obtained via NASDAQ 
and CRSP. Underwriter rank is obtained from the Carter and Manaster (1990) index.   
Panel A. Distribution by Year and Primary Exchange 
Year N NYSE NASDAQ 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
78 
113 
127 
80 
53 
36 
46 
41 
22 
13 
42 
67 
86 
58 
40 
Total 451 158 293 
Panel B. IPO Distribution by Industry 
Industry name SIC Codes N 
Oil and Gas 
Food products 
Chemical products 
Manufacturing 
Computer equipment & services 
Electronic equipment & services 
Scientific instruments 
Wholesale and retail trade 
Entertainment services 
Health services 
All Others 
13 
20 
28 
30-34 
35, 73 
36 
38 
50-59 
70, 78, 79 
80 
10, 21-27, 29, 37 
14 
6 
157 
5 
118 
22 
21 
49 
12 
10 
37 
Total  451 
Panel C. Offering Characteristics 
 Mean Std Q1 Median Q3 
Offer Price ($) 
Shares Offered ($M) 
Offer Proceeds ($M) 
Firm Age 
Underwriter Rank 
Firm Size (Ln) 
Expenses ($M) 
Offer_Close (%) 
Offer_Open (%) 
Open_Close (%) 
14.58 
12.66 
235.60 
17.61 
7.93 
13.00 
3.61 
18.90% 
17.11% 
1.43% 
5.62 
31.03 
923.51 
21.42 
2.15 
1.14 
1.92 
30.66% 
24.26% 
13.61% 
11.00 
5.00 
64.00 
7.00 
8.00 
12.15 
2.50 
0.00% 
0.67% 
-4.68% 
15.00 
7.00 
95.40 
10.00 
8.50 
12.95 
3.21 
10.00% 
9.33% 
0.00% 
18.00 
11.36 
172.50 
18.00 
9.00 
13.77 
4.10 
28.75% 
26.20% 
5.88% 
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Table 3: Offering Day Trading Statistics by Underpricing 
This table provides the summary statistics and differences for offering day trading activity for our sample 
of IPOs sorted into quartiles via the level of initial underpricing. IPOs that experience the least (most) 
offering day underpricing are classified in the cold (hot) IPO quartile. In Panel A, we report the IPO 
offering characteristics. In Panel B, we report measures of dark and hidden trading. In Panel C, we report 
measures of lit fragmentation and algorithmic trading. Measures of hidden and algorithmic trading are 
obtained from MIDAS. Measures of dark trading are obtained through TAQ. The last column reports the 
differences in trading statistics between firms in the most underpriced quartile (“hot”) and least 
underpriced quartile (“cold”). T-tests are conducted to confirm differences among the group means. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
 
Cold IPOs 
(N=125) 
Cool IPOs 
(N=101) 
Warm IPOs 
(N=112) 
Hot IPOs 
(N=113) 
Hot - 
Cold 
IPOs 
Panel A. IPO Offering Characteristics 
Number of IPOs 
Offer Price 
Offer Amount 
Offer_Close Return 
Open_Close Return 
Offer_Open Return 
Float 
Offer Turnover (%) 
Turnover (%) 
DailyRange (%) 
125 
$12.24 
$144,185,667 
-6.21% 
-5.18% 
-0.74% 
36.22% 
48.01 
16.93 
10.96% 
101 
$14.47 
$476,454,310 
3.81% 
-2.31% 
6.74% 
35.48% 
47.44 
16.42 
10.00% 
112 
$15.22 
$199,911,854 
18.69% 
4.41% 
15.32% 
35.62% 
61.63 
19.54 
11.31% 
113 
$16.62 
$156,805,468 
60.37% 
9.14% 
47.89% 
29.95% 
96.31 
30.43 
15.83% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel. B Dark and Hidden Trading 
Hidden-to-Trade 
Hidden-to-Volume 
Dark-to-Trade 
Dark-to-Volume 
Hidden Size  
Dark Size 
23.43% 
18.50% 
25.47% 
22.19% 
259.34 
304.24 
24.10% 
18.81% 
25.92% 
24.95% 
246.39 
457.26 
24.45% 
17.39% 
28.70% 
27.07% 
195.23 
254.37 
26.00% 
18.52% 
29.19% 
29.05% 
171.29 
237.74 
3.77*** 
1.31 
4.47*** 
5.67*** 
8.45*** 
3.63*** 
Panel C. Fragmentation and Algorithmic Trading 
LitFrag 
Odd-to-Trade 
Odd-to-Volume 
Trade-to-Order 
Cancel-to-Trade 
Trade Size 
63.91 
7.96% 
1.54% 
16.90% 
5.81 
256.09 
66.95 
8.94% 
1.96% 
16.32% 
6.23 
232.14 
70.49 
11.09% 
2.80% 
15.30% 
6.40 
193.67 
72.67 
15.25% 
3.91% 
13.72% 
7.18 
175.67 
7.84*** 
11.96*** 
13.22*** 
5.71*** 
2.45** 
10.48*** 
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Table 4: Lit Fragmentation in the IPO Secondary Market 
This table reports the trend analysis showing how lit fragmentation changes in the first 60 days of the IPO secondary market. We also report how 
measures of lit fragmentation vary across IPOs sorted into quartiles via the level of initial underpricing where the most (least) underpriced IPOs 
are referred to as “hot” (“cold”). In Panel A, we report the estimates of lit fragmentation for each of the first trading days and then for every other 
fifth day in the IPO secondary market in the first 30 days following the offering. We report days 31 through 60 as a composite average. In Panel B, 
we provide differences and t-statistics showing the differences in lit fragmentation across the later time periods relative to the offering date. Lit 
fragmentation is calculated via an inverted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index using trading volumes reported on each exchange from MIDAS. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
  
Cold IPOs 
(N=125) 
Cool IPOs 
(N=101) 
Warm IPOs 
(N=112) 
Hot IPOs 
(N=113) 
All IPOs 
(N=451) 
Hot - Cold 
IPOs 
Panel A. Lit Fragmentation 
Day 1 
Day 2 
Day 3 
Day 4  
Day 5 
Day 10 
Day 15 
Day 20 
Day 25 
Day 30  
Day 31-60 
63.91 
65.25 
65.28 
62.38 
64.48 
65.68 
63.84 
66.64 
68.66 
70.64 
69.91 
66.95 
67.85 
66.53 
65.30 
67.03 
68.63 
67.33 
68.53 
72.53 
70.79 
71.71 
70.49 
72.72 
73.34 
73.41 
72.25 
70.17 
71.16 
72.18 
72.32 
73.03 
73.11 
72.67 
75.06 
75.40 
75.57 
75.05 
74.00 
72.41 
74.10 
74.09 
73.70 
74.90 
68.42 
70.19 
70.21 
69.06 
69.66 
69.59 
68.65 
70.37 
71.83 
72.07 
72.42 
8.76*** 
9.80*** 
10.13*** 
13.20*** 
10.57*** 
8.32*** 
8.57*** 
7.47*** 
5.44*** 
3.03** 
4.98*** 
Panel B. Comparing Early IPO Secondary Market with the Remaining Weeks 
Day 1 vs. 
Day 5 
Day 1 vs.  
Day 10 
Day 1 vs.  
Day 20 
Day 1 vs.  
Days 31-60 
-0.57 
(0.35) 
-1.17 
(0.96) 
-2.73 
(1.58) 
-6.00 
(5.20)*** 
-0.08 
(0.03) 
-1.68 
(0.84) 
-1.58 
(0.84) 
-4.76 
(3.94)*** 
-1.76 
(1.52) 
-0.32 
(0.23) 
-1.69 
(1.50) 
-2.62 
(2.95)*** 
-2.38 
(2.23)** 
-1.33 
(1.30) 
-1.43 
(1.53) 
-2.22 
(3.06)*** 
-1.24 
(1.52) 
-1.16 
(1.41) 
-1.95 
(2.58)** 
-4.00 
(8.54)*** 
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Table 5: Lit Fragmentation and IPO Underpricing 
This table reports the results from estimating a fixed-effects regression equation for our sample of IPO 
firms on their respective offering date where the dependent variable, LitFrag
i
 is calculated as one minus a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index using trading volumes reported on each exchange from MIDAS. The main 
independent variable in both regression specifications is the level of IPO underpricing, using either the 
continuous measure, Underpricing
i
 or dummy variable measure, WarmIPOi. Controls related to the IPO 
firm’s size, firm age, price support, and underwriter ranking are included in the specification. We also 
include controls related to the IPO firm’s trading volume, relative tick size (inverse price), and number of 
competing markets on the offering date. We further include both IPO year and industry fixed-effects. T-
statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively.   
 
 
Dependent Variable Lit Fragmentation 
 [1] [2] 
Underpricing 
 
Warm IPO  
 
Firm Size 
 
Volume 
 
Inverse Price 
 
Market_Competition 
 
Firm Age 
 
Price Support 
 
Underwriter 
 
Intercept  
 
 
Industry FE 
Year FE 
Adjusted R² 
0.0245*** 
(4.01) 
 
 
0.0131*** 
(3.72) 
-0.0018 
(1.07) 
-0.6887*** 
(7.14)  
0.0251*** 
(8.23) 
0.0021 
(0.60) 
-0.0186* 
(1.84) 
0.0019 
(1.48) 
0.2446*** 
(5.32) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
24.06% 
 
 
0.0250*** 
(4.43) 
0.0144*** 
(4.45) 
-0.0003 
(0.16) 
-0.6994*** 
(7.42) 
0.0304*** 
(10.30) 
0.0065** 
(2.21) 
-0.0310*** 
(2.94) 
0.0021* 
(1.77)  
0.2003*** 
(2.94) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
32.11% 
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Table 6: Dark and Hidden Trading in the IPO Secondary Market 
This table reports the trend analysis showing how measures of dark and hidden trading change in 
the first 60 days of the IPO secondary market. In Panel A, we report the estimates of dark and 
hidden trading for each of the first trading days and then for every other fifth day in the IPO 
secondary market in the first 30 days following the offering. We report days 31 through 60 as a 
composite average. In Panel B, we provide differences and t-statistics showing differences in 
dark and hidden trading across the later time periods relative to the offering date. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively.   
 
 
 
 
Dark-to-
Trade 
Dark-to-
Volume 
Hidden-to-
Trade 
Hidden-to-
Volume 
Panel A. Estimates of Dark, Hidden, and Fragmented Trading 
Day 1 
Day 2 
Day 3 
Day 4  
Day 5 
Day 10 
Day 15 
Day 20 
Day 25 
Day 30  
Day 31-60 
27.30% 
34.54% 
37.29% 
37.55% 
39.85% 
41.38% 
40.55% 
39.26% 
38.81% 
37.15% 
35.08% 
25.74% 
40.84% 
45.52% 
45.86% 
49.32% 
52.47% 
50.39% 
50.03% 
48.68% 
47.89% 
44.86% 
33.42% 
27.93% 
27.20% 
27.27% 
27.17% 
25.93% 
26.10% 
25.96% 
26.71% 
25.36% 
24.40% 
33.81% 
31.51% 
30.63% 
31.31% 
31.63% 
28.51% 
28.19% 
28.59% 
27.65% 
26.62% 
25.94% 
Panel B. Comparing Early IPO Secondary Market with the Remaining Weeks 
Day 1 vs. 
Day 5 
Day 1 vs.  
Day 10 
Day 1 vs.  
Day 20 
Day 1 vs.  
Days 31-60 
-12.55% 
(20.21)*** 
-14.08% 
(22.07)*** 
-11.95% 
(19.36)*** 
-7.78% 
(23.22)*** 
-23.58% 
(26.77)*** 
-26.73% 
(31.01)*** 
-24.29% 
(27.82)*** 
-19.12% 
(28.58)*** 
6.25% 
(8.36)*** 
7.49% 
(10.08)*** 
7.46% 
(9.76)*** 
9.02% 
(16.58)*** 
2.18% 
(2.44)** 
5.30% 
(6.14)*** 
5.22% 
(5.98)*** 
7.87% 
(13.23)*** 
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Table 7: Dark and Hidden Trading and IPO Underpricing 
This table reports the results from estimating a fixed-effects regression equation for our sample of IPO firms on their respective offering date 
where the dependent variable in columns (1) through (4) is a measure of dark trading using a ratio of dark trading to overall trading via volume or 
number of trades. The dependent variable in columns (5) through (8) is a measure of hidden trading using a ratio of hidden trading to overall 
trading via volume or number of trades. The main independent variable is underpricing measured via the natural log underpricing, Underpricing, 
or a dummy variable, Warm IPO, taking the value of 1 if the IPO is in the top quartile of underpriced IPOs. Year and industry fixed-effects are 
included. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable Dark-to-Volume Dark-to-Trade Hidden-to-Volume Hidden-to-Trade 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Underpricing 
 
Warm IPO  
 
Firm Size 
 
Volume 
 
Inverse Price 
 
Market_Competition 
 
Firm Age 
 
Price Support 
 
Underwriter 
 
Intercept  
 
 
Industry FE 
Year FE 
Adjusted R² 
No. of Obs 
0.1059*** 
(4.27) 
 
 
0.0068 
(1.01) 
-0.0279*** 
(5.24) 
0.1325 
(0.72)  
0.0067 
(1.09) 
-0.0046 
(0.75) 
-0.0306*** 
(2.93) 
-0.0013 
(0.57) 
0.3725*** 
(2.96) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
26.87% 
451 
 
 
0.0423*** 
(3.75) 
0.0073 
(1.08) 
-0.0268*** 
(5.02) 
0.0357 
(0.20) 
0.0065 
(1.05) 
-0.0054 
(0.88) 
-0.0310*** 
(2.94) 
-0.0018 
(0.77)  
0.3804*** 
(3.00) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
26.13% 
451 
0.0328** 
(1.97) 
 
 
0.0029 
(0.64) 
-0.0117*** 
(3.29) 
-0.1376 
(1.12) 
0.0012 
(0.29) 
0.0028 
(0.69) 
-0.0292*** 
(4.17) 
0.0004 
(0.24) 
0.2957*** 
(3.50) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
29.17% 
451 
 
 
0.0190** 
(2.54) 
0.0031 
(0.69) 
-0.0113*** 
(3.19) 
-0.1312 
(1.11) 
0.0012 
(0.28) 
0.0029 
(0.72) 
-0.0280*** 
(3.99) 
0.0003 
(0.20) 
0.2918*** 
(3.47) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
29.61% 
451 
0.0709*** 
(2.62) 
 
 
-0.0158** 
(2.16) 
-0.0039 
(0.67) 
-0.5693*** 
(2.84) 
-0.0268*** 
(3.99) 
0.0089 
(1.33) 
0.0372*** 
(3.26) 
0.0042 
(1.63) 
0.8791*** 
(6.40) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
34.83% 
451 
 
 
0.0200 
(1.62) 
-0.0156** 
(2.11) 
-0.0033 
(0.57) 
-0.6850*** 
(3.52) 
-0.0270*** 
(4.00) 
0.0079 
(1.18) 
0.0351*** 
(3.05) 
0.0038 
(1.47) 
0.8933*** 
(6.47) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
34.15% 
451 
0.0902*** 
(4.71) 
 
 
-0.0250*** 
(4.81) 
0.0124*** 
(3.03) 
-0.5209*** 
(3.68) 
-0.0199*** 
(4.18) 
-0.0010 
(0.21) 
-0.0102 
(1.26) 
0.0003 
(0.00) 
0.7725*** 
(7.94)  
 
Yes 
Yes 
53.75% 
451 
 
 
0.0219** 
(2.47) 
-0.0247*** 
(4.67) 
0.0131*** 
(3.14)  
-0.6897*** 
(4.94) 
-0.0202*** 
(4.16) 
-0.0025 
(0.52) 
-0.0136 
(1.65) 
-0.0006 
(0.32) 
0.7943*** 
(8.01) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
51.92% 
451 
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Table 8: Algorithmic Trading in the IPO Secondary Market 
This table reports the trend analysis showing how measures of algorithmic trading change in the 
first 60 days of the IPO secondary market. In Panel A, we report the estimates of algorithmic 
trading for each of the first trading days and then for every other fifth day in the IPO secondary 
market in the first 30 days following the offering. We report days 31 through 60 as a composite 
average. In Panel B, we provide differences and t-statistics showing differences in algorithmic 
trading across the later time periods relative to the offering date. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Odd-to-Trade Trade-to-Order Cancel-to-Trade Trade Size 
Panel A. Estimates of Algorithmic Trading 
Day 1 
Day 2 
Day 3 
Day 4  
Day 5 
Day 10 
Day 15 
Day 20 
Day 25 
Day 30  
Day 31-60 
10.78% 
14.98% 
15.77% 
16.62% 
16.98% 
18.12% 
18.20% 
19.73% 
22.22% 
22.96% 
25.95% 
15.58% 
13.59% 
11.54% 
9.92% 
7.26% 
6.10% 
6.16% 
6.14% 
5.37% 
5.46% 
4.83% 
6.36 
8.01 
11.91 
14.76 
21.74 
24.34 
24.51 
25.09 
25.14 
24.67 
25.21 
215.08 
180.32 
173.76 
168.65 
167.19 
152.61 
142.23 
143.70 
129.79 
127.61 
117.97 
Panel B. Comparing Early IPO Secondary Market with the Remaining Weeks 
Day 1 vs. 
Day 5 
Day 1 vs.  
Day 10 
Day 1 vs.  
Day 20 
Day 1 vs.  
Days 31-60 
-6.21% 
(11.55)*** 
-7.34% 
(12.11)*** 
-8.95% 
(13.52)*** 
-15.17% 
(23.46)*** 
8.32% 
(24.29)*** 
9.48% 
(29.92)*** 
9.44% 
(30.35)*** 
10.75% 
(50.11)*** 
-15.34 
(12.06)*** 
-17.94 
(14.14)*** 
-18.69 
(13.81)*** 
18.81 
(16.41)*** 
47.89 
(9.86)*** 
62.47 
(14.47)*** 
71.38 
(15.89)*** 
97.10 
(28.85)*** 
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Table 9: Algorithmic Trading and IPO Underpricing 
This table reports the regression results where the dependent variable is a measure of algorithmic trading. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent 
variable is the Odd-to-Trade ratio. In columns (3) and (4), the Trade-to-Order serves as the dependent variable. In columns (5) and (6), the 
Cancel-to-Trade ratio serves as the dependent variable. In columns (7) and (8), Trade Size is the dependent variable. The main independent 
variable in all the regressions is our measure of underpricing captured via the natural log of one plus underpricing, Underpricing, or a dummy 
variable, Warm IPO, taking the value of 1 if the IPO is in the top quartile of underpriced IPOs. Controls included firm size, return volatility, 
inverse price, market competition, firm age, price support dummy, and underwriter rank. Year and industry fixed-effects are included. T-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
 
 
Dependent Variable  Odd-to-Trade Trade-to-Order Cancel-to-Trade Trade Size 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Underpricing 
 
Warm IPO  
 
Firm Size 
 
Volatility 
 
Inverse Price 
 
Market_Competition 
 
Firm Age 
 
Price Support 
 
Underwriter 
 
Intercept  
 
 
Industry FE 
Year FE 
Adjusted R² 
No. of Obs 
0.0954*** 
(7.69) 
 
 
-0.0021 
(0.72) 
0.0192*** 
(4.84) 
-0.2755*** 
(3.14) 
-0.0101*** 
(3.68) 
-0.0044 
(1.53) 
-0.0048 
(0.99) 
-0.0003 
(0.24) 
0.2960*** 
(4.94) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
43.45% 
451 
 
 
0.0348*** 
(6.27) 
-0.0011 
(0.39) 
0.0236*** 
(6.01) 
-0.3871*** 
(4.52) 
-0.0101*** 
(3.62) 
-0.0052* 
(1.77) 
-0.0047 
(0.99) 
-0.0007 
(0.63) 
0.3232*** 
(5.30) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
40.91% 
451 
-0.0273** 
(2.17) 
 
 
0.0007 
(0.25) 
0.0035 
(0.86) 
0.1315 
(1.48) 
-0.0070** 
(2.51) 
0.0032 
(1.09) 
0.0086* 
(1.73) 
0.0030*** 
(2.68) 
0.1274** 
(2.09) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
18.54% 
451 
 
 
-0.0151*** 
(2.76) 
0.0004 
(0.14) 
0.0032 
(0.82) 
0.1310 
(1.55) 
-0.0071** 
(2.55) 
0.0031 
(1.07) 
0.0076 
(1.53) 
0.0030*** 
(2.75) 
0.1279** 
(2.12) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
19.12% 
451 
0.9540 
(0.73) 
 
 
-0.1354 
(0.45) 
0.3833 
(0.92) 
-2.2857 
(0.25) 
0.4471 
(1.56) 
-0.4964* 
(1.66) 
-0.2264 
(0.44) 
-0.1305 
(1.14) 
9.0302 
(1.44) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
16.34% 
451 
 
 
0.6801 
(1.20) 
-0.1213 
(0.41) 
0.3639 
(0.90) 
-1.3153 
(0.15) 
0.4532 
(1.58) 
-0.4862 
(1.63) 
-0.1654 
(0.32) 
-0.1300 
(1.14) 
8.7672 
(1.41) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
16.53% 
451 
-0.1834*** 
(2.66) 
 
 
0.0453*** 
(2.86) 
-0.1079*** 
(4.89) 
3.5498*** 
(7.29) 
0.0574*** 
(3.77) 
-0.0003 
(0.02) 
0.1261*** 
(4.65) 
-0.0107* 
(1.75) 
3.4938*** 
(10.49) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
41.77% 
451 
 
 
-0.0610** 
(2.01) 
0.0435*** 
(2.74) 
-0.1176*** 
(5.49) 
3.8020*** 
(8.14) 
0.0576*** 
(3.77) 
0.0015 
(0.10) 
0.1271*** 
(4.64) 
-0.0097 
(1.60) 
3.4320*** 
(10.32) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
41.33% 
451 
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Table 10: The Effects of Dark, Hidden, and Lit Fragmentation on IPO Offering Day Liquidity 
This table reports the second-stage estimates where the dependent variable is one of our measures of market quality. In columns (1) through (3), 
the main independent variable is the Dark̂ ratio. In columns (4) through (6), the LitFraĝ  serves as the main independent variable. In columns (7) 
through (9), the Hidden̂  ratio serves as the main independent variable. Dark̂, LitFraĝ , and Hidden̂  are predicted values from a first-stage 
regression. Controls included firm size, return volatility, trading volume, underwriter rank, firm age, and underpricing. Year and industry fixed-
effects are included. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
Offering Day Market Quality 
Dependent 
Variable 
Quoted 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Price 
Impact 
Quoted 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Price 
Impact 
Quoted 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Price 
Impact 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
Dark̂ 
 
LitFraĝ  
 
Hidden̂  
 
Ln(Mcap) 
 
Ln(Volatility)  
 
Ln(Volume) 
 
Underwriter 
 
Ln(1+Age) 
 
Ln(Underpricing) 
 
Constant 
 
 
Year FE 
Industry FE 
Adjusted R² 
0.0026 
(0.99) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0001 
(0.74) 
0.0029*** 
(13.01) 
-0.0017*** 
(10.43) 
-0.0005*** 
(8.10) 
0.0000 
(0.29) 
-0.0003 
(0.43) 
0.0418*** 
(10.17) 
 
Yes 
Yes  
0.6915 
-0.0003 
(0.12) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0002 
(1.08) 
0.0022*** 
(9.06) 
-0.0013*** 
(7.26) 
-0.004*** 
(6.80) 
0.0002 
(1.06) 
-0.0007 
(0.96) 
0.0368*** 
(8.07) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.5501 
0.0032 
(1.02) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0002 
(1.27) 
0.0025*** 
(9.84) 
-0.0007*** 
(3.58) 
-0.0000 
(0.12) 
0.0001 
(0.55) 
-0.0008 
(0.99) 
0.0241*** 
(4.97) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.3662 
 
 
-0.0074*** 
(3.90) 
 
 
0.0009 
(0.57) 
0.0031*** 
(13.80) 
-0.0018*** 
(13.96) 
-0.0004*** 
(7.50) 
0.0001 
(0.53) 
0.0004 
(0.63) 
0.0432*** 
(10.87) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.6958 
 
 
-0.0072*** 
(3.40) 
 
 
-0.0002 
(0.11) 
0.0024*** 
(9.60) 
-0.0013*** 
(9.11) 
-0.0004*** 
(6.18) 
0.0002 
(1.29) 
-0.0004 
(0.56) 
0.0372*** 
(8.36) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.5502 
 
 
-0.0048** 
(2.16) 
 
 
-0.0001 
(0.45) 
0.0027*** 
(10.32) 
-0.0008*** 
(5.36) 
0.0000 
(0.17) 
0.0001 
(0.67) 
-0.0002 
(0.25) 
0.0256*** 
(5.46) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.3767 
 
 
 
 
-0.0132** 
(2.51) 
-0.0002 
(1.00) 
0.0032*** 
(11.76) 
-0.0019*** 
(12.33) 
-0.0004*** 
(5.77) 
0.0001 
(0.55) 
0.0008 
(1.12) 
0.0523*** 
(8.89) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.6148 
 
 
 
 
-0.0170*** 
(2.77) 
-0.0003 
(1.50) 
0.0026*** 
(8.18) 
-0.0014*** 
(8.05) 
-0.0004*** 
(4.27) 
0.0003 
(1.26) 
0.0003 
(0.39) 
0.0491*** 
(7.14) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.3779 
 
 
 
 
-0.0151** 
(2.40) 
-0.0003 
(1.43) 
0.0029*** 
(8.97) 
-0.0009*** 
(5.08) 
0.0001 
(0.79) 
0.0002 
(0.76) 
0.0005 
(0.60) 
0.0363*** 
(5.13) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1768 
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Table 11: The Effects of Algorithmic Trading on IPO Offering Day Liquidity 
This table reports the second-stage estimates where the dependent variable is one of our measures of market quality. In columns (1) through (3), 
the main independent variable is the Odd-to-Trade ̂ ratio. In columns (4) through (6), the Cancel-to-Tradê  serves as the main independent variable. 
In columns (7) through (9), the inverse Trade-to-Order^̂  ratio serves as the main independent variable. Odd-to-Tradê , Cancel-to-Tradê , and 
Trade-to-Order^̂ are predicted values from a first-stage regression. Controls included firm size, return volatility, trading volume, underwriter rank, 
firm age, and underpricing. Year and industry fixed-effects are included. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
 
Dependent Variable Quoted 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Price 
Impact 
Quoted 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Price 
Impact 
Quoted 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Price 
Impact 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
Odd-to-Trade ̂  
 
Cancel-to-Tradê   
 
Trade-to-Order^̂  
 
Ln(Mcap) 
 
Ln(Volatility)  
 
Ln(Volume)^% 
 
Underwriter 
 
Ln(1+Age) 
 
Ln(Underpricing) 
 
Constant 
 
 
Year FE 
Industry FE 
Adjusted R² 
-0.0242*** 
(2.82) 
 
 
 
 
0.0001 
(0.47) 
0.0034*** 
(11.08) 
-0.0020*** 
(11.46) 
-0.0005*** 
(6.83) 
-0.0001 
(0.33) 
0.0028** 
(2.33) 
0.0457*** 
(9.74) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.5968 
-0.0305*** 
(3.21) 
 
 
 
 
0.00002 
(0.13) 
0.0028*** 
(8.39) 
-0.0016*** 
(8.27) 
-0.0004*** 
(5.64) 
0.0001 
(0.29) 
0.0027** 
(2.10) 
0.0404*** 
(7.79) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.4165 
-0.0263*** 
(2.76) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0000 
(0.05) 
0.0031*** 
(9.21) 
-0.0011*** 
(5.54) 
0.0000 
(0.11) 
-0.0001 
(0.07) 
0.0026** 
(1.96) 
0.0284*** 
(5.47) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.2671 
 
 
-0.0007*** 
(2.68) 
 
 
0.0003 
(1.17) 
0.0034*** 
(8.99) 
-0.0024*** 
(7.69) 
-0.0005*** 
(5.70) 
-0.002 
(0.83) 
0.0006 
(0.66) 
0.0484*** 
(7.61) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.3056 
 
 
-0.0007** 
(2.52) 
 
 
0.0002 
(0.73) 
0.0027*** 
(6.87) 
-0.0019*** 
(5.87) 
-0.0005*** 
(5.08) 
-0.0001 
(0.23) 
-0.0001 
(0.15) 
0.0423*** 
(6.38) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1082 
 
 
-0.0002 
(1.08) 
 
 
-0.0007 
(0.29) 
0.0027*** 
(9.00) 
-0.0010*** 
(3.94) 
-0.0000 
(0.28) 
0.0000 
(0.07) 
-0.0002 
(0.30) 
0.0271*** 
(5.25) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.3248 
 
 
 
 
-0.0410*** 
(4.28) 
0.0004* 
(1.91) 
0.0029*** 
(11.29) 
-0.0024*** 
(11.46) 
-0.0005*** 
(7.67) 
0.0000 
(0.01) 
0.0015* 
(1.91) 
0.0339*** 
(6.60) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.5734 
 
 
 
 
-0.0399*** 
(3.89) 
0.0003 
(1.27) 
0.0022*** 
(8.10) 
-0.0019*** 
(8.43) 
-0.0005*** 
(6.68) 
0.0001 
(0.72) 
0.0007 
(0.84) 
0.0281*** 
(5.11) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.4225 
 
 
 
 
-0.0190* 
(1.91) 
0.0003 
(0.14) 
0.0026*** 
(9.70) 
-0.0011*** 
(4.99) 
-0.0000 
(0.55) 
0.0001 
(0.40) 
0.00027 
(0.33) 
0.0212*** 
(3.97) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.3211 
  
65 
 
APPENDIX 12: THE EFFECTS OF DARK, HIDDEN, AND LIT FRAGMENTATION 
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Table 12: The Effects of Dark, Hidden, and Lit Fragmentation on Extended IPO Aftermarket Liquidity 
This table reports the second-stage estimates where the dependent variable is one of our measures of market quality. In columns (1) through (3), 
the main independent variable is the Dark̂ ratio. In columns (4) through (6), the LitFraĝ  serves as the main independent variable. In columns (7) 
through (9), the Hidden̂  ratio serves as the main independent variable. Dark̂, LitFraĝ , and Hidden̂  are predicted values from a first-stage 
regression. Controls included firm size, return volatility, trading volume, underwriter rank, firm age, and underpricing. Year, industry, and firm 
fixed-effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
Dependent 
Variable 
Quoted 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Price 
Impact 
Quoted 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Price 
Impact 
Quoted 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Price 
Impact 
Panel A. Week 1 
Dark̂ 
 
LitFraĝ  
 
Hidden̂  
0.0045* 
(1.75) 
 
 
0.0032** 
(2.24) 
 
 
0.0030** 
(2.45) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0038 
(1.15) 
 
 
-0.0029 
(1.12) 
 
 
0.0003 
(0.13) 
 
 
 
 
0.0132 
(1.52) 
 
 
 
 
0.0107 
(1.48) 
 
 
 
 
0.0020 
(0.35) 
Panel B. Weeks 2 – 5 
Dark̂ 
 
LitFraĝ  
 
Hidden̂  
 
0.0047*** 
(3.01) 
0.0057*** 
(3.08) 
0.0007 
(1.00) 
 
 
-0.0053** 
(2.39) 
 
 
-0.0038** 
(2.51) 
 
 
0.0008 
(0.64) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0056 
(0.84) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0026 
(0.47) 
 
 
 
 
0.0014 
(0.41) 
Panel C. Weeks 6 – 10 
Dark̂ 
 
LitFraĝ  
 
Hidden̂  
 
 
Controls 
Fixed Effects 
0.0036*** 
(3.35) 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0035*** 
(4.83) 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0002 
(0.48) 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
-0.0126*** 
(3.35) 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
-0.0077*** 
(3.04) 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
-0.0046** 
(2.48) 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
0.0457*** 
(4.37) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
0.0322*** 
(4.44) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
0.0141*** 
(3.06) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
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Table 13: The Effects of Algorithmic Trading on Extended IPO Aftermarket Liquidity 
This table reports the second-stage estimates where the dependent variable is one of our measures of market quality. In columns (1) through (3), 
the main independent variable is the Odd-to-Trade ̂ ratio. In columns (4) through (6), the Cancel-to-Tradê  serves as the main independent variable. 
In columns (7) through (9), the inverse Trade-to-Order^̂  ratio serves as the main independent variable. Odd-to-Tradê , Cancel-to-Tradê , and 
Trade-to-Order^̂  are predicted values from a first-stage regression. Controls included firm size, return volatility, trading volume, underwriter rank, 
firm age, and underpricing. Year, industry, and firm fixed-effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
 
Dependent Variable Quoted 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Price 
Impact 
Quoted 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Price 
Impact 
Quoted 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Price 
Impact 
Panel A. Week 1 
Odd-to-Trade ̂  
 
Cancel-to-Tradê   
 
Trade-to-Order^̂  
 
-0.0082 
(1.16) 
 
-0.0045 
(0.84) 
 
-0.0003 
(0.06) 
 
 
 
-0.0001 
(1.02) 
 
 
 
-0.0001** 
(2.19) 
 
 
 
0.0000 
(0.76) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0001 
(1.58) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0001** 
(2.15) 
 
 
 
 
0.0000 
(0.44) 
Panel B. Weeks 2 – 5 
Odd-to-Trade ̂  
 
Cancel-to-Tradê   
 
Trade-to-Order^̂  
 
-0.0030 
(1.50) 
 
-0.0001 
(0.08) 
 
-0.0002 
(0.15) 
 
 
 
-0.0001 
(0.94) 
 
 
 
0.0000 
(0.37) 
 
 
 
0.0001** 
(1.99) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0000 
(1.41) 
 
 
 
 
0.0000 
(0.67) 
 
 
 
 
0.0000 
(0.67) 
Panel C. Weeks 6 – 10 
Odd-to-Trade ̂  
 
Cancel-to-Tradê   
 
Trade-to-Order^̂  
 
 
Controls 
Fixed Effects 
-0.0041*** 
(2.65) 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0025** 
(2.45) 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0016** 
(2.15) 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
0.0002*** 
(3.34) 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
0.0001*** 
(2.96) 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
0.0001*** 
(2.86) 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
-0.0000** 
(2.41) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
-0.0000** 
(2.24) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
-0.0000** 
(2.01) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
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Figure 1: Hidden and Dark Trading on the Offering Date Sorted by Underpricing 
Figure 1 provides the level of hidden and dark trading on offering date for our sample of IPOs. Panel A provides the proportion of executed hidden 
trades to all executed trades on the offering date, sorted by underpricing quartiles. Panel B provides the proportion of executed dark or off-
exchange trades to all executed trades on the offering date, sorted by underpricing quartiles. IPOs that experience the least (most) offering day 
underpricing are classified in the cold (hot) IPO quartile. 
Panel A. Hidden-to-Trade      Panel B. Dark-to-Trade 
  
 
22.00%
22.50%
23.00%
23.50%
24.00%
24.50%
25.00%
25.50%
26.00%
26.50%
Cold Cool Warm Hot
23.00%
24.00%
25.00%
26.00%
27.00%
28.00%
29.00%
30.00%
Cold Cool Warm Hot
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OFFERING DATE BY UNDERPRICING 
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Figure 2: Fragmentation and Algorithmic Trading by Underpricing 
Figure 2 reports the measures of lit fragmentation and three measures of algorithmic trading (trade size omitted). The visuals provided in Figure 2 
reference the initial day trading statistics provided in Table 3. Results are reported for our sample of IPOs sorted into quartiles via the level of 
initial underpricing where “cold” (“hot) refer to the least (most) underpriced IPOs. Our measures of hidden, algorithmic trading, and lit 
fragmentation are obtained from MIDAS. Our measure of dark trading is calculated using TAQ data. 
Panel A. Lit Fragmentation      Panel B. Odd-to-Trade 
  
Panel C. Trade-to-Order      Panel D. Cancel-to-Trade 
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Figure 3: Lit Fragmentation and the IPO Secondary Market  
This figure shows the level of lit fragmentation in the first 60 trading days following the offering date. 
Results are reported as the average level of lit fragmentation for the group of IPOs within each quartile, 
formed via the level of initial underpricing. IPOs that experience the least (most) offering day 
underpricing are classified in the cold (hot) IPO quartile. Our measure of lit fragmentation is calculated 
via a an inverted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index using trading volumes reported for each exchange within 
MIDAS.  
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APPENDIX 17: HIDDEN AND DARK TRADING AND THE IPO SECONDARY 
MARKET 
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Figure 4: Hidden and Dark Trading and the IPO Secondary Market 
This figure reports the trend analysis between measures of hidden and dark trading for all IPOs 
in the first 60 days following the offering date. The solid (dashed) line denotes the level of dark 
(hidden) trading. Our measure of hidden (dark) trading is obtained from MIDAS (TAQ).  
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Figure 5: Algorithmic Trading and the IPO Secondary Market  
This figure reports the trend analysis for the four measures of algorithmic trading for all IPOs in 
the first 180 days following the offering date. All measures are obtained via MIDAS.  
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PART 2: WHERE DOES EX-DIVIDEND TRADING OCCUR: A PECKING ORDER OF 
TRADING VENUES EXPLANATION OF DIVIDEND CAPTURE 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Dividend capture is the trading practice where traders buy the stock cum-dividend and 
sell the stock ex-dividend in attempt to capture the dividend income. Recently, Henry and Koski 
(2017) and Mortal, Paudel, and Silveri (2017) suggest that trading costs are relevant for ex-
dividend trading. Henri and Koski posit that more skilled institutions – those better at obtaining 
lower execution costs, are more profitable than lesser-skilled institutions in capturing dividends. 
Mortal, Paudel, and Silveri examine if market frictions such as transaction costs impact price 
efficiency around the ex-dividend date. Mortal, Paudel, and Silveri account for both structural 
and regulatory changes that reduce transaction costs and improve price efficiency on the 
NASDAQ exchange. They also analyze the impact of market structure changes associated with 
the NASDAQ on the ex-dividend price-drop ratio (PDR), the ratio of the stock price change on 
the ex-dividend day relative to the distributed dividend amount, and find a decline in price-drop 
ratios for NASDAQ-listed stocks. Their findings indicate that both transactions costs and market 
structure affect the level of ex-dividend day activity.  
To the extent transaction costs and market structure impact ex-dividend activity, we 
analyze if traders have a trading venue preference in capturing dividends. If waiting costs, order 
aggressiveness, and transaction costs determine the level of traders engaging in dividend-capture, 
then we expect changes in trading venue market share around the ex-dividend date. For example, 
if waiting costs associated with limit order queues increase on cum-dividend days, as suggested 
by Ainsworth and Lee (2014), then traders have incentives to bypass limit order queues to
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capture the dividend. Two trading venues in the current market structure allow traders to bypass 
the queue and become more aggressive in capturing the dividend: taker-maker and dark trading 
venues.  
Currently, trading venues operate via two fee-and-rebate models: maker-taker and taker-
maker. Maker-taker venues provide rebates to limit order submissions (i.e., liquidity suppliers) 
and charge fees to market order submissions (i.e., liquidity demanders). The maker-taker fee 
model is currently offered by 8 of the 13 U.S. exchanges (Comerton-Forde, Gregoire, and Zhang, 
2018). Taker-maker venues are trading venues that enable traders to earn rebates on market order 
submissions and pay fees on limit order submissions. The taker-maker model effectively allows 
traders to bypass limit order queues by submitting aggressive market orders, providing traders 
rebates despite crossing the spread. As for limit order submissions on taker-maker venues, 
Comerton-Forde, Gregoire, and Zhong document that liquidity-supplying limit orders displayed 
on taker-maker venues will likely execute before limit orders submitted at the same price on 
maker-taker venues since the taker-maker fee model attracts a higher share of liquidity-taking 
market orders. Taker-maker models also attract aggressive liquidity-taking participants by 
providing faster and more certain execution at lower net trading costs. Currently three exchanges 
offer the taker-maker fee model (BATS-Y, BOSTON, and EDGA) and account for just under 
15% (10%) of overall lit (total) market share.8   
Dark trading venues are alternative trading platforms that allow subscribers to use 
anonymous, non-transparent orders that interact away from quoting exchanges (i.e., lit trading 
venues) at prices no worse than the current National Best Bid Offer (NBBO). Currently, over 30 
                                                          
8 As of June 2018, the taker-maker venues account for 14.8% of the market share on “lit” trading venues. Including 
the trading activity of dark venues as part of the aggregate trading volume, the taker-maker venue accounts for 
9.41%. Trading statistics for each exchange are provided at https://www.nasdaqtrader.com.  
  
82 
 
dark trading venues exists and together, account for over 30% of overall market share.9 Trading 
in dark venues offers investors a tradeoff between better execution costs as well as pre-trade 
anonymity and higher execution risk. This tradeoff manifests since transacting in the dark 
requires the availability of a counterparty. Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2017) posit that longer 
waiting queues in the limit order book may trap market orders in the dark, forcing more 
aggressive traders to the dark venue. Zhu (2014) provides a theoretical model suggesting that 
liquidity orders in the dark face less execution risk as they are less correlated and less likely to 
cluster on one side of the book. Since dividend-capturing traders are trading for liquidity 
purposes as opposed to information signals, finding a counterparty is expected to be less 
problematic.  
Our analysis centers around the limit order models developed by Foucault, Kadan, and 
Kandel (2005) and Rosu (2009), which suggest that patient (impatient) liquidity traders tend to 
submit limit (market) orders. Ainsworth and Lee (2014) argue that ex-dividend dates provide 
several advantages in testing the level of order aggressiveness and trading patience associated 
with these limit order models. First, the ex-dividend date is known in advance, providing a 
setting where liquidity traders instead of informed traders are more active. Second, the limit 
order models theorize that traders have subjective differences with regards to valuation, resulting 
in trading profits. As it relates to ex-dividend trading, the differential tax rates applied to income-
seeking traders, not information, may affect valuation differences. Third, the ex-dividend date is 
likely to change the proportion of both patient and impatient traders, given the existence of 
dividend clienteles. Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel posit that the changes in the proportion of 
patient and impatient traders can impact market resiliency while Rosu argues that the change in 
                                                          
9 Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu (2017) provide these trading statistics using data reported from Rosenblatt 
Securities.    
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the proportion of patient traders can result in overshooting prices and price impact. To the extent 
that the composition of patient and impatient traders adjusts around the ex-dividend date, both 
ex-day returns and price-drop ratios could change.   
Consistent with Ainsworth and Lee (2014), we hypothesize that waiting costs will 
increase on the cum-dividend days and decrease on the ex-dividend day. The increases in waiting 
costs on the cum-dividend days will induce more competition from liquidity suppliers, increasing 
the limit order queue. This greater competition in the limit order book will also result in more 
aggressively-priced limit order submissions, and a reduction in the bid-ask spread consistent with 
the make-take phase model of Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2013). Once the trading deadline 
expires on the ex-dividend day, both waiting costs and aggressively-priced orders are expected to 
decrease, resulting in widening spreads. We hypothesize that the resulting increase in limit order 
competition and waiting costs on cum-dividend days will lead to more aggressive liquidity takers 
in the taker-maker venue due to the higher execution rates and the ability to use rebates to offset 
crossing the spread. Simultaneously, limit order traders (i.e., liquidity makers) can trade 
aggressively in taker-maker markets by simply paying the access fee and step in front on the 
limit order queue. Likewise, if the higher waiting costs and limit order competition narrows 
spreads in the cum-dividend days, then we expect less trading activity in maker-taker venues 
since the lower spreads marginalize liquidity supplier profits as well as execution rates. We also 
predict that dark trading venues provide aggressive traders another trading platform to bypass 
limit order queues in capturing dividends. To the extent that aggressive, liquidity traders increase 
their participation in the dark venue, counterparty risk will decrease, and fill rates in the dark 
venue will increase. Although our theoretical arguments suggest that both inverted, taker-maker 
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venues and dark venues capture a larger share of cum-dividend trading, empirical evidence is 
warranted since both venues may also serve as substitutes for dividend-capturing traders.  
We also analyze if retail traders increase their participation in dark venues to capture 
dividends. Broker-dealer dark pools are dark pools that allow brokers to facilitate retail customer 
orders in the dark venue. Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2017) document seven operating broker-
dealer pools exist in the U.S, accounting for over 8% of equity volume in the U.S.10 More 
importantly, dark venues may appeal to retail investors in obtaining cheaper execution costs in 
capturing the dividend. For example, SEC Rule 612 permits sub-penny pricing, which effectively 
allows brokers to jump in front of the NBBO by placing a slightly better offer, facilitating 
immediate execution (Comerton-Forde et al, 2018). This allows retail orders to avoid paying the 
penny spread since marketable orders are routed to off-exchange trading venues. Consistent with 
our earlier arguments that longer limit order queues, waiting costs, and transaction costs affect 
which trading venues obtain market share prior to the dividend, we expect that broker-dealers 
take advantage of sub-penny pricing opportunities in the dark venue, resulting in more retail 
trading and buying prior to the ex-dividend date.  
If waiting costs, transaction costs, and order aggressiveness incentivize more trading in 
both taker-maker and dark trading venues on cum-dividend days, then we expect this relation to 
be more pronounced in stocks with higher transaction costs as both Kalay (1982) and Miller and 
Scholes (1982) suggest that transactions costs impact arbitragers seeking to profit around ex-
dividend dates. Further, if stocks with higher dividend yields attract more liquidity traders then 
                                                          
10 The numbers we cite are provided Buti, Rindi, and Warner (2017) and sourced from Rosenblatt Securities as of 
December 2012.  
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we expect more trading in taker-maker and dark trading venues than maker-taker venues prior to 
the ex-dividend date for those stocks.11   
Using all ex-dividend dates for the universe of dividend-paying stocks in CRSP between 
January 2013 and September 2016, our findings indicate a significant increase in dark trading on 
cum-dividend days yet find a significant decrease in taker-maker trading on cum-dividend days, 
increasing once the stock trades ex-dividend. We suggest that the increase in taker-maker trading 
after the ex-dividend date is likely due to changes in spread constraints as the proportion of 
impatient and patient traders adjust. We also find that the decrease (increase) in taker-maker 
(dark) trading is more pronounced in stocks with higher dividend yields. This finding suggests 
that despite providing similar incentives to dividend-capturing traders, dark venues, not taker-
maker venues, obtain a larger market share prior to the ex-dividend day. We argue this empirical 
finding supports the notion that these two venues, competing for order flow by offering investors 
away to bypass limit order queues and subvert sub-penny pricing restrictions, serve as 
substitutes.  
This study contributes to multiple streams of literature. First, we contribute to the ex-
dividend trading literature by providing evidence as to which trading venues are preferred by 
investors in capturing dividends.12 Dubofksy (1992), Bali and Hite (1998), Frank and 
Jagannathan (1998), and Jakob and Ma (2004) document the importance of pricing grids and 
trading costs as determinants of ex-dividend trading activity, emphasizing the importance of 
market structure effects on ex-dividend day trading. We add to these studies by investigating if 
                                                          
11 Rather than tests the effects of transaction costs and dividend yield separately, we suggest that a stock’s dividend 
yield serves as an appropriate proxy for transaction costs. In unreported results, we find that spreads increase 
monotonically from low-yield stocks to high-yield stocks.  
12 Akmedov and Jakob (2010) investigate ex-dividend day trading activity between on- and off-exchange trading 
venues in Denmark, finding that the off-exchange average price trading affects the low price-drop ratios found on 
the on-exchange trading venue, Copenhagen Stock Exchange (CSE). However, the market structure between U.S. 
and Denmark fee models are not comparable.  
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trading venues offering investors the opportunity to bypass trading constraints (i.e., limit order 
queues and pricing grids) in capturing dividends. Second, we contribute to the literature 
investigating the impact of fee models and fragmentation on market activity. The two fee 
models, maker-taker and taker-maker provide different incentives and costs to both limit order 
and marketable order traders. We use the ex-dividend date as a deadline for liquidity traders to 
offer new insight into which trading venues and fee models attract greater market share. Third, 
our results indicate that highly fragmented stocks are associated with lower price-drop ratios 
(PDRs) although this relation reverses once we account for the stock’s dividend yield. We 
interpret this finding that for high dividend yield stocks, market fragmentation increases the PDR 
closer to one, increasing price efficiency on the ex-day return. Fourth, we document that retail 
investor order imbalances, both in the number of trades and executed volume are positive on 
cum-dividend days, becoming negative on the ex-dividend day. This last finding conflicts with 
previous studies in several aspects. In contrast to Jakob and Ma (2003), we find that both 
measures of order imbalances are negative on the ex-dividend day. Further, our results do not 
support Frank and Jagannathan’s (1998) dividend aversion contention that some investors, 
particularly retail investors, delay the purchase of a stock until the stock trades ex-dividend - our 
results indicate that order imbalances are significantly positive on cum-dividend days. Consistent 
with Jakob and Ma (2003), we find that ex-dividend day order imbalances contribute to a 
reduction in the PDR. However, the relation inverts once we interact our order imbalance 
measure with the stock’s dividend yield. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Several studies analyzing ex-dividend trading suggests that market frictions such as 
trading costs and pricing grids impact the level of dividend capture. Kalay (1982) and Miller and 
Scholes (1982) suggest that transactions costs play a significant role in the level of ex-dividend 
trading behavior. Dubofksy (1992), Frank and Jagannathan (1998), Bali and Hite (1998), and 
Koski and Scruggs (1998) document the relevance of price discreteness and transaction costs as 
determinants of ex-dividend trading activity. The argument behind transactions costs impacting 
the level of dividend-capture is built on the premise that higher transaction costs hinder arbitrage 
trading profitability, reducing the incentive of short-term traders or arbitragers to obtain the 
dividend-paying stock. Naranjo, Nimalendran, and Ryngaert (2000) provide empirical evidence 
supporting the notion that higher transaction costs impedes traders from buying the dividend-
paying stock. Graham, Michaely, and Roberts (2003) provide empirical findings failing to 
support the transactions cost model of ex-dividend trading. Likewise, Jakob and Ma (2004) 
analyze ex-dividend trading around changes in the minimum price increment, finding little 
support for the argument that transactions costs and price discreteness influence ex-dividend 
activity. Jakob and Ma (2005; 2007) examine the role of limit order adjustment on price-drop 
ratios. Their findings examine Dubofsky’s explanation of ex-dividend day price drops. Dubofsky 
argues that automated ex-day limit order adjustment mechanically effects ex-dividend day stock 
price behavior. Henry and Koski (2017) demonstrate that skilled institutional traders, those able 
to execute trades at significantly lower costs, are better in capturing dividends than less-skilled
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institutional traders. Mortal, Paudel, and Silveri (2017) argue that transactions costs are relevant 
in determining price behavior around ex-dividend dates. The findings of Mortal, Paudel, and 
Silveri suggest that market frictions are relevant in understanding ex-dividend day trading 
activity. 
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III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Our hypotheses are developed from the limit order book models provided by Foucault 
(1999), Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2005), and Rosu (2009) as well as the theoretical literature 
analyzing the liquidity cycles associated with fee venue pricing models – Colliard and Foucault 
(2012) and dark pools (Buti, Rindi, and Werner, 2017). First, the theoretical limit order book 
models provide a setting where informed trading is absent, and all trading is conducted by 
liquidity traders who place subjective valuations unrelated to information. Ex-dividend day 
trading provides an empirical setting where traders place differing valuations to accommodate 
potential differences in both tax and capital gains rates. 
Foucault (1999) suggests the bid-ask spread will increase as the execution risk of limit 
orders increases. Foucault further argues that market orders will increase once a change occurs in 
the proportion of traders placing a higher subjective value on the stock. Ainsworth and Lee 
(2014) posit that the ex-dividend day provides a valuable setting where there is an increase in 
investors placing higher valuations on dividends. Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2005) develop 
an optimal order choice model involving the trade-off between execution immediacy and the 
delayed cost of execution. Their model suggests that when the market is dominated by patient 
(impatient) traders, limit (market) order submissions increase. When market orders dominate, a 
liquidity shock occurs, and spreads widen. When patient limit orders dominate, liquidity demand 
subsides, which lengthens the expected time to execution of limit orders. This increase in
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execution time in the limit order queue forces limit orders to price more aggressively. Rosu 
(2009) theorizes that limit orders are placed at different levels since traders need to be 
compensated for waiting. Similar to Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel, Rosu argues that impatient 
(patient) traders submit market (limit) orders. Rosu concludes that increases in liquidity 
competition results in lower bid-ask spreads and price impact, causing prices overreact. Central 
to both models is the absence of asymmetric information, which allows market frictions to 
manifest via the waiting costs and rent-seeking strategies of patient traders. Trading around the 
ex-dividend date provides an empirical setting to examine these theoretical implications since 
liquidity traders are more active than informed traders. 
Colliard and Foucault (2012) account for the role of exchange fee models in discussing 
the relation between patient and impatient traders and order submissions. Colliard and Foucault 
develop five equilibriums for patient and impatient investors and the corresponding execution 
probability. The equilibrium that most resembles the ex-dividend trading setting described by 
Ainsworth and Lee (2014) is the first equilibrium type since impatient investors can act as 
makers or takers depending on fee structure and the execution rates across the two venues, while 
patient investors can be makers or takers depending on the state of the limit order book. In the 
existence of higher waiting costs and a pending deadline to capture the dividend, we posit that 
order placement becomes more aggressive on cum-dividend days, resulting in more market order 
submissions. We posit that impatient traders will submit market orders to the taker-maker venue 
to capture the dividend. Simultaneously, if patient, limit order traders desire higher execution 
probability, then patient traders will submit more limit orders to taker-maker venues since the 
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execution rates increase in the presence of more liquidity-demanders (i.e., takers).13 We expect 
higher fill rates for limit orders submitted to inverted venues as Battalio, Corwin, and Jennings 
(2016) demonstrate that limit orders submitted to high take fee venues (i.e., maker-taker venues) 
are associated with significantly lower fill rates than limit orders submitted to low take fee 
venues (i.e., taker-maker venues). 
Figure 1 above provides the anticipated order flow for maker-taker and taker-maker 
venues around the ex-dividend date. Figure 1 shows that larger waiting costs and limit order 
queues provide incentives for traders to employ more aggressive orders and the taker-maker 
venue is the best venue for these traders due to faster execution, rebates, and lower net trading 
costs. Once the trading deadline expires on ex-dividend date, then both waiting costs and limit 
order queues decline and bid-ask spreads increase. Following the ex-dividend date, order 
aggressiveness declines and traders use more limit orders as the profits from supplying liquidity 
increases in the form of a larger bid-ask spread. Therefore, we hypothesize that taker-maker 
venues receive a higher market share on cum-dividend days, prior to the ex-dividend date. 
H1: Taker-Maker fee venues experience greater market share on cum-dividend 
days. 
Hypothesis 1 states that taker-maker fee venues offering rebates to aggressive market 
orders and higher execution probability for limit orders capture a greater market share prior to 
the ex-dividend day. An alternative explanation suggests taker-maker venues receive a higher 
market share following the ex-dividend date. Angel, Harris, and Spatt (2015) argue that larger 
                                                          
13 Our argument mirrors the optimal order routing theory proposed by Maglaras, Moallemi, and Zheng (2012). 
Similar to Boehmer, Jennings, and Wei (2006), Maglaras et al. demonstrate that market orders gravitate towards 
markets with the lowest fees, while limit orders are submitted to the markets with the highest rebates and/or lowest 
execution waiting times. Maglaras, Moaellemi, and Zheng (2015) show that standing limit orders directed to high-
fee venues experience lower execution quality and trade less frequently.  
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trading costs provide incentives for traders to jump the limit order queue by submitting more 
orders to taker-maker venues.14 To the extent that waiting costs and patient traders keep spreads 
low prior to the ex-dividend date then traders may refrain from using the taker-maker venue 
since the price improvement incentive offered by the inverted venue is marginalized. Further, if 
waiting costs reduce and the proportion of patient and impatient traders adjust following the ex-
dividend date then spreads will increase. The resulting wider spread will then encourage more 
participation in taker-maker venues to bypass the queue as liquidity competition increases as 
both Comerton-Forde, Gregoire, and Zhang (2018) and Cox, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2018) 
show that larger spreads associated with a wider tick size increase market share in taker-maker 
venues. 
We next derive our hypothesis related to dark trading around ex-dividend dates. 
Consistent with our argument that the higher waiting costs and longer limit order queues 
increases the incentive for traders to bypass the queue by submitting more orders to taker-maker 
venues, we expect that dark trading venues provide another trading platform to bypass resting 
limit orders. Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2011) suggests that dark pools are more active the higher 
the level of competition in the lit limit order book. Buti, Rindi, and Werner argue that 
competition among liquidity suppliers due to a wider spread may encourage traders to submit 
more market orders to the dark to execute at the mid-quote rather than incur the wider spread in 
limit order book. However, a wider spread encourages patient, liquidity traders to submit orders 
to the limit order book on the lit venue as liquidity-supplying profits are greater. While these 
explanations provide conflicting predictions, Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2017) provide an updated 
                                                          
14 Angel, Harris, and Spatt (2015) also note that when maker-taker and taker-maker venues offer the same quotes at 
the same price on the same side of the market, traders are incentivized to send marketable orders to taker-maker 
venues to receive the rebate. Hence, the execution probability for limit orders placed at the quote on taker-maker 
venues is larger than similar orders placed on the maker-taker venue.  
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theoretical model to account for continuous dark pool executions, where traders can choose to 
submit limit or market orders to either the lit limit order book or the dark venue. The model 
shows that when the limit order book starts empty, traders are more likely to submit limit orders, 
and it is limit orders that primarily migrate to the dark venue. Buti, Rindi, and Werner further 
argue that since dark pools typically trap market orders, reducing the available supply of 
liquidity demanders in the publicly transparent limit order book, execution rates for limit orders 
in the lit venue decline. Simultaneously, traders switch from limit orders to market orders. The 
model also shows that when the limit order book in the lit venue is deeper, then traders make 
greater use of market orders and it is market orders that primarily migrate to the dark venue. 
Comerton-Forde, Gregoire, and Zhang (2018) provide empirical evidence that liquidity 
demanders prefer dark venues as competition in the lit venue limit order book increases. Finally, 
the Buti, Rindi and Werner’s model implies that trader’s personal valuation of the asset will 
affect the perceived gain from trading and will motivate higher use of market orders. 
Applying the theoretical model setting of Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2017) to the expected 
limit and market order submissions around the ex-dividend date, we posit that increasing 
competition among liquidity suppliers and a deeper limit order book will motivate more traders 
to submit market orders to the dark venue prior to the ex-dividend date. Absent of asymmetric 
information, the trader’s higher valuation is solely on the dividend, creating another incentive to 
use market orders to capture the dividend. Formalizing our second hypothesis, we predict that the 
dark venue captures a larger share of aggressive, liquidity-demanding dividend traders prior to 
the ex-dividend date. 
H2: Dark trading venues experience greater market share on cum-dividend days 
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We argue that the patient liquidity-supplying competition in the lit limit order book 
motivates more traders to use market orders in the dark venue to capture the dividend. However, 
execution rates for market orders in the dark venue depends on the availability of a counterparty. 
Further, since the execution probability of a market order in the dark venue is less than a market 
order in the lit venue, it is primarily limit orders that experience a higher execution probability in 
the dark venue than in the lit venue. Finally, if the bid-ask spread is a determinant of dark venue 
market share as suggested by Buti, Consonni, Rindi, Wen, and Werner (2015) and Kwan, 
Masulis, and McInish (2015), then lower expected spreads on cum-dividend days may mitigate 
any price improvement obtained in the dark venue. If this relation holds, then dark market share 
may decrease on cum-dividend days. 
In this study, we have suggested that higher waiting costs, transactions costs, and order 
aggressive affect which trading venues obtain greater market share around the ex-dividend date, 
however, we next examine if the determinants of trading venue market share apply to the 
executions of retail trades in the dark. Dark pools such as broker dealer pools provide many retail 
customers the opportunity to obtain price improvement and bypass current limit order queues. 
Bartlett and McCrary (2015) document that SEC Rule 612 which permits trading at sub-penny 
prices, allows broker-dealers the opportunity to route retail marketable orders to the dark venue 
to avoid paying displayed spreads and bypass limit order queues. We argue that the trading 
deadline for liquidity-takers around the ex-dividend date to result in higher retail trading and 
buying activity in the dark venue. Thus, we expect that retail trades in the dark venue will 
increase on the cum-dividend days to bypass limit order queues. To the extent that retail trades in 
the dark venue are used to capture dividends, we expect an increase in retail trading prior to the 
ex-dividend date. We further posit retail trades to engage in buying (selling) behavior before 
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(after) the ex-dividend date. Formalizing our third and final hypothesis, we predict that retail 
traders are net buyers (sellers) before (after) the ex-dividend day. 
H3: Retail traders are buyers (sellers) before (after) the ex-dividend date 
While it seems obvious that retail investors are likely net buyers prior to the ex-dividend 
date, Frank and Jagannathan (1998) put forth a dividend aversion hypothesis that argues 
investors defer trading until the stock is trading without dividend. They argue that some investors 
do not like dividends since dividends entail decision costs such as what do with received funds as 
well physically depositing or cashing dividend check. Frank and Jagannathan conclude that 
changes in the order imbalances between the last cum-dividend day and first ex-dividend can 
reduce the measured PDR. Jakob and Ma (2003) argue that while the dividend aversion 
hypothesis may not pose a dilemma for sophisticated institutional investors, small, retail traders 
are more likely to postpone their stock purchase until the ex-dividend date. Jakob and Ma (2003) 
provide supporting evidence that small, retail trade imbalances postpone stock purchases around 
the ex-dividend date and this behavior results in upward bias in the ex-day closing price and a 
decline in the PDR. We argue that technological changes that allow retail brokerages to directly 
deposit dividend distributions into a retail investor’s account likely mitigates any potential 
dividend aversion costs. Thus, we expect that retail order imbalances will not contribute to ex-
day price increases and a decline in the PDR. 
As it relates to our discussion surrounding the pecking order of trading venues around the 
ex-dividend date, we next analyze whether changes in market fragmentation improve or impede 
price efficiency on the ex-dividend day. The literature cites that under the assumption the capital 
markets are perfect, the share price following a dividend distribution should fall by the exact 
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amount of the dividend paid on a per share basis.15 While tax-based theories suggests that tax 
differentials between capital gains and dividend income help explain ex-dividend price drops, 
other papers (Dubofsky, 1992; Jakob and Ma, 2004; and Akhmedov and Jakob, 2010) argue that 
microstructure effects could influence the ex-day pricing anomaly. In this study, we suggest that 
changes in both lit and dark fragmentation serve as another market friction that contributes to 
changes in the price drop ratio or PDR. The microstructure literature finds mixed evidence as to 
the effects of market fragmentation and price efficiency. O’Hara and Ye (2011) show that while 
fragmentation increases short-term volatility, they also provide evidence that the prices of small, 
fragmented stocks tend to be closer to a random walk. Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2015) find 
that higher levels of dark trading coincide with increases price discovery on the lit venue while 
Hatheway, Kwan, and Zhang (2017) document that dark venues contribute less to price 
discovery on the consolidated market. Therefore, it remains an empirical question as to the 
impact of lit and dark fragmentation on the level of price efficiency around the ex-dividend date. 
In this study, we examine the effects of lit market fragmentation (i.e., competition among limit 
order book exchanges) as well as off-exchange or dark market fragmentation on ex-day PDRs.
                                                          
15 Elton and Gruber (1970), Lakonishok and Vermaelen, (1986), and Michaely (1991) provide discussion on the 
impact of differential tax rates on ex-dividend activity.  
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IV. DATA AND METHODS 
 
METHODS AND MEASURES 
 We classify dark trading in two ways, using the total number of trades and trading 
volume reported in exchange code “D” in TAQ. Exchange code “D” captures all off-exchange 
trading activity reported by the trade reporting facility (TRF) for stock i on day t. While this 
measure encompasses all trading taking place away from the lit venue and not specific to dark 
pools, other studies including Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu (2017) define dark trading using this 
data. We scale both the number of trades and trading volume reported in exchange code “D” to 
the total number of trades and trading volume reported in TAQ to create our two dark trading 
ratios. We use the Market Information Data Analytics System, MIDAS, in capturing both the 
level of trade executions and trading volume for all lit venues, including both the maker-taker 
and taker-maker venues. Since we scale the total trade and trading volumes reported for all 
maker-taker and taker-maker venues to all reported trade and trading volume, which includes 
dark trading, the constructed trading ratios for maker-taker and taker-maker venues are not 
perfectly inversely related.16  
 We identify retail trades in the dark venue using executions that receive small amounts of 
price improvement, typically less than a penny (Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2017). These 
transactions usually take place just above or below a round penny. For example, we identify
                                                          
16 If taker-maker and maker-taker ratios were constructed using only report lit trades and trading volume, then the 
two measures would be inversely related (i.e., TM Ratio = 1 – MT Ratio). The correlation coefficient in market 
share measures between the maker-taker and taker-maker trading venues is -0.4990.   
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transactions as retail-initiated buys if the executed price is slightly below the round penny, and 
retail-initiated sells if the executed price is slightly above the round penny. If we let 𝑃𝑖𝑡 equal the 
execution price in stock i at time t, then let 𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 100 * mod (𝑃𝑖𝑡, 0.01) be the fraction of a penny 
associated with that execution price. 𝑍𝑖𝑡 can take on any value in the unit interval [0,1). We then 
classify retail buys if the transaction price falls in the (0.6, 1) 𝑍𝑖𝑡 interval and classify retail sells 
if the transaction price falls in the (0,0.4) 𝑍𝑖𝑡 interval. We compute buy-sell imbalances by 
scaling the difference between retail buy and sell trades (volume) to the total amount of executed 
retail trades (volume). We create a retail trading ratio by scaling all dark venue, retail executed 
trades to all executed trades for stock i on day t. We also construct retail trading ratio by scaling 
all executed retail share volume to all executed shares volume for stock i on day t. We verify our 
measures of retail trading with those of Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, finding similar numbers.   
 
DATA AND SAMPLE PERIOD 
Sample construction includes all ordinary common stocks (CRSP share code 10 or 11) 
between January 2013 and September 2016. The beginning of the sample coincides with the 
introduction of the exchange data provided by MIDAS. We end the sample for all dividends in 
September to not conflict with changes to the tick size increment for the pilot firms associated 
with the SEC’s Tick Size Pilot Program as the literature documents that increases in the 
minimum price increment may confound not only changes in market share across fee venues but 
also ex-dividend trading. For example, both Comerton-Forde, Gregoire, and Zhang (2018), Cox, 
Van Ness, and Van Ness (2018) show that increases in the tick size associated with the SEC’s 
Tick Size Pilot results in greater market share for taker-maker fee venues. The dividend literature 
provides evidence that transaction costs and price discreteness affect ex-dividend trading as well 
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as ex-day premiums and the price-drop ratio. We also require stocks in our sample to trade every 
day of the sample period and require that the stock have a share price greater than $5 for every 
day in sample period. We use CRSP to collect our sample of firms paying quarterly dividends 
during our sample period, using both CRSP and Nasdaq to verify ex-dividend dates. We also use 
CRSP to obtain control measures related to market capitalization, share turnover, price, price 
volatility, and dividend yield.  
 Table 1 reports statistics that describe the sample. Panel A reports the stock and trading 
characteristics of our sample. The average stock has a market capitalization of $12.18 billion and 
a price of $46.05. Price volatility, measured as the standardized daily range (see Diether, Lee, 
and Werner, 2009), is 2.33%. We also calculate share turnover using CRSP, dividing the daily 
trading volume by the number of shares outstanding. We obtain the retail ratio by scaling the 
total number of retail trades on TAQ to the total number of executed trades in TAQ. We create a 
similar ratio using retail volume. We find that the retail ratio, using scaled retail volume, is 
6.83%. Note that this ratio reflects the retail trading taking place under exchange code “D” in 
TAQ and does not account for retail trading taking place on lit venues. We also report dividend 
characteristics such as the dividend paid, dividend yield, and the number of dividend increases 
and decreases. Finally, we document that the average dividend paid is 23 cents a share, with a 
yield of 0.6%. 
  
100 
 
V. RESULTS 
 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
    We construct a 21-day event window study around the ex-dividend date to examine 
abnormal levels of dark, taker-maker, and maker-taker venue trading activity. The 21-day event 
window allows us to examine the changes in dark, taker-maker, and maker-taker venue trading 
activity before and after the ex-dividend date while mitigating the potential effects of 
confounding events such as earnings announcements and/or stock splits that may affect trading 
venue preference.17 We employ two measures of dark trading using our described dark ratio as 
well as a standardized dark trading ratio to account for conflicting motivations of dark trading. 
Similarly, we construct standardized measures of taker-maker and maker-taker in the 21-day 
event window around the ex-dividend date. For each standardized measure, we compute the 
ratios using the proportion of executed trades for each trading venue. We use a standardized 
measure as other studies (Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986; Koski and Scruggs, 1998; Blau, 
Fuller, and Van Ness, 2011) also employ a standardized trading measure around the ex-dividend 
date. We finally construct standardized measures of retail trading and retail trading imbalances 
around the ex-dividend date.
                                                          
17 Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu (2017) demonstrate that uncertainty surrounding earnings announcements results in 
market consolidation and a pecking order of trading venue preference. Yao and Ye (2014) demonstrate that stock 
splits induce changes in the relative tick size, resulting in changes in market share between maker-taker and taker-
maker trading venues.   
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Table 2 reports the results for a 21-day window surrounding the ex-dividend date. We 
report not only the trading venue ratio and standardized trading venue ratio but also the market-
adjusted return in the event window. Market-adjusted returns are calculated by deducting the 
CRSP equally-weighted index return (including distributions) from the stock’s daily raw return. 
We conduct t-tests to determine whether the level of trading venue market share differs from 
zero for each trading day within the event window. In columns [2] and [3], we report the changes 
in maker-taker market share around the ex-dividend. In columns [4] and [5], we show the 
changes in taker-maker market share while in columns [6] and [7], we display the changes in 
dark trading around the ex-dividend day. In Table 2, we document that abnormal maker-taker 
market share levels peak on the ex-dividend date, 0.0289. The results in column [5] demonstrate 
that abnormal levels of taker-maker market share are lower on the cum-dividend days. Following 
the ex-dividend date, we find that taker-maker market share increases after the ex-dividend date. 
Hence, our earlier findings contrast with hypothesis 1 in that we show that taker-maker market 
share increases following the ex-dividend date. To the extent that aggressive dividend-capture 
traders seek a trading venue to bypass limit order queues and spread constraints prior to the ex-
dividend date, our evidence suggests that taker-maker venues are not attracting this order flow. 
In column [7], we report that abnormal dark trading is higher on the cum-dividend days. 
Following the ex-dividend date, we find that abnormal dark trading levels decrease. Our finding 
that taker-maker (dark) venue market share decreases (increases) prior to the ex-dividend date 
only to revert following the ex-dividend date indicates that dark venues attract a larger share of 
dividend-capturing order flow, supporting hypothesis 2.  
Figure 2 shows that visual changes in trading venue market share around the ex-dividend 
date. We report both the scaled and standardized measures of trading venue market share. In 
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Panel A, we show that maker-taker market share increases on the ex-dividend date, where both 
the regular and standardized measure peaks on the ex-day. For instance, the standardized maker-
taker ratio peaks at 0.0289. In Panel B, we document that taker-maker market share increases 
following the ex-day. For example, we find that both the regular and standardized measure of 
taker-maker market share exhibits a sharp discontinuity before and after the ex-dividend date. 
The standardized measure ranges between -0.0400 and -0.0600 on the cum-dividend days, and 
ranges between 0.0250 and 0.0500 on the ex-dividend days. In Panel C, we provide the levels of 
dark trading market share around the ex-dividend date. The visual in Panel C indicates that dark 
venue market share peaks on the cum-dividend days, decreasing once the stock trades ex-
dividend. Overall, the illustrations provided in Figure 3 indicate increases in dark venue market 
share when the stock trades cum-dividend while taker-maker venue market share increases when 
the stock trades ex-dividend.  
 In Table 3, we report changes in retail trading in dark venues around the ex-dividend 
date. Consistent with our expectation, we find that retail trading levels increase on cum-dividend 
days. We show that abnormal levels of retail trading (0.0483) peak on the day prior to the ex-
dividend date. Following the ex-dividend date, we find that retail trading levels decline. In 
columns [4] through [7], we provide the changes in retail trading imbalances around the ex-
dividend date. In column [5], we report that abnormal retail trading imbalances increase on the 
cum-dividend days, peaking on the last cum-dividend day, (SOIBTRD = 0.1014), indicating more 
retail buying prior to the ex-dividend date. After the ex-dividend date, we find that retail traders 
are net sellers, where all ex-dividend days in the event widow possess a negative order imbalance 
estimate. In column [7], we display the changes in abnormal retail trading imbalances using 
executed volume. The results in column [7] corroborate hypothesis 3 that retail traders in the 
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dark venue are net buyers prior the ex-dividend date, supporting the contention that retail trades 
in dark venues are capturing dividends prior to the ex-dividend date.  
Figure 3 shows the visual changes in retail trading around the ex-dividend date. In Panel 
A, we display that retail trading increases on the cum-dividend days, declining on the ex-
dividend date. The standardized retail trading ratio peaks on the last cum-dividend day (0.0483), 
becoming statistically negative on the ex-dividend days. In Panels B and C, we provide the 
changes in retail trading imbalances. In Panel B, we show that retail trading imbalances using 
executed trades, OIBTRD, is positive and increasing on the cum-dividend days, only to decrease 
upon the ex-dividend day. In Panel C, we display the levels of retail trading imbalances using 
executed trade volume, OIBVOL. Consistent with the imbalance estimates provided in Panel B, 
we find that retail trading imbalances using executed trade volume peaks just prior to the ex-
dividend date and becomes negative after the ex-dividend date. For example, we show that the 
standardized order imbalance measure peaks on the last cum-dividend day (0.1058), becoming 
negative and significant for all ex-dividend days. Overall, the visuals provided in Figure 3 
indicate that retail trades in the dark are net buyers prior to the ex-dividend date. 
  
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
To evaluate if other factors impact the level of dark trading the ex-dividend date, we 
employ a multivariate regression framework. Consistent with Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), 
Hu and Tseng (2006), and Tseng and Hu (2013), we employ both our scaled measure as well a 
standardized measure of trading except in this study our measure of trading is the level of trading 
in dark, taker-maker, and maker-taker venues. Following Park and Lee (2014), we employ the 
standardized trading measure in a multivariate regression framework. In analyzing how dark and 
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taker-maker trading activity changes around the ex-dividend date, we include five separate 
dummy variables to represent a five-day subset around the event date. For example, EX t-2 
(EX t+2) takes the value of a 1 for the two trading days before (after) the ex-dividend date. 
Our controls include firm size since previous literature suggests that the level of dark 
trading varies with firm size.18  We also include a control for price since the availability of sub-
penny pricing in both dark and taker-maker venues is less attractive for investors in stocks with 
high prices. This follows since the relative tick size is higher (lower) in lower (higher)-priced 
stocks which may motivate trading activity in dark and taker-maker venues to bypass lit venue 
tick constraints (Comerton-Forde, Gregoire, and Zhong, 2018). Further, we include controls for 
volatility and turnover. To the extent that share turnover measures the amount of liquidity in the 
market as suggested by Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998), we expect that dark trading is likely to 
have a positive relation with turnover.19 Finally, we include a control for volatility since research 
(see Ready, 2013; Zhu, 2014; Buti, Rindi, and Werner, 2017) suggest that volatility directly 
impacts the level of dark trading, while Garvey, Huang, and Wu (2016) suggest an inverse 
relation. Combining these controls, we estimate the following equation. We also include both 
stock and date fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the stock and date level. The dependent 
variable, Trading Venue_Ratio
i,t
 refers to trading venue market share ratios associated with 
maker-taker, taker-maker, and dark trading venues. The full regression specification is provided 
below.  
Trading Venue_Ratio
i,t
= β
0
+β
1
EXi,t-2+β2EXi,t-1+β3EXi,t+β4EXi,t+1+β5EXi,t+2+Controlsi,t+εi,t (1) 
                                                          
18 Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2011) show that dark trading is higher among larger firms while the studies of 
Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2015) show that large cap stocks have lower levels of dark trading.  
19 Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2017) argue that dark trading is directly related with the overall trading 
frequency/volume in the stock.  
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Table 4 reports the results from regression equation [1]. In columns [1] and [2], the 
dependent variable is maker-taker market share. In column [2], we show that the standardized 
measures of maker-taker market share, SMT Ratio, is only significant on the ex-dividend day, 
0.0310, indicating that maker-taker market share is highest on the ex-dividend day. In columns 
[3] and [4], we show that taker-maker market share levels are lower on cum-dividend days. In 
column [4], we report that the coefficient estimates for ExDay
t-2
 and ExDay
t-1
 are both negative. 
Similar results hold when the unstandardized measure of taker-maker market share serves as the 
dependent variable (see column 3). This finding indicates that taker-maker market share is 
significantly lower on cum-dividend days relative to the rest of the trading days in the sample 
period. In columns [5] and [6], we provide the coefficient estimates for the ex-dividend date 
dummy variables, where dark venue market share serves as the dependent variable. Consistent 
with our univariate results, we show that following the ex-dividend date, dark venue market 
share declines. In column [6], we show that all ex-dividend date dummy variables after the ex-
dividend day are negative. For instance, the standardized dark trading ratio is -0.0329, -0.0215, 
and -0.0430 on ExDay
t
, ExDay
t+1
, and ExDay
t+2
, confirming that dark trading market share is 
significantly negative following dividend distribution date. We further document that abnormal 
levels of dark venue market share are positive, 0.0258, on the last cum-dividend day, 
ExDay
t-1
.The results provided in Table 4 confirm support for hypothesis 2 that dark venue 
market share increases prior to the ex-dividend date but do not support for hypothesis 1 in that 
taker-maker venue market share increases on the cum-dividend days.  
We next analyze retail trading in multivariate framework. Following other studies such as 
Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007), Lai and Teo (2008), and Park and Lee (2014), we use 
standardized trading imbalances using event window studies as well as in a multivariate 
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regression framework. Consistent with our previous regression equation, we include controls 
related to firm size, price volatility, turnover, and price. We also include stock and date fixed-
effects and cluster standard errors at the stock and date level. The dependent variable, 
Retail_Ratio
i,t
 refers to retail trading ratios as well as our measures of retail trading imbalances. 
The full regression specification is provided below. 
Retail_Ratio
i,t
= β
0
+β
1
EXi,t-2+β2EXi,t-1+β3EXi,t+β4EXi,t+1+β5EXi,t+2+Controlsi,t+εi,t (2) 
 In Table 5, we provide the coefficient estimates from regression equation (2). In columns 
[1] and [2], we provide the coefficient estimates for the ex-dividend date dummy variables, 
where our measures of retail trading serve as the dependent variable. In column [1], we report 
positive coefficient estimates for each of the ex-dividend date dummy variables, ExDay
t-2
 and 
ExDay
t-1
, prior to the ex-dividend date. However, we also report that retail trading increases on 
the ex-dividend date. While this confirms that ex-dividend day is associated with increases in 
retail trading, however, once we standardized the retail trading measure, we find in column [2], 
that retail trading peaks only on the cum-dividend days prior to the ex-dividend date. Further, the 
standardized retail trading becomes negative on the ex-dividend date, ExDay
t
, consistent with 
our expectation that retail trading participation recedes once the stock begins to trade without the 
dividend. In columns [3] and [4], we provide the estimates where our measure of retail trading 
imbalance using executed trades serves as the dependent variable. The results indicate that retail 
traders are net buyers on the cum-dividend days. For example, we report coefficient estimates of 
0.0186 and 0.0240 for dummy variables, ExDay
t-2
 and ExDay
t-1
, in column [3]. In column [4], 
we provide estimates positive estimates for both ExDay
t-2
 and ExDay
t-1
, confirming that retail 
trading imbalances are positive prior to the ex-dividend date. In columns [3] through [6], we 
document that following the ex-dividend date, retail traders in the dark venue are net sellers. This 
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last finding contrasts with Jakob and Ma (2003), who infer retail trading using order sizes, 
finding that small order buys outnumber the small order sells on the ex-dividend day. Overall, 
the evidence provided in Table 5 confirm hypothesis three in that retail trades which execute in 
dark venue are associated with dividend-capture trading behavior. 
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VI. ROBUSTNESS 
 
DIVIDEND YIELD 
Several studies show dividend-capture trading is directly related to the stock’s dividend 
yield. First, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) demonstrate that ex-dividend returns are affected 
by stocks with larger dividend yields, which are likely stocks that experience the largest demand 
by dividend capture traders. Michaely and Vila (1995; 1996) provide additional evidence that ex-
dividend trading volume increases in the level of the stock’s dividend yield.  To address if 
investor’s use of dark and taker-maker venues around the ex-dividend date is greater for high 
dividend-yield stocks, we use a 21-day event window, analyzing how dark and taker-maker 
market share varies across five quintiles formed via the stock’s dividend yield. We interact the 
five ex-dividend day dummy variables with the stock’s dividend yield. Consistent with our 
previous model specifications, we include controls such as firm size, price volatility, turnover, 
and price. We also include stock and date fixed-effects and cluster standard errors at the stock 
and date level. The dependent variable, Trading Venue_Ratio
i,t
 refers to trading venue market 
share ratios associated with maker-taker, taker-maker, and dark trading venues. The full 
regression specification is provided below.
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Trading Venue_Ratio
𝑖,𝑡
= β
0
+ β
1
EXi,t-2 + β2EXi,t-1 + β3EXi,t + β4EXi,t+1 + β5EXi,t+2
+ β
6
EXi,t-2*Yield + β7EXi,t-1*Yield + β8EXi,t*Yield
+ β
9
EXi,t+1*Yield + β10EXi,t+2*Yield + β11Yieldi + Controlsi,t + εi,t 
(3) 
Table 6 reports the coefficient estimates from regression equation (3). In columns [1] and 
[2], we report the coefficient estimates for the ex-dividend date dummy variables as well as the 
interaction term accounting for the stock’s dividend yield, where maker-taker market share 
serves as the dependent variable. We find in columns [1] and [2] that the stock’s dividend yield 
has no significant effects on trading in maker-taker venues around the ex-dividend date. To the 
extent that higher dividend yield stocks are more desired by dividend-capturing traders, our 
results suggests that maker-taker venues are less attractive to those capturing dividends. In 
columns [3] and [4], we report estimates from regression equation (3) where measures of taker-
maker venue market share serve as the dependent variable. In column [3], we find that the 
interaction terms prior to the ex-dividend date, EXi,t-2*Yield and EXi,t-1*Yield, are negative. We 
also report a negative coefficient estimate for the interaction term on the ex-dividend date, 
EXi,t*Yield. These findings imply that for costly dividend arbitrage stocks such as those with 
higher dividend yields, there is less trading activity on taker-maker venues despite cost savings 
associated with these venues. We find similar evidence in column [4], where the standardized 
measure of taker-maker market share serves as the dependent variable. In columns [5] and [6], 
we show that the higher dividend yield results in more trading in the dark venues prior to the ex-
dividend date. For instance, the coefficient estimates for EXi,t-2*Yield and EXi,t-1*Yield are 
0.2438 and 0.4860 using the scaled dark trading ratio and 3.8353 and 6.0073 using the 
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standardized dark trading ratio. These findings suggest that higher dividend-yield stocks 
motivate less (more) dividend-capture trading in the (taker-maker) dark trading venue.  
 Consistent with the premise that high-dividend yield stocks attract more dividend-capture 
trading, we expect a higher share of retail orders which execute in the dark for high-dividend 
yield stocks.  Such a finding would corroborate Graham and Kumar (2006), who find that retail 
investor holdings indicate a preference for high dividend yield securities.20 We address this 
relation by analyzing the proportion of retail-executed trades in the dark venue as well as the 
order imbalances of retail traders in the dark venue across stocks, sorted by dividend yield. To 
test this relation, we replace the trading venue ratios as the dependent variable in equation (3) 
with our measures of retail trading.  
In Table 7, we provide estimates of retail trading and retail trading imbalances in the dark 
venue around the ex-dividend, accounting for the stock’s dividend yield. In columns [1] and [2], 
we provide evidence that retail trading increases around the ex-dividend date for high-dividend 
yield stocks. We also show that retail trading peaks for high-dividend yield stocks on the last 
cum-dividend date, where the estimate for EXi,t-1*Yield is positive, 0.3843 (12.9009), when the 
scaled (standardized) retail trading ratio serves as the dependent variable. This finding implies 
that high dividend yield stocks are associated with more dividend-capture activity by retail 
investors. In columns [3] and [4], we find that retail trade imbalances prior to the ex-dividend are 
increasing with the stock’s dividend yield. For instance, the coefficient estimates for 
EXi,t-2*Yield and EXi,t-1*Yield are 2.3776 and 3.0578 using the scaled retail trading imbalance, 
OIBTRD. This result suggests that retail traders are stronger buyers of dividend-paying stocks on 
                                                          
20 Another explanation is that retail investors tend to hold low-priced stocks. Low-priced, dividend-paying stocks are 
likely to have large dividend yields. To account for this confounding effect, we control for price in all our regression 
specifications.  
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cum-dividend days for high-dividend yield stocks. We provide corroborating evidence when the 
standardized measure of retail trading imbalance, SOIBTRD, serves as the dependent variable, 
the estimates for EXi,t-2*Yield and EXi,t-1*Yield are 9.4489 and 12.6101. In columns [5] and [6], 
we display the retail trading imbalances using executed trade volume, OIBVOL, which support 
our contention that high dividend yield stocks motivate more retail buying prior to the ex-
dividend date. Consistent with our trading imbalance measures using trades which execute, we 
find that imbalances using executed trade volume is higher on the last two cum-dividend dates 
for high-dividend yield stocks. Finally, we show that measures of retail trading imbalances, using 
both executed trades and trade volume are negative following the ex-dividend date. This 
indicates that retail traders are less active in trading the stock once the dividend begins to trade 
without the dividend – consistent with dividend-capturing behavior. We conclude that the results 
provided in Table 7 confirm that the stock’s dividend yield is a significant factor in retail trading 
participation and trading behavior in dark venues around the ex-dividend date.  
Figure 4 shows the changes in retail trading imbalances around the ex-dividend date 
sorted by the stock’s dividend yield. In Panel A, we provide the retail trading imbalances using 
trades which execute around the ex-dividend date. The visual in Panel A shows that retail trading 
imbalance, OIBTRD, increases on the cum-dividend days for high-dividend yield stocks (i.e., 
quintile 5). The retail trading imbalance for stocks in the next largest dividend-yield quintile 
exhibit similar patterns around the ex-dividend, although smaller in magnitude. This confirms 
that while moderately high-dividend yield stocks exhibit some retail dividend-capturing trading 
behavior, it is primarily the largest dividend-yield stocks that attracts more retail-oriented buying 
behavior on the cum-dividend days. In Panel B, we provide changes in retail trading imbalance 
using executed volume, OIBVOL. Consistent with Panel A, we show that retail trading 
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imbalances increases on the cum-dividend days for high-dividend yield stocks. For instance, we 
document that the high-dividend yield quintile (i.e., blue line) is associated with the highest level 
of retail trading imbalance. 
  
EFFECTS OF LIT AND DARK FRAGMENTATION ON PRICE-DROP RATIO 
In this section, we examine whether fragmented stocks experience higher or lower price-
drop ratio, PDR. We follow Mortal, Paudel, and Silveri (2017) and measure the PDR, as the 
difference between the closing price on the cum-dividend date and the closing price on the ex-
dividend date, scaled by the dividend paid on a per share basis. The formal calculation is 
provided in equation (4) below:  
Price Drop Ratio (PDR) =
 Pricecum-Priceex
Dividend
 
(4) 
 In unreported results, the average PDR for our sample of firms is 0.4474 while the 
median PDR for our sample of firms is 0.4896. The average PDR in our sample is lower than 
that reported by Jakob and Whitby (2017) although their measure of PDR is adjusted for market 
returns on the cum-dividend price. After adjusting for the market-return on the cum-dividend 
price, the mean and median PDR is 0.5328 and 0.6243, which is closer to the numbers reported 
in their paper.21  
We first examine the relation between our measures of fragmentation and the PDR. We 
define lit fragmentation as the fragmentation of order flow across publicly transparent limit order 
book exchanges. Our measure of lit fragmentation, LitFrag, is constructed using an inverted 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, using daily trading volumes reported by all trading venues reported 
                                                          
21 The PDR totals reported in this paper are slightly lower than the mean (0.656) and median (0.715) reported by 
Jakob and Whitby (2017). One explanation for such differences are likely to attributed to sample periods as their 
study extends back to 1982 and stops at 2012.  
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in the Market Information Data Analytics System (MIDAS) database. The inverted index allows 
us to interpret that a higher index score implies greater lit fragmentation. Apart from analyzing 
the impact of market fragmentation on price drops, we also control for several possible variables 
that might influence the PDR. First, we control for the stock’s dividend yield as tax-based 
dividend arguments suggest that varying dividend yields serve as a proxy for measuring tax 
clienteles. Second, we control for the stock’s nominal price as Jakob and Whitby (2017) show 
that there is a negative relation between the nominal share price and the price drop ratio, 
suggesting the ex-dividend day prices are more efficient when the stock has a lower nominal 
share price. We also control for the nominal dividend paid per share as both Dubofsky (1992) 
and Bali and Hite (1998) argue that the dividend size is positively related with the PDR. We 
also include a spread measure as larger transaction costs may inhibit short-term arbitrage traders, 
resulting in PDRs to move further away from one.  Conversely, when transaction costs are low, 
short-term dividend arbitrage traders will increase the PDR closer to one. Although Mortal, 
Paudel, and Silveri (2017) show that PDRs are comparable between NASDAQ and NYSE-listed 
stocks, we control for the stock’s primary listing exchange to see if the listing exchange impacts 
the ex-day price drop. Finally, we control for the firm size and trading volume. We expect that 
more liquid stocks such as those with larger trading volumes stimulate short-term dividend 
arbitrage activity, resulting in enhanced price efficiency and a price-drop ratio closer to one. The 
specification includes both year and firm fixed-effects. The full regression specification is 
provided below in equation (5): 
PDRi,t = β0 + β1Fragi,t + β2Fragi,t*Yieldi + β3Yieldi + Controlsi,t + εi,t (5) 
Table 8 column (1) reports the coefficient estimate for our measure lit fragmentation, 
LitFrag. While the coefficient estimate is negative it is not statistically different from zero. 
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Consistent with our earlier analysis, we account for the influence of the stock’s dividend yield. 
Thus, we include an interaction term LitFrag x Yield. In column (2), we report a negative 
coefficient estimate for LitFrag, however, the interaction term is positive. This result implies 
that in high dividend-yield stocks, higher levels of lit fragmentation increase the PDR, 
improving price efficiency. In column (3), we find higher levels of off-exchange or dark 
fragmentation reduces the PDR, a finding that suggests higher levels of dark fragmentation 
impedes the price efficiency mechanism on the ex-dividend day. In other words, it appears that 
increases in dark trading surrounding the ex-dividend date help explain the ex-day price 
anomaly. Consistent with our specification in column (2), we interact our measure of dark 
fragmentation with the stock’s dividend yield. In column (4), we find that our interaction term 
DarkFrag x Yield is positive – a similar result to that found with the interaction term using our 
measure of lit fragmentation. Our results indicate that both lit and dark fragmentation appear to 
reduce the PDR, however, we also document that in high-dividend yield stocks, market 
fragmentation appears to increase the PDR, improving ex-day price efficiency. The coefficient 
estimate for the stock’s nominal share price is negative, consistent with Jakob and Whitby 
(2017). Interestingly, we find that the estimate for trading volume, LnVol, is negative across 
all specifications, which contradicts the liquidity argument that liquidity facilitates arbitrage 
activity. Finally, we show that our transaction cost measure, Spread, is negatively related to the 
PDR, which is consistent with the transaction costs hypothesis that argues that stocks with 
higher transaction costs inhibit dividend capturing activity.  
Aside from our analysis on the effects of market fragmentation on the ex-day PDR, we 
next examine the effects on the ex-day return. We replace the stock’s ex-day PDR with the 
stock’s ex-day return as the dependent variable. The stock’s ex-day return refers to either the 
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stock’s raw return (including the dividend distribution) as well as its market-adjusted return, 
which we refer to as AB Return. To the extent that market fragmentation reduces the PDR, we 
expect both lit and dark fragmentation to be associated with higher ex-day returns. However, to 
the extent that the stock’s dividend yield moderates the effects of market fragmentation leading 
to an increase the PDR, we expect that ex-day returns to increase as well. All other independent 
variables from equation (5) are the same. Likewise, both year and firm fixed-effects are included. 
The full regression specification is provided below in equation (6):   
Returni,t = β0 + β1Fragi,t + β2Fragi,t*Yieldi + β3Yieldi + Controlsi,t + εi,t (6) 
 Table 9 provides the coefficient estimates from the equation (6). Consistent with our 
expectation, we find in higher dividend-yield stocks, higher levels of lit and dark fragmentation 
are associated with lower ex-day returns. For example, both columns (2) and (4) show that the 
coefficient estimate is negative for our interaction term, LitFrag x Yield. This indicates that for 
higher-dividend yield stocks, more fragmented stocks are associated with lower ex-day returns. 
In columns (6) and (8), we find that the parameter estimate is negative for our interaction term, 
DarkFrag x Yield. Notably, the estimates for LitFrag and DarkFrag are insignificant across all 
specifications, indicating that the two measures of fragmentation, alone, are not significant 
determinants of ex-day returns. Overall, the results provided in Table 8 and 9 indicate that 
conditional on the stock’s dividend yield, higher levels of market fragmentation drive the PDR 
closer to one, resulting in lower ex-day returns. Finally, we document a positive coefficient 
estimate for Spread, consistent with the argument the stock’s with larger spreads inhibit dividend 
arbitrage activity.  
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RETAIL TRADING IMBALANCES AND THE PRICE-DROP RATIO 
In the final part of our analysis, we examine whether retail trading imbalances affect the 
PDR. According to Frank and Jagannathan (1998) and Jakob and Ma (2003), retail traders are 
subject dividend aversion behavior which argues that retail traders may delay the stock purchases 
until the stock trades ex-dividend, resulting in prices to close higher on the ex-dividend date. 
Although we have shown that retail traders are not only more active prior to the ex-dividend, they 
are also net buyers, particularly in the high-dividend yield stocks. Nonetheless, we test whether 
retail trading imbalances contribute to smaller or larger PDRs. In Table 10, we provide results 
showing that retail trading imbalances, OIBTRD, appear to result in lower PDRs, consistent with 
the findings of Jakob and Ma (2003). However, once we interact the retail trading imbalance with 
the stock’s dividend yield, we document a positive coefficient for the term, OIBTRD x Yield. This 
finding indicates that in the higher dividend yield stocks, retail traders contribute to a higher PDR. 
In fact, the combined effects, conditional on the stock’s dividend yield, indicate that retail traders 
increase not only the PDR but also improve ex-day price efficiency.   
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 We argue that the ex-dividend date influences which trading venues capture a larger 
share of dividend-capturing traders. We follow theoretical limit order models as well the 
literature on ex-dividend trading to suggests that certain trading venues (i.e., taker-maker and 
dark venues) are more attractive to dividend-capture traders. We posit that these two trading 
venues enable aggressive dividend-capture traders the opportunity to bypass limit order queues 
and offset transaction costs in capturing dividend-paying stocks. Finally, we argue that SEC Rule 
612 allowing trading at sub-penny prices motivates broker-dealers to route retail marketable 
orders to dark venues as to avoid paying displayed spreads and bypass limit order queues.  
 Our univariate and multivariate analysis confirms that dark trading venues obtain higher 
market share prior to the ex-dividend date, confirming our expectation that dark trading venues 
provide an aggressive favorable platform in capturing dividends. However, our results indicate 
that taker-maker trading venues experience lower market share on cum-dividend days only to 
increase once the stock trades ex-dividend. We argue that the increase in taker-maker market 
share following the ex-dividend date is consistent with the contention that once the stock trades 
ex-dividend, spreads increase resulting in higher incentives for traders to use taker-maker venues 
to offset larger transaction costs and bypass the limit order queue. Additional tests confirm that 
retail trading in the dark venue increases on cum-dividend days. Further, our analysis shows that 
retail traders in dark venues are net buyers – consistent with dividend-capturing trading behavior. 
We further control for the stock’s dividend yield as an additional factor contributing to the
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changes in trading venue and retail trading activity. Our evidence suggests that the stock’s 
dividend yield is a relevant factor in explaining how trading fragments around the ex-dividend 
date. 
 We also analyze if more fragmented stocks are associated with better ex-day price 
efficiency. Although we find that both lit and dark fragmentation are associated with a reduction 
in the PDR, once we account for the stock’s dividend yield, we find that fragmented trading is 
associated with higher PDR and lower ex-day returns. This result is consistent the notion that 
fragmented trading, lit and dark, are associated with improving price efficiency. Finally, we 
address whether retail traders contribute to higher or lower PDRs as the dividend aversion 
hypothesis holds that certain traders delay their stock purchases following the dividend 
distribution date, driving up ex-day prices, and a lower PDR. Our results indicate that retail 
trading imbalances lower PDR, however, once conditioning on the stock’s dividend yield, we 
show that retail trading imbalances increase the PDR. This last result indicates the retail traders 
improve ex-day price efficiency.   
 Our findings have a several implications. First, we show that the impending trading 
deadline associated with capturing dividends motivates more trading in dark venues on cum-
dividend days. This results in less trading activity on lit venues on cum-dividend days. Second, 
we find that the higher subjective valuation associated with stock’s dividend yield motivates 
more activity to the dark venues. Third, in contrast to the dividend aversion hypothesis, we show 
that retail trading in dark venues exhibit dividend-capture trading tendencies. Finally, we detail 
that fragmented stocks as well as off-exchange retail trading contribute the ex-day price drop 
anomaly. 
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1
2
6
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table presents statistics that describe the sample. Panel A reports the following stock and trading characteristics. Market capitalization is the 
CRSP market cap in (000s). Price the daily closing price using the midpoint of the bid and ask. Price volatility is the difference between the daily 
high and daily low scaled by the daily high price. Turnover is measured by dividing the daily trade volume by the shares outstanding. Maker-taker 
and Taker-maker Ratios are computed using reported executed trades and trading volume in MIDAS. Maker-taker (Taker-maker) ratio is the daily 
maker-taker (taker-maker) volume scaled to by all daily trades. Dark trades are daily trade executions reported under exchange code “D” in TAQ. 
Dark ratio is the daily dark trades divided by daily trades. Retail ratio is computed by scaling all identified retail trades in exchange code “D” in 
TAQ to all reported trades. OIBTRD (OIBVOL) refer to the retail order imbalances using executed trades (volume). Panel B reports the statistics 
about the dividends. The amount of dividend and dividend yield are reported as well as the amount of the dividend change. Increases (decreases) 
are the positive (negative) difference between the recent dividend and the last dividend yield.  
 Mean Standard Deviation Q1 Q3 N 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Panel A. Stock and Trading Characteristics 
Market Cap 
Price  
Price Volatility 
Turnover 
Maker-taker Ratio (Trades) 
Maker-taker Ratio (Volume) 
Taker-maker Ratio (Trades)  
Taker-maker Ratio (Volume)  
Dark Ratio (Trades)  
Dark Ratio (Volume)  
Retail Ratio (Trades)  
Retail Ratio (Volume) 
OIBTRD 
OIBVOL 
12,183,918,000 
46.05 
0.0233 
0.0071 
0.6468 
0.6084 
0.1217 
0.0859 
0.2316 
0.3057 
0.0471 
0.0683 
-0.0219 
-0.0355 
35,590,498,000 
42.93 
0.0153 
0.0085 
0.0943 
0.1124 
0.0602 
0.0456 
0.0856 
0.1182 
0.0634 
0.0850 
0.2870 
0.3598 
662,190,280 
19.98 
0.0139 
0.0030 
0.5983 
0.5517 
0.0859 
0.0588 
0.1767 
0.2282 
0.0210 
0.0282 
-0.1750 
-0.2381 
83,899,684,500 
59.23 
0.0280 
0.0086 
0.7090 
0.6810 
0.1513 
0.1079 
0.2666 
0.3589 
0.0474 
0.0728 
0.1429 
0.1696 
1,671 
1,671 
1,671 
1,671 
1,671 
1,671 
1,671 
1,671 
1,671 
1,671 
1,671 
1,671 
1,671 
1,671 
Panel B. Dividend characteristics 
Dividend paid 
Dividend yield 
0.2304 
0.0061 
0.1923 
0.0042 
0.0200 
0.0006 
1.0250 
0.0262 
19,546 
19,546 
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Table 2: Event study of Trading Venue Market Share Around the Ex-Dividend Day 
Table 2 presents results from a 21-day event study around dividend ex-dividend day. Columns [2] and [3] report the results for maker-taker market 
share and standardized maker-taker market share. Columns [4] and [5] report the results for taker-maker market share and standardized taker-
maker market share. Columns [6] and [7] report the results for dark market share and standardized dark market share. Column [1] reports the 
market-adjusted returns, which are obtained by subtracting CRSP equally-weighted index returns from the CRSP raw returns. We standardized 
each trading venue measure by calculating the difference between the venue ratio for stock i on day t and the average venue ratio and then divide 
this difference by the standard deviation of venue trading measure for stock i. The standardization procedure allows each stock to have a trading 
venue measure on each day that is similarly distributed with a zero mean and a unit variance. The t-tests tests whether the standardized trading 
venue measure is significantly different from zero. *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.  
 
 
Returns MT Ratio 
Standardized 
MT Ratio 
TM Ratio 
Standardized 
TM Ratio 
Dark Ratio 
Standardized 
Dark Ratio 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
t-10, t-6 
t-5 
t-4 
t-3 
t-2 
t-1 
Ex-Day 
t+1 
t+2 
t+3 
t+4 
t+5 
t+6,t+10 
0.0286*** 
0.0675*** 
0.0610*** 
0.0190 
0.0060 
-0.0098*** 
-0.0370*** 
0.0340*** 
0.0236** 
-0.0138 
0.0233* 
0.0334*** 
0.0046*** 
0.6452 
0.6449 
0.6448 
0.6452 
0.6453 
0.6453 
0.6468 
0.6459 
0.6453 
0.6447 
0.6442 
0.6456 
0.6445 
-0.0008 
0.0101 
-0.0100 
0.0167** 
0.0125* 
0.0043 
0.0289*** 
0.0073 
0.0064 
-0.0054 
-0.0190*** 
0.0020 
-0.0104*** 
0.1207 
0.1204 
0.1198 
0.1201 
0.1203 
0.1196 
0.1217 
0.1224 
0.1235 
0.1230 
0.1229 
0.1235 
0.1233 
-0.0337*** 
-0.0444*** 
-0.0486*** 
-0.0416*** 
-0.0420*** 
-0.0538*** 
-0.0022 
0.0137** 
0.0370*** 
0.0249*** 
0.0306*** 
0.0355*** 
0.0523*** 
0.2340 
0.2347 
0.2354 
0.2347 
0.2344 
0.2351 
0.2316 
0.2317 
0.2312 
0.2326 
0.2329 
0.2309 
0.2322 
0.0287*** 
0.0218*** 
0.0455*** 
0.0065 
0.0102 
0.0312*** 
-0.0318*** 
-0.0205*** 
-0.0376*** 
-0.0146** 
-0.0014 
-0.0350*** 
-0.0233*** 
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Table 3: Retail Trading and Retail Trading Imbalances Around Ex-Dividend Dates 
Table 3 presents results from a 21-day event study around dividend announcements. Columns [2] and [3] report the results for retail and 
standardized retail market share. Columns [4], and [5] report the results for retail order imbalances and standardized retail order imbalances using 
trade executions. Columns [6], and [7] reports the results for retail order imbalances and standardized retail order imbalances using executed trade 
volume. Column [1] reports the market-adjusted returns, which are obtained by subtracting CRSP equally-weighted index returns from the CRSP 
raw returns. Retail ratio (daily retail volume in dark venues divided by daily trade volume) is reported along with the standardized retail ratio. We 
standardized the retail trading measure by calculating the difference between the retail ratio for stock i on day t and the average retail ratio and 
then divide this difference by the standard deviation of the retail trading measuring for stock i. The standardization procedure allows each stock to 
have a dark measure on each day that is similarly distributed with a zero mean and a unit variance. The t-tests tests whether the standardized retail 
trading measure is significantly different from zero. The standardized procedure is also applied to retail order imbalances. *, **, *** denotes 
significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.  
 
Returns Retail Ratio 
Standardized 
Retail Ratio 
OIBTRD 
Standardized 
OIBTRD 
OIBVOL 
Standardized 
OIBVOL 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
t-10, t-6 
t-5 
t-4 
t-3 
t-2 
t-1 
Ex-Day 
t+1 
t+2 
t+3 
t+4 
t+5 
t+6,t+10 
0.0286*** 
0.0675*** 
0.0610*** 
0.0190 
0.0060 
-0.0098*** 
-0.0370*** 
0.0340*** 
0.0236** 
-0.0138 
0.0233* 
0.0334*** 
0.0046*** 
0.0473 
0.0485 
0.0483 
0.0488 
0.0487 
0.0483 
0.0471 
0.0464 
0.0468 
0.0467 
0.0465 
0.0459 
0.0473 
0.0017 
0.0100 
0.0417*** 
0.0225*** 
0.0320*** 
0.0483*** 
-0.0175** 
-0.0192*** 
-0.0448*** 
-0.0298*** 
-0.0106 
-0.0308*** 
-0.0019 
-0.0178 
-0.0178 
-0.0125 
-0.0095 
-0.0038 
0.0028 
-0.0219 
-0.0277 
-0.0292 
-0.0377 
-0.0307 
-0.0257 
-0.0228 
0.0111*** 
0.0057 
0.0297*** 
0.0460*** 
0.0792*** 
0.1014*** 
-0.0073 
-0.0431*** 
-0.0347*** 
-0.0724*** 
-0.0428*** 
-0.0261*** 
-0.0186*** 
-0.0262 
-0.0236 
-0.0230 
-0.0205 
-0.0100 
-0.0029 
-0.0355 
-0.0395 
-0.0440 
-0.0461 
-0.0438 
-0.0388 
-0.0366 
0.0134*** 
0.0251*** 
0.0317*** 
0.0405*** 
0.0834*** 
0.1058*** 
-0.0213*** 
-0.0465*** 
-0.0444*** 
-0.0558*** 
-0.0398*** 
-0.0338*** 
-0.0226*** 
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Table 4: Trading Venue Market Share Around the Ex-Dividend Day 
This table reports the regression results from equation (1). The dependent variable refers to trading venue 
market share ratio, where trading venue refers to either maker-taker, taker-maker, and dark trading 
venues. We also use the standardized trading venue market share as the dependent variable.  All trading 
venue market share ratios are measured for stock i on day t across the event window where EXt is equal 
to one if day t is the ex-dividend date. Five separate dummy variables are included to capture the five 
days around the ex-dividend date. Other independent variables include firm size, price volatility, share 
turnover, and price. Both day and stock fixed effects are included in the regression. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm and date level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denotes 
significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 Maker-Taker Taker-Maker Dark 
Dep Var. =  MT Ratio SMT Ratio TM Ratio STM Ratio Dark Ratio SDark Ratio 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
ExDay
t-2
 
 
ExDay
t-1
 
 
ExDay
t
 
 
ExDay
t+1
 
 
ExDay
t+2
 
 
Sizet 
 
Volatility
t
 
 
Turnovert 
 
Pricet 
 
Intercept 
 
 
 
Adjusted R² 
Stock FE 
Day FE 
0.0004 
(0.40) 
0.0005 
(0.60) 
0.0007 
(0.68) 
0.00087 
(0.85) 
0.0008 
(0.79) 
0.0006 
(0.44) 
0.0218*** 
(15.70) 
-0.2513*** 
(3.85) 
0.0318*** 
(10.43) 
0.6120*** 
(51.21) 
 
 
0.0705 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0157 
(1.47) 
0.0114 
(1.18) 
0.0310*** 
(3.15) 
0.0095 
(0.89) 
0.0126 
(1.16) 
0.0130*** 
(4.75) 
0.1299*** 
(17.15) 
-5.45*** 
(14.75) 
0.0064 
(1.63) 
0.3324*** 
(9.52) 
 
 
0.0056 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0362*** 
(4.92) 
-0.0016** 
(2.24) 
-0.0022*** 
(3.23) 
-0.0016** 
(2.28) 
0.0004 
(0.52) 
0.0014** 
(2.08) 
0.0083*** 
(12.25) 
-0.0076*** 
(8.04) 
0.0342 
(0.83) 
-0.0184*** 
(11.40) 
 
 
0.0552 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0457*** 
(4.71) 
-0.0592*** 
(6.25) 
-0.0054 
(0.55) 
0.0105 
(1.02) 
0.0332*** 
(3.31) 
-0.0032 
(1.50) 
-0.0900*** 
(14.63) 
-4.1179*** 
(8.77) 
-0.0129*** 
(3.61) 
-0.2282*** 
(7.93) 
 
 
0.0056 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0012 
(1.25) 
0.0017* 
(1.92) 
0.0009 
(1.02) 
-0.0012 
(1.33) 
-0.0022*** 
(2.65) 
-0.0089*** 
(8.62) 
-0.0142*** 
(12.52) 
0.2171*** 
(3.80) 
-0.0134*** 
(6.37) 
0.3512*** 
(28.66) 
 
 
0.0763 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0081 
(0.73) 
0.0258** 
(2.54) 
-0.0329*** 
(3.32) 
-0.0215** 
(1.96) 
-0.0430*** 
(3.93) 
-0.0124*** 
(4.75) 
-0.0808*** 
(10.42) 
9.0441*** 
(14.39) 
0.0022 
(0.66) 
-0.206*** 
(5.72) 
 
 
0.0072 
Yes 
Yes 
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Table 5: Retail Trading Around Ex-Dividend Date 
This table reports the regression results from equation (2). The dependent variable refers to one of the 
measures of retail trading. In columns [1] and [2], the dependent variable refers to the ratio of retail 
trading to all reported trading. In columns [3] and [4], the dependent variable refers to retail order 
imbalances using executed trades while in columns [5] and [6], the dependent variable refers to retail 
order imbalances using executed trade volume. We also use the standardized trading retail trading and 
retail order imbalance as the dependent variable.  All retail trading ratios are measured for stock i on day t 
across the event window where EXt is equal to one if day t is the ex-dividend date. Five separate dummy 
variables are included to capture the five days around the ex-dividend date. Other independent variables 
include firm size, price volatility, share turnover, and price. Both day and stock fixed effects are included 
in the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and date level. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses.  *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Retail Trading Trade Imbalance Volume Imbalance 
Dep Var. =  Retail Trd SRetail Trd OIBTRD SOIBTRD OIBVOL SOIBVOL 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
EXt-2 
 
EXt-1 
 
EXt 
 
EXt+1 
 
EXt+2 
 
Sizet 
 
Volatility
t
 
 
Turnovert 
 
Pricet 
 
Intercept 
 
 
 
Adjusted R² 
Stock FE 
Date FE 
0.0011*** 
(3.12) 
0.0011*** 
(3.12) 
0.0034*** 
(7.79) 
-0.0006** 
(1.96) 
-0.0009*** 
(3.26) 
-0.0094*** 
(13.70) 
-0.0083*** 
(9.18) 
-0.3291*** 
(6.27) 
0.0007 
(0.70) 
0.1486*** 
(18.61) 
 
0.1090 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0319*** 
(2.73) 
0.0489*** 
(4.29) 
-0.0179* 
(1.72) 
-0.0206* 
(1.93) 
-0.0511*** 
(4.61) 
-0.0056** 
(2.14) 
-0.0913*** 
(11.86) 
-0.8593 
(1.37) 
-0.0076*** 
(2.73) 
-0.2429*** 
(6.77) 
 
0.0032 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0186*** 
(7.60) 
0.0240*** 
(10.14) 
-0.0041* 
(1.75) 
-0.0073*** 
(3.05) 
-0.0083*** 
(3.50) 
0.0116*** 
(11.06) 
0.0118*** 
(5.79) 
0.5367*** 
(5.70) 
0.0033 
(1.42) 
-0.1574*** 
(12.47) 
 
0.0070 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0897*** 
(9.44) 
0.1095*** 
(11.66) 
-0.0011 
(-0.13) 
-0.0386*** 
(4.35) 
-0.0294*** 
(3.27) 
0.0006 
(0.36) 
0.0083* 
(1.82) 
0.1936 
(0.98) 
-0.0002 
(0.14) 
0.0163 
(0.78) 
 
0.0011 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0223*** 
(7.69) 
0.0290*** 
(9.68) 
-0.0067** 
(2.44) 
-0.0086*** 
(2.95) 
-0.0122*** 
(4.08) 
0.0093*** 
(10.24) 
0.0155*** 
(7.20) 
0.7300*** 
(7.48) 
0.0058*** 
(2.64) 
-0.1304*** 
(10.93) 
 
0.0042 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0908*** 
(10.09) 
0.1126*** 
(12.15) 
-0.0167** 
(2.10) 
-0.0441*** 
(5.45) 
-0.0402*** 
(4.54) 
-0.0000 
(0.03) 
-0.0013 
(0.35) 
0.1843 
(1.04) 
-0.0012 
(0.69) 
-0.0063 
(0.50) 
 
0.0012 
Yes 
Yes 
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Table 6: Trading Venue Market Share Around the Ex-Dividend Day by Dividend Yield 
 This table reports the regression results from equation (3). The dependent variable refers to trading venue 
market share ratio, where trading venue refers to either maker-taker, taker-maker, and dark trading 
venues. We also use the standardized trading venue market share as the dependent variable.  All trading 
venue market share ratios are measured for stock i on day t across the event window where EXt is equal 
to one if day t is the ex-dividend date. Five separate dummy variables are included to capture the five 
days around the ex-dividend date. Five separate interaction terms are included to capture the effects of the 
stock’s dividend yield around the ex-date. Other independent variables include firm size, price volatility, 
share turnover, and price. Both day and stock fixed effects are included in the regression. Standard errors 
are clustered at the firm and date level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denotes 
significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Maker-Taker Taker-Maker Dark 
Dep Var. =  MT Ratio SMT Ratio TM Ratio STM Ratio Dark Ratio SDark Ratio 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
EXt-2 
 
EXt-1 
 
EXt 
 
EXt+1 
 
EXt+2 
 
EXt-2 x Yield 
 
EXt-1 x Yield 
 
EXt x Yield 
 
EXt+1 x Yield 
 
EXt+2 x Yield 
 
 
Intercept 
 
 
Adjusted R² 
Controls 
Fixed Effects 
0.0009 
(0.72) 
0.0022* 
(1.68) 
0.0011 
(0.94) 
0.0012 
(0.95) 
0.0007 
(0.57) 
-0.0776 
(0.71) 
-0.2664* 
(1.86) 
-0.0706 
(0.76) 
-0.0479 
(0.49) 
0.0212 
(0.23) 
0.6216*** 
(51.58) 
 
0.0734 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0203 
(1.42) 
0.0271** 
(1.99) 
0.030** 
(2.43) 
0.0138 
(0.94) 
0.0152 
(1.07) 
-0.7369 
(0.47) 
-2.5346 
(1.57) 
0.0083 
(0.01) 
-0.6832 
(0.46) 
-0.4149 
(0.28) 
0.3265*** 
(9.32) 
 
0.0056 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0005 
(0.65) 
-0.0009 
(1.04) 
-0.0007 
(0.91) 
0.0003 
(0.32) 
0.0010 
(1.29) 
-0.1662*** 
(2.84) 
-0.2195*** 
(4.20) 
-0.1374** 
(2.42) 
0.0176 
(0.27) 
0.0712 
(1.26) 
0.0370*** 
(5.04) 
 
0.0553 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0209* 
(1.69) 
-0.0356*** 
(2.88) 
0.0165 
(1.39) 
0.0043 
(0.31) 
0.0246* 
(1.95) 
-3.9741*** 
(3.38) 
-3.7849*** 
(3.50) 
-3.5233*** 
(3.09) 
0.9882 
(0.66) 
1.3757 
(1.12) 
-0.2327*** 
(7.94) 
 
0.0056 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0004 
(0.33) 
-0.0014 
(1.14) 
-0.0004 
(0.42) 
-0.0015 
(1.39) 
-0.0017* 
(1.71) 
0.2438** 
(2.27) 
0.4860*** 
(3.30) 
0.2079** 
(2.40) 
0.0303 
(0.36) 
-0.0924 
(1.01) 
0.3414*** 
(27.92) 
 
0.0810 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0158 
(1.11) 
-0.0116 
(0.79) 
-0.0493*** 
(4.06) 
-0.0274** 
(2.00) 
-0.0410*** 
(3.04) 
3.8353*** 
(2.70) 
6.0073*** 
(3.59) 
2.6272** 
(2.33) 
0.9509 
(0.78) 
-0.3175 
(0.25) 
-0.1958*** 
(5.41) 
 
0.0073 
Yes 
Yes 
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Table 7: Retail Trading Around the Ex-Dividend Day Sorted by Dividend Yield 
This table reports the regression results from equation (3). The dependent variable refers to one of the 
measures of retail trading. We also use the standardized trading venue market share as the dependent 
variable.  All trading venue market share ratios are measured for stock i on day t across the event window 
where EXt is equal to one if day t is the ex-dividend date. Five separate dummy variables are included to 
capture the five days around the ex-dividend date. Five separate interaction terms are included to capture 
the effects of the stock’s dividend yield around the ex-date. Other independent variables include firm size, 
price volatility, share turnover, and price. Both day and stock fixed effects are included in the regression. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm and date level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** 
denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Retail Trading Trade Imbalance Volume Imbalance 
Dep Var. =  Retail Trd SRetail Trd OIBTRD SOIBTRD OIBVOL SOIBVOL 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
EXt-2 
 
EXt-1 
 
EXt 
 
EXt+1 
 
EXt+2 
 
EXt-2 x Yield 
 
EXt-1 x Yield 
 
EXt x Yield 
 
EXt+1 x Yield 
 
EXt+2 x Yield 
 
Intercept 
 
 
Adjusted R² 
Controls 
Stock FE 
Day FE 
0.0006 
(1.16) 
-0.0013* 
(1.94) 
0.0025*** 
(5.12) 
-0.0006 
(1.43) 
-0.0005 
(1.18) 
0.0800 
(1.36) 
0.3843*** 
(3.92) 
0.1379** 
(2.42) 
-0.0121 
(0.25) 
-0.0654 
(1.16) 
0.1403*** 
(17.53) 
 
0.1175 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0024 
(0.14) 
-0.0315 
(1.45) 
-0.0524*** 
(3.46) 
-0.0262* 
(1.93) 
-0.0554*** 
(4.11) 
5.4992*** 
(2.95) 
12.9009*** 
(4.11) 
5.5338*** 
(3.17) 
0.8903 
(0.72) 
0.7003 
(0.54) 
-0.2360*** 
(6.52) 
 
0.0036 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0038 
(0.76) 
0.0050 
(0.97) 
-0.0001 
(0.04) 
-0.0003 
(0.07) 
0.0036 
(0.86) 
2.3776*** 
(3.51) 
3.0578*** 
(3.99) 
-0.6385** 
(2.00) 
-1.14526** 
(2.24) 
-1.9120*** 
(3.47) 
-0.1825*** 
(12.95) 
 
0.0098 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0308 
(1.56) 
0.0309 
(1.53) 
0.0073 
(0.63) 
-0.0058 
(0.39) 
0.0146 
(1.02) 
9.4489*** 
(3.39) 
12.6101*** 
(4.15) 
-1.3580 
(1.13) 
-5.2512*** 
(2.68) 
-7.0490*** 
(3.82) 
0.0189 
(0.88) 
 
0.0017 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0103** 
(2.12) 
0.0144*** 
(3.06) 
-0.0004 
(0.10) 
-0.0039 
(1.01) 
-0.0020 
(0.45) 
1.9174*** 
(3.20) 
2.3455*** 
(3.35) 
-1.0135** 
(2.47) 
-0.7576 
(1.58) 
-1.6514*** 
(3.22) 
-0.1499*** 
(11.36) 
 
0.0053 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0449*** 
(2.70) 
0.0498*** 
(2.85) 
-0.0002 
(0.02) 
-0.0258** 
(2.36) 
-0.0010 
(0.08) 
7.3638*** 
(3.17) 
10.0851*** 
(3.70) 
-2.6349** 
(2.09) 
-2.9262** 
(2.06) 
-6.2830*** 
(3.74) 
-0.0044 
(0.34) 
 
0.0016 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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Table 8: Fragmentation and Price-Drop Ratios 
This table reports the regression results from equation (5). The dependent variable refers to the price-drop 
ratio, PDR, as provided in equation (4). The main independent variable is our measure of fragmentation, 
lit or dark. All fragmentation measures are calculated for stock i on day t, where t refers to the ex-
dividend date. We interact our measure of fragmentation with the stock’s dividend yield. We also include 
controls such as the stock’s dividend yield, price, dividend, firm size, trading volume, spread, and 
exchange listing. Both year and stock fixed effects are included in the regression. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses.  *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable = PDR [1] [2] [3] [4] 
LitFrag 
 
LitFrag x Yield 
 
DarkFrag 
 
DarkFrag x Yield 
 
Dividend Yield 
 
Price 
 
Dividend 
 
LnMcap 
 
LnVol 
 
Spread 
 
NASDAQ 
 
Intercept 
 
 
Year FE 
Firm FE 
Adjusted R² 
-0.7115 
(1.08) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-8.5272 
(0.49) 
-0.0089*** 
(2.76) 
0.5557 
(1.19) 
-0.2973 
(1.29) 
-0.2227*** 
(2.88) 
-43.5228*** 
(3.22) 
1.3096 
(1.31) 
8.3977** 
(2.34) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1045 
-1.1321* 
(1.65) 
0.2058** 
(2.09) 
 
 
 
 
-12.4670 
(0.71) 
-0.0087*** 
(2.66) 
0.4843 
(1.03) 
-0.0983 
(0.39) 
-0.2252*** 
(2.91) 
-43.7299*** 
(3.24) 
1.3060 
(1.30) 
5.9500 
(1.57) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1046 
 
 
 
 
-1.2241*** 
(2.84) 
 
 
-8.6984 
(0.50) 
-0.0088*** 
(2.71) 
0.5584 
(1.19) 
-0.3151 
(1.36) 
-0.1953** 
(2.52) 
-42.8505*** 
(3.17) 
1.3590 
(1.36) 
8.3578** 
(2.34) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1048 
 
 
 
 
-2.8336*** 
(4.72) 
0.7898*** 
(3.84) 
-15.6322 
(0.89) 
-0.0086*** 
(2.66) 
0.4979 
(1.06) 
-0.0388 
(0.16) 
-0.1912** 
(2.47) 
-44.0635*** 
(3.26) 
1.3570 
(1.36) 
4.5945 
(1.24) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1055 
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Table 9: Fragmentation and Ex-Day Returns  
This table reports the regression results from equation (6). The dependent variable refers to the ex-day return, where Return refers to the raw return 
and AB Return refers to the market-adjusted return on the ex-dividend date. The main independent variable is our measure of fragmentation, lit or 
dark. All fragmentation measures are calculated for stock i on day t, where t refers to the ex-dividend date. We interact our measure of 
fragmentation with the stock’s dividend yield. We also include controls such as the stock’s dividend yield, price, dividend, firm size, trading 
volume, spread, and exchange listing. Both year and stock fixed effects are included in the regression. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, 
**, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable  Return Return AB Return AB Return Return Return AB Return AB Return 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
LitFrag 
 
LitFrag x Yield 
 
DarkFrag  
 
DarkFrag x Yield  
 
Div Yield 
 
Intercept 
 
 
Controls 
Year FE 
Firm FE 
Adjusted R² 
-0.0029 
(0.23) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.3826 
(1.17) 
-0.1453** 
(2.17) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.3122 
0.0044 
(0.34) 
-0.0035* 
(1.93) 
 
 
 
 
0.4504 
(1.37) 
-0.1032 
(1.46) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.3133 
-0.0067 
(0.55) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.3310 
(1.02) 
-0.1456** 
(2.18) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.3133 
0.0007 
(0.05) 
-0.0036** 
(1.97 
 
 
 
 
0.3997 
(1.22) 
-0.1029 
(1.46) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.3134 
 
 
 
 
0.0010 
(0.12) 
 
 
0.3830 
(1.17) 
-0.1473** 
(2.21) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.3122 
 
 
 
 
0.0179 
(1.60) 
-0.0083** 
(2.16) 
0.4560 
(1.39) 
-0.1077 
(1.56) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.3123 
 
 
 
 
-0.0027 
(0.33) 
 
 
0.3309 
(1.02) 
-0.1488 
(0.29) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.3133 
 
 
 
 
0.0147 
(1.31) 
-0.0085** 
(2.23) 
0.4057 
(1.24) 
-0.1082 
(1.57) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.3135 
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Table 10: Retail Order Imbalances and Price-Drop Ratios 
This table reports the regression results from equation (5) except we replace our measure of fragmentation 
with our measure of retail trading imbalance. The dependent variable refers to the price-drop ratio, PDR, 
as provided in equation (4). Our retail trading imbalance measure, OIBTRD, is calculated for stock i on 
day t, where t refers to the ex-dividend date. We interact our retail trading imbalance measure with the 
stock’s dividend yield. We also include controls such as the stock’s dividend yield, price, dividend, firm 
size, trading volume, spread, and exchange listing. Both year and stock fixed effects are included in the 
regression. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 
levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable = PDR [1] [2] 
OIBTRD 
 
OIBTRD x Yield 
 
Dividend Yield 
 
Price 
 
Dividend 
 
LnMcap 
 
LnVol 
 
Spread 
 
NASDAQ 
 
Intercept 
 
 
Year FE 
Firm FE 
Adjusted R² 
-0.3357** 
(2.20 
 
 
-8.2106 
(0.47) 
-0.0089*** 
(2.75) 
0.5590 
(1.19) 
-0.2991 
(1.29) 
-0.2329*** 
(3.06) 
-44.1952*** 
(3.27) 
1.3384 
(1.34) 
7.8401** 
(2.20) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1046 
-0.7925*** 
(3.14) 
72.9626** 
(2.28) 
-5.4515 
(0.31) 
-0.0085*** 
(2.63) 
0.4182 
(0.89) 
-0.2858 
(1.24) 
-0.2338*** 
(3.07) 
-44.3399*** 
(3.28) 
1.3398 
(1.34) 
7.6119** 
(2.13) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1049 
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Figure 1: Fee Venues and Ex-Dividend Trading 
 
Figure 1 provides the motivation for trading across fee models around the ex-dividend date. Limit order 
book queues, waiting costs, and bid-ask spreads are likely to motivate order placement before and after 
the ex-dividend date. We conclude this will motivate which fee venue, maker-taker vs. taker-maker, will 
attract a larger proportion of dividend-capture trading.   
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Figure 2: Trading Venue Market Share Around the Ex-Dividend Day 
Figure 2 reports dark trading activity around the ex-dividend date across a 10-day event window. Panel A reports both the maker-taker trading 
ratio and standardized maker-taker ratio for all ex-dividend days. Panels B documents both the taker-maker trading ratio and standardized taker-
maker ratio for all ex-dividend days. Panels C documents both the dark trading ratio and standardized dark trading ratio for all ex-dividend days. 
Panel A. Maker-Taker Trading Ratio     Panel B. Taker-Maker Trading Ratio 
  
Panel C. Dark Trading Ratio 
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Figure 3: Retail Trading Around the Ex-Dividend Day 
Figure 3 reports both the retail trading ratio and retail trading imbalances around dividend announcements. Panel A reports retail trading ratios 
around dividend announcements. Panels B and C reports retail trading imbalances, OIBTRD, across all (dividend vs. increase) dividend 
announcements. Panel D reports the retail trading imbalances, OIBTRD, across all dividend announcements sorted via the stock’s dividend yield.  
Panel A. Retail Trading Ratio      Panel B. OIBTRD 
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Figure 4: Retail Trading Around Ex-Dividend Date by Dividend Yield 
Figure 4 reports both the retail trading ratio and retail trading imbalances around ex-dividend days. Panel A reports retail trading ratios around ex-
dividend days. Panels B and C reports retail trading imbalances, OIBTRD, across all (dividend vs. increase) ex-dividend days. Panel D reports the 
retail trading imbalances, OIBTRD, across all ex-dividend days sorted via the stock’s dividend yield.  
Panel A. OIBTRD       Panel B. OIBVOL 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A May 26th, 2017 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article, “Amazon’s Brush With $1,000 Signals 
the Death of the Stock Split” cites Amazon’s decision not to split their stock despite a share price 
closing near $1,000 as a signal that stock splits are dead.22 The article documents that S&P 500 
companies, in total, have accounted for less than 50 stock splits since 2010. Figure 1 shows the 
decline in the stock splits for S&P 500 companies.  
 The decline in the number of stock splits since 2010 is notable given that the average 
share price for stocks in the S&P 500 has been rising, coinciding with a “bull” market run over 
the same period. The WSJ article cites that among other explanations, that decades ago, 
companies considered stock splits as a method to keep shares affordable for retail investors. 
Despite no fundamental changes to the company following the stock splits, splits help generate 
excitement among retail investors, resulting in more trading. In recent years, however, 
individuals have moved away from direct ownership in equities and toward more diversified 
investments such as index funds.  
Consistent with the notion that changes in retail investor ownership have contributed to 
the decline in the number of stock splits, Minnick and Raman (2014) confirm that one 
contributing factor to the declining number of stock splits is the decline in direct retail ownership 
of stocks. Their findings suggest that firms are less likely to benefit from a stock split since 
increasing the shareholder base and attracting more retail investors is more difficult as other
                                                          
22 Available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazons-brush-with-1-000-signals-the-death-of-the-stock-split-
1495791009  
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investment options (i.e., mutual funds) exist for retail investors to diversify their holdings.23 
While Minnick and Raman provide evidence that changes in retail wealth and retail household 
income impact the firm’s propensity to split, they do not examine if stock splits are relevant in 
attracting retail trading around the split date. In this study, we investigate retail trading activity 
using around stock splits to see if stock splits are relevant in attracting retail investors. 
One historical view dating back to the early works of Copeland (1979), Baker and 
Gallagher (1980), and Baker and Powell (1993) suggests that stock splits align stocks prices in 
an optimal price range, resulting in a larger, dispersed shareholder base. A beneficiary from the 
post-split price reduction is the individual (i.e. retail) investor. In fact, numerous studies 
(Kryzanowski and Zhang, 1996; Schultz, 2000; Easley, O’Hara, and Saar, 2001; Angel, Brooks, 
& Mathew, 2004; Pavabutr and Sirodom, 2010) examine whether retail or small traders increase 
their participation around stock splits. Most of these papers rely on trade size as a proxy for retail 
trading. O’Hara, Yao and Ye (2014) document that changes to market structure such as increases 
in high-frequency trading reduce researchers’ ability to proxy for retail trading using trade size 
and odd lot executions. In this study, we use a recently developed measure put forth by Boehmer, 
Jones, and Zhang (2018) to identify off-exchange retail trades around stock splits. Boehmer, 
Jones, and Zhang document that nearly 90% of orders placed with brokers received small price 
improvements and that these small price improvements typically occur off-exchange. 
Nonetheless, Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang argue that their measure captures an economically 
significant amount of retail trading activity.   
Studies analyzing the impact of stock splits on retail investor clientele document that 
splits have a long-term impact on the degree of retail investor activity. For example, 
                                                          
23 Minnick and Raman (2014) cite the Dolley’s (1933) viewpoint that retail investors purchase splitting stocks to 
diversify their holdings. See Minnick and Raman (2014) for studies confirming this viewpoint.  
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Kryzanowski and Zhang (1996) show that increases in small-board lot trading (i.e., trade values 
of less $10,000) following a split persist for nearly 120 trading days while large traders (i.e., 
trade values of at least $100,000) are less affected by the stock split. Likewise, Schultz (2000) 
shows that the trading activity of small traders extends for over two months following the split-
date. Angel, Brooks, and Mathew (2004) find increases in activity of small-volume traders after 
the stock split date and confirm a long-term change increase in small-volume investors. Lipson 
and Mortal (2006) examine long-term liquidity effects post-stock split, finding that the average 
trade size declines considerably following the stock split, which they infer as a long-term 
increase in individual trading. These studies provide consistent evidence in support of the trading 
range hypothesis. We also examine if stock splits provide retail traders a favorable trading range, 
resulting in a long-term increase in retail trading. This expectation follows that post-split price 
levels do not revert to pre-stock split levels in the short-term, otherwise, the splitting stock 
underestimated the appropriate split factor to get prices back to a favorable range. To the extent 
that stock splits are no longer relevant in attracting retail participation, we expect that stock splits 
do not induce long-term retail participation.  
We also analyze if reverse stock splits alter retail trading. Consistent with the premise 
that stock splits enable an optimal price range for retail traders, Bacon, Salandro, and Shin 
(1993) investigate managerial decisions to engage in a reverse split, finding that managers 
believe that reverse stock splits align stock prices to a more favorable range and increase their 
ownership base. Han (1995) documents that trading costs reduce and volume increases following 
reverse splits, supporting the notion that reverse splits enhance the liquidity of the stock. 
However, Han does not demonstrate if reverse splits directly impact the retail trading activity. 
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Several studies investigate post-split volatility effects of reverse splits.24 Koski (2007) suggests 
that the decline in post-split volatility following reverse splits is attributed to the decline in noise 
traders, however, Koski does not directly identify retail trades. While reverse stock splits may 
move prices to an optimal range, many reverse stock splits may drive prices away from the low 
prices typically coveted by retail traders. Our identification of retail trades allows us to examine 
whether reverse splits increases or decreases retail trading activity.  
We analyze nearly 700 combined forward and reverse splits between 2007 and 2016. We 
find that retail trading increases (decreases) around forward (reverse) splits. We also confirm that 
stock splits have only a transitory effect on retail trading. For example, we find that retail trading 
and retail trading imbalances increases in the several days around the split-date, subsiding in the 
subsequent 10 days. We further account for pre- and post-split price levels to determine if stock 
splits affect retail trading. We posit that forward stock splits with lower post-split prices and 
higher pre-split prices will have higher retail trading levels following the split-date. Our evidence 
shows that retail trading increases more for splits with higher pre-split prices but not for lower 
post-split prices. We also partition the sample of reverse splits by pre-split and post-split price 
levels, finding that higher post-split prices levels result in less retail trading following the split-
date. Our results suggest that retail trading and trading behavior is affected by stock splits and is 
conditional on pre-split and post-split price levels. To the extent stock splits provide retail 
investors an optimal price, allowing for long-term retail trading participation, our results cast 
doubt on this optimal price hypothesis. Our findings do suggest that an optimal price range may 
exists depending on the pre- and post-split price levels associated with the forward and reverse 
splits. However, across all sample cuts, we find that the resulting change in retail participation 
                                                          
24 Dravid (1987), Peterson and Peterson (1992), and Koski (2007) all analyze volatility effects associated with 
reverse splits. 
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subsides within 10 trading days of the split-date. This finding confirms the notion that stock 
splits are less significant in capturing greater retail demand.    
 We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we contribute to the literature by 
providing an updated analysis of retail trading around stock splits, using a contemporary 
identification of retail traders. Second, we contribute to the literature as to the permanent effects 
of stock splits on retail trading by examining whether stock splits induce long-term or transitory 
retail trading. To the extent our findings indicate transitory retail investor participation, we 
provide evidence consistent with Minnick and Raman’s (2014) assertion that the benefits of 
stocks splits have declined, in part, due to changes in retail investing. Third, we provide evidence 
as to the relation between retail trading around reverse splits. To the extent that retail trading 
declines following reverse splits, we argue reverse splits do not enable an optimal price but 
rather move prices away from the lower price levels preferred by retail investors. 
  
159 
 
II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
The optimal range hypothesis states that stock splits lower stock prices to an “optimal” 
range in order to attract more retail investors, as it makes it easier for investors to purchase in 
round lots (Baker and Gallagher, 1980; Lakonishok and Lev, 1987; Dyl and Elliott; 2006). The 
optimal range hypothesis also suggests that stock splits increase the firm’s shareholder base, 
attracting greater retail clientele. However, some studies provide inconclusive evidence that 
stock splits adjust prices to an optimal range, increasing the firm’s shareholder base. Lamoureux 
and Poon (1987) find increases in the number of transactions along with the number of shares 
traded but do not provide evidence as to changes in investor clienteles. Maloney and Mulherin 
(1992) document that stock splits increase the firm’s shareholder base, specifically for 
institutional ownership, however, they do not directly test changes in retail ownership. Since 
these early findings, a host of studies document an increase in retail trading activity around stock 
splits.25 Many of these studies use trade size and the number of odd lot trades as a proxy for retail 
activity. However, O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2014) show that stealth traders and algorithmic traders 
use small-sized trades, including odd lot trades so that small traders are no longer considered 
retail traders.  
While the literature suggests that stock splits may align prices to a favorable range, 
reverse splits may serve a similar purpose. Bacon, Salandro, and Shin (1993) investigate
                                                          
25 See Kryzanowski and Zhang, 1996; Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1996; Schultz, 2000; Lipson, 2001; Easley et al., 
2001; Kamara and Koski, 2001; Angel, Brooks, & Mathew, 2004; Kadapakkam et al., 2005; Pavabutr and Sirodom, 
2010; and Kumar, Page and Spalt, 2012.  
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managerial decisions to engage in a reverse split, finding that managers believe that reverse splits 
align stock prices to a more favorable range and increase a firm’s ownership base. Specifically, 
Bacon, Salandro, and Shin cite the managerial belief that despite driving prices upwards, the 
higher price resulting from the reverse split improves the marketability of the stock. Yet, many 
reverse splits are often conducted to avoid exchange delisting (Peterson and Peterson, 1992). 
Kim, Klein, and Rosenfeld (2008) show that over 63% of their sample of reverse-splitting firms 
engage in a reverse split to avoid exchange delisting. Further, Kim, Klein, and Rosenfield as well 
as Koski (2007) show that firms engaging in a reverse stock split to avoid delisting tend to be 
low-priced, smaller capitalized, and more volatile. Han and Kumar (2013) document that retail 
investors prefer stocks with lottery-like features such as lower market capitalization, low price, 
and high volatility. Similarly, Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011) argue that retail investors suffer 
from underdiversification and show a tendency for trading stocks with lottery-like features. 
Finally, Meng and Pantzalis (2018) examine turn-of-the-month effects and monthly retail 
investor liquidity around stock splits, finding that lower prices following a stock splits results in 
greater turn-of-the-month demand for stocks with lottery-like features. To the extent that reverse 
splits increase prices and reduce volatility (Koski, 2007), thereby reducing the lottery-like 
features of the stock, then we expect a decline in retail trading activity. We formalize our first 
hypothesis below.  
H1: Retail trading increases (decreases) around forward (reverse) stock splits 
 We also examine the buy-sell imbalances of retail investors around stock splits. Previous 
stock split studies (Kryzanowski and Zhang, 1996; Schultz, 2000; Easley at al., 2001) show that 
retail investors are net buyers despite an overall rise in trading costs following the stock split. All 
three studies rely on the Lee-Ready (1991) trade classification algorithm in determining buy and 
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sells. In this paper, we use Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2018) in classifying retail trading. 
Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang compare their buy-sell assignment to the trade sign of the Lee and 
Ready algorithm, finding that the trade signs match for nearly 90% of the observations. Hence, 
we expect that retail traders exhibit stronger buying tendencies around stock splits. To the extent 
that reverse splits drive prices away from preferred levels of retail traders, we expect retail sell 
trades to dominate retail buy trades. Therefore, we expect the following hypothesis to hold.  
H2: Retail traders are net buyers (sellers) around forward (reverse) stock splits 
 While hypotheses 1 and 2 analyze if stock splits affect the level of retail trading as well 
as the trading behavior of retail investors, we next focus on the duration of retail investor activity 
following the stock split. To the extent that stock splits enable an optimal price range, allowing 
more retail traders the opportunity to transact in a stock at a lower price, then a stock split should 
have a sustaining effect on retail trading participation. Empirical evidence provided by 
Kryzanowski and Zhang (1996), Schultz (2000), Angel, Brooks, and Mathew (2004), and Lipson 
and Mortal (2006) confirm that stock splits impact retail traders beyond the split date, with some 
studies (i.e., Kryzanowski and Zhang, Schultz, and Lipson and Mortal) documenting effects 
lasting between two and four months following the split date.  
 One alternative explanation for stock splits is that they serve in attracting awareness 
about the firm. Consistent with signaling theory of stock splits, both Brennan and Copeland 
(1988), and Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984) argue that stock splits serve in attracting 
awareness to the firm. Huang, Liano, and Pan (2015) suggest that the stock split argument 
offered by Grinblatt et al. mirrors the attention-grabbing hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2007). 
Empirical evidence provided by Huang, Liano, and Pan shows that liquidity effects are short-
lived around both the announcement and split date. They do not test, however, the liquidity 
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effects associated with retail investors around the split date. Further, most of their sample period 
precedes many of the stock split studies in the literature and therefore, may not provide an 
accurate depiction of the changes in retail investor participation.26  
Formalizing our third hypothesis, we reference Minnick and Raman (2014), who suggests 
that the decline in direct equity investment from retail investors implies fewer benefits to firms in 
splitting the stock in expanding the long-term shareholder base. Further, to the extent that retail 
traders no longer use stock splits to diversify their holdings as posited by Minnick and Raman, 
retail trading following a split could be short-lived. We posit that to the extent that retail trading 
participation increases following the stock split as suggested in hypothesis 1 and 2, we expect 
that this relation is transitory. 
H3: Forward and reverse stock splits have only transitory effects on retail trading activity. 
                                                          
26 Their sample period ranges back to 1960 and most of their sample firms come before market structure changes 
such as decimalization, increases in high frequency trading, and the decline of direct retail trading participation.  
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III. MEASURES AND METHODS 
 
DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 Our measure of retail trading comes from Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2018), who 
measure retail trading in dark venues between 2010 and 2016. Our data allow us to examine 
retail trades dating back to 2004, however, Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu (2017) document that 
dark trades as defined by those reported to FINRA (code “D” in TAQ definition) are missing 
from May 2006 to February 2007 because TAQ data mixed trades reported to FINRA with some 
NASDAQ trades. Thus, we examine only stock splits taking place after February 2007 to 
mitigate any sample bias and data reporting errors. We obtain all stock and reverse splits from 
CRSP using distribution code 5523. Following the stock split literature, we filter out stock 
(reverse) splits that have a split factor less (greater) than 2 (0.5). For example, 3-for-2 stock splits 
(i.e., split factor = 1.5) and 2-for-3 reverse stock splits (i.e., split factor = 0.667) are excluded 
from the sample. We construct measures of retail trading and retail trading imbalances as well as 
standardized measures of retail trading imbalances. Applying these filters, we have 315 stock 
splits and 379 reverse splits.  
 Table 1 provides summary statistics for our sample. Panel A reports the number of splits, 
forward and reverse, for each year in our sample period. We find that most of the forward stock 
splits occur in the earlier years of our sample period. We also report the number of reverse splits 
occurring with a pre-split price below and above $1.00. Consistent with notion that most reverse 
splits are conducted to avoid delisting, we find that 75% of the reverse splits are conducted with
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 a pre-split price below $1.00. In Panel B, we report the frequency of forward stock splits by split 
factor. Most of our forward stock splits have a split factor of 2-to-1. Panel B also reports the 
frequency of forward stock splits by pre-split price range and post-split price range. We find that 
nearly 95% of the forward stock splits have a pre-split price greater than $30 while over 60% of 
the forward stock splits have a post-split price greater than $30. In Panel C, we report the 
frequency of reverse splits by split factor. We show that nearly half of the reverse splits have a 
split factor between 6 and 10. We also report the frequency of reverse splits by their pre- and 
post-split price range, finding nearly half of the reverse splits have a post-split price ranging 
between $1 and $5.  
 Figure 2 shows that distribution of forward and reverse stock splits across the years in the 
sample period. In Panel A, we show that the frequency of forward splits is highest in the 
beginning of the sample period, while reverse splits peak toward the end of the sample period. In 
Panel B, we provide the distribution of reverse splits, grouped by their pre-split price level. We 
find that the frequency of reverse splits with a pre-split price greater than $1.00 is consistent in 
all years of the sample, however, we do find that frequency of reverse splits occurring with a pre-
split price less $1.00 increases over the time-series.  
We follow Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2018) to identify retail trading activity. Boehmer, 
Jones, and Zhang argue that their measure of retail trading accounts for a considerable amount of 
all retail trading activity. Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang suggests that nearly all retail orders are 
non-directed, giving the broker discretion on execution venue. Thus, brokers have autonomy in 
routing orders to off-exchange venues to receive some price improvement. Further, Boehmer, 
Jones, and Zhang cite 606 filings with several brokerage houses, finding that most retail investor 
orders (90%) receive some small price improvement. Finally, while the measure is limited to 
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market orders and does not include possible retail limit orders limiting the scope of all retail 
trading activity, considering that most retail order flow is internalized or sold to wholesalers, we 
are confident that the proxy of off-exchange retail trading captures a significant portion of 
aggregate retail trading activity.27 
Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2018) propose that one can identify retail trades in the dark 
venue by using executions that receive small amounts of price improvement, typically less than a 
penny. These transactions usually take place just above or below a round penny. For example, 
we identify transactions as retail-initiated buys if the executed price is slightly below the round 
penny, and retail-initiated sells if the executed price is slightly above the round penny. If we let 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 equal the execution price in stock i at time t, then let 𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 100 * mod (𝑃𝑖𝑡, 0.01) be the 
fraction of a penny associated with that execution price. 𝑍𝑖𝑡 can take on any value in the unit 
interval [0,1). We then classify retail buys if the transaction price falls in the (0.6, 1) 𝑍𝑖𝑡 interval 
and classify retail sells if the transaction price falls in the (0,0.4) 𝑍𝑖𝑡 interval. We compute buy-
sell imbalances by scaling the difference between retail buy and sell trades (volume) to the total 
amount of executed retail trades (volume). We create a retail trading ratio by scaling all dark 
venue, retail executed trades to all executed trades for stock i on day t. We also construct retail 
trading ratio by scaling all executed retail share volume to all executed shares volume for stock i 
on day t. We verify our measures of retail trading with those of Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 
finding similar numbers.28   
                                                          
27 Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2018) show that their measure of retail trading accounts for nearly 3.68% of all 
executed trades. Our analysis shows that retail trading accounts for 3.68% of all executed trades.  
28 For example, we find that order imbalances using trades (volume) is -0.044 (-0.040). Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang 
(2018) report that order imbalances using trades (volume) is -0.038 (-0.032). However, comparing median values of 
order imbalance measures, our numbers are nearly identical (-0.028 vs. -0.027) to those of Boehmer, Jones, and 
Zhang.  
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OIBTRD(VOL)=
Retail Buy Trd (Vol)-Retail Sell Trd (Vol)
Total Retail Trd (Vol)
 
(1) 
 Finally, to better evaluate if retail trading levels statistically differ from mean levels 
throughout our event window period, we construct a standardize retail trading measure for both 
our retail market share ratios as well as our order imbalances measures. To compute our 
standardized measures, we take the retail trading measure for stock i on day t, and then subtract 
the average retail trading measure for stock i across the event window period, and then divide 
this difference by the standard deviation in the retail trading measure for stock i over the event 
window period.
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 In Table 2, we provide changes in retail trading around forward and reverse splits in our 
event window. In Panel A, columns (1) through (4) provide the changes in retail trading for 
forward splits while columns (5) through (8) provide the changes in retail trading around reverse 
splits. We show that following the stock split date, both standardized retail trading measures, 
constructed using either executed trades or trade volume, increase. Retail trading peaks on 
around split date, where both standardized measures are larger on the peak date than in the 
subsequent days. While retail trading levels remain positively elevated from their pre-split levels, 
the levels of retail trading following the split do not reflect a long-term change after the stock 
split. We show that retail trading declines following reverse splits. In column (8), we find that 
the standardized retail trading measure using executed trade volume declines following the stock 
splits.  
In Panel B of Table 2, we partition the sample of reverse splits based on the pre-split 
price of $1 since many splits conducted below $1 are done so to avoid exchange delisting. Kwan, 
Masulis, and McInish (2015) argue that market structure changes for stocks priced around $1.00 
present conflicting reasons for retail trading in the dark such as SEC Rule 612 which prohibits 
the displaying, ranking, or accepting orders priced at more than two decimal places for stocks 
priced at or above $1.00 by broker- dealers and exchanges. Specifically, they show that once a 
stock falls below $1.00, the minimum price increment falls from $0.01 to $0.001, resulting in a
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lower relative tick size. Kwan, Masulis, and McInish show that retail dark volume decreases 
once the stock price rises above $1.00, however, they also document that retail market share 
increases as the stock price goes above $1.00. In columns (1) through (4), we show that retail 
trading declines following reverse splits with a pre-split price less $1.00 The decline in retail 
trading supports the results of Kwan, Masulis, and McInish. The decreases in retail trading 
following the reverse stock split are also supportive of our arguments that reverse splits drive 
prices away from their lottery like features. In columns (5) through (8), we show that retail 
trading increases on the split date for reverse splits with a pre-split price above $1.00, however, 
the increase in retail trading is only transitory. The standardized estimates of retail trading are not 
significantly different from zero in the remaining days following the split.  
 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Our multivariate analysis regresses retail trading activity and trading imbalances on 
dummy date variables around the stock split date. We also control for the stock’s daily market 
capitalization, volume, price, volatility, spread, split factor, and turnover. The same regression 
specification is applied to reverse splits; however, we partition the sample of reverse splits to 
account for Reg NMS rule 612. Reg NMS rule 612 (i.e., subpenny pricing rule) implies that 
when a stock falls below $1.00, the required minimum pricing increment for exchange trades 
decreases from a penny, or $0.01, to $0.0001. To account for this potential confounding 
influence on our measure of retail trading, we partition the reverse splits that take place with pre-
split price below and above $1.00. By partitioning reverse splits based on the pre-split price 
above $1.00, we can make inferences about retail trading participation for reverse splits that are 
not influenced by Reg NMS rule 612. To further account for measurement errors, we divide the 
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sample of reverse splits into pre-split and post-split price buckets (see Koski, 2007). We also 
include both industry and year fixed-effects and cluster standard errors at the stock level. The full 
model specification is provided in equation (2).  
Retaili = β0+β1SplitDatei,t-2+β2SplitDatei,t-1+β3SplitDatei,t+β4SplitDatei,t+1
+ β
5
SplitDate
i,t+2
+ β
6
SplitDate
i,t+3,t+10
+ β
7
Controlsi + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(2) 
 Table 3 provides the coefficient estimates from regression equation (2). In columns (1) 
and (2), we find that only the coefficient estimate for SplitDate
i,t+1
is positive, 0.0051 (0.0130), 
when retail trading is measured via executed trades (trade volume). The other stock split-date 
dummy variables are insignificant both before and after the split, indicating that the effective 
date of the stock split has no sustaining influence on retail trading. The transitory increases in 
retail trading following the stock split are consistent with the notion suggested by Minnick and 
Raman (2014) in that retail investors are less likely to use stock splits to diversify their holdings. 
In columns (3) and (4), we provide the results for all reverse splits. We find that following 
reverse stock splits, both retail trading measures, execute retail trades and retail volume, decline 
following the stock split date. Consistent with our conjecture that pre-stock split prices below 
and above $1.00 affect the level of retail trading activity, we find that retail trading decreases 
following reverse stock splits for those occurring with a pre-stock split price below $1.00. In 
column (6), we find that retail trading does not significantly change following reverse splits 
occurring with a pre-split price above $1.00. The lack of an increase in retail trading following a 
reverse stock split contrast with the argument that reverse stock splits improve the marketability 
of the stock, resulting in greater retail investor participation. Our results suggest that the reverse 
stock split forces prices away from the lower price levels preferred by retail investors.  
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Figure 3 provides the visual changes in retail trading around forward and reverse stock 
splits. In Panel A, we show the changes in retail trading levels using both our scaled and 
standardized measure of retail trading using executed trades. The visual in Panel A indicates that 
retail trading peaks on the stock split date, however, the abnormal levels of retail trading quickly 
decline in the 10 days after the stock split. In Panel B, we provide the changes in retail trading 
around the stock split using executed volume. Consistent with our results in Panel A, we find that 
forward stock splits induce a transitory increase in retail trading around the stock split date, only 
to subside in the subsequent 10 days. Thus, the visuals provided in Figure 3 illustrate that stock 
splits induce only a short-term effect on retail participation.  
Figure 4 provides the visual changes in retail trading around forward and reverse stock 
splits. In Panel A, we show the changes in retail trading around all reverse stock splits. We find 
that a decline in retail trading leading around the stock split date. In fact, the standardized 
measure of retail trading becomes negative around the reverse stock split date. In Panel B, we 
provide similar evidence using executed trade volume. In Panel C, we show the changes in retail 
trading around reverse stock splits with a pre-stock split price less than $1.00, finding that retail 
trading declines on the stock split date. While retail trading levels increase in the subsequent 
days after the stock split-date, the levels are well below those prior to the stock split. Panel D 
displays that for reverse stock splits with a pre-stock split price greater than $1.00, we find that 
retail trading increases. The dashed line denotes that sharp increase in retail trading following the 
reverse stock split date. The results provided in Panels C and D indicate that reverse splits 
influence the level of retail trading yet are conditional on the pre-stock split price level around 
$1.00. 
  
171 
 
 Our analysis shows that forward (reverse) stock splits result in increases (decreases) in 
retail trading, consistent with hypothesis 1. We next address hypothesis 2 which states that 
forward (reverse) stock splits result in more (less) retail buying. Consistent with our previous 
model specification, we analyze the levels of retail trading around the split date, replacing our 
retail trading ratio with our measure of order imbalance, OIBTRD/OIBVOL, as the dependent 
variable. Following the studies of Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007), Lai and Teo (2008), 
and Park and Lee (2014), we use a standardized imbalance measure, SOIBTRD/SOIBVOL, in 
our multivariate regressions. Columns (1) through (4) display the level of retail trade imbalances 
across the stock split date dummy variables for forward stock splits while columns (5) through 
(8) show the level of retail trade imbalances for reverse stock splits. We find that forward stock 
splits, retail traders are net buyers following the stock split. In column (1), the coefficient 
estimates for SplitDate
i,t+1
, SplitDate
i,t+2
, and SplitDate
i,t+3,t+10
 are 0.1635, 0.0794, and 0.0292. 
The decline in the size estimates for the post-split date dummy variables indicate that beyond the 
effective date, retail traders exhibit less buying behavior. We provide similar results when 
measuring trade imbalances using executed volume as well as our standardized measures. In 
columns (5) and (6), we find that reverse stock splits induce more net retail selling following the 
split date. In column (5), the coefficient estimates for SplitDate
i,t+1
, SplitDate
i,t+2
, and 
SplitDate
i,t+3,t+10
 are -0.0812, -0.0810, and -0.0467. The decline in the size estimates for the post-
split date dummy variables indicate that beyond the effective date of the reverse stock split, retail 
traders exhibit less selling behavior. We find similar results using our measure of standardized 
trade imbalance, SOIBTRD, however, our results using volume-based imbalances measures 
yield insignificant results. 
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RESULTS BY PRE- AND POST-SPLIT PRICE LEVELS 
 In this section, we analyze the changes in retail trading activity around both forward and 
reverse stock splits accounting for pre- and post-stock split price levels. First, we analyze 
whether the post-stock split price levels affect the level of retail trading around forward stock 
splits. To the extent that lower post-stock split price results in greater retail participation, we 
expect that stocks with a post-stock split price less than $30 will have more retail trading 
following the split-date. We partition the sample of forward stock splits into two categories 
based on whether the post-stock split price is greater or less than $30, performing the same 
regression analysis from the previous section.  
 Table 5 reports the changes in retail trading around forward stock splits, grouped by their 
post-stock split price levels. In columns (1) through (4), we report the changes in retail trading 
levels around the split for forward stock splits with a post-stock split price less than $30 while 
columns (5) through (8) report the results for stocks with a post-split price greater than $30. We 
find that post-stock split price levels affect the level of retail trading, however, our results 
contrast with our conjecture that a lower post-stock split price level induces more retail trading. 
While we find that retail trading increases the day after the effective stock split-date for stock 
splits with a post-stock split price level below $30, we do not find higher levels of retail trading 
in the subsequent event window. Further, the coefficient estimate for Split
𝑡+3,,𝑡+10
 is negative in 
both columns (1) and (2), suggesting that retail trading is lower than pre-stock split retail trading 
levels. In columns (5) and (8), we show that retail trading remains significantly higher than its 
post-stock split levels. The results in Table 5 indicate that retail trading around the stock split-
date is moderated by post-stock split levels. To further test whether post-stock split price levels 
affect the level of retail trading activity around forward stock splits, we analyze retail trading 
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imbalances around the stock split date for forward stock splits, grouped by post-stock split price 
levels.  
 We show in Table 6 that retail trading imbalances are positive around the stock split-date 
for forward stock splits, regardless of post-stock split price levels. The coefficient estimates for 
Split
t+1
 are positive for all imbalance measures across all forward stock splits. However, we find 
that the coefficient estimates for Split
t+2
 and Split
𝑡+3,,𝑡+10
 remain positive for retail trading 
imbalance measures only for forward stock splits with a post-stock split price greater than $30. 
Our finding that retail trading activity, both participation and buying behavior, is transitory for 
forward stock splits less than $30, indicates support for the contention that retail traders are not 
using splitting of stocks to diversify their holdings. Further, our results indicate that an optimal 
price range – one in which results in greater long-term retail participation, is conditional on post-
stock split price levels, particularly for higher-priced stocks.  
 To further examine whether retail trading participation around forward stock splits is 
affected by price levels, we account for pre-stock split price levels. Over 95% of our forward 
stock splits have a pre-stock split price greater than $30. To facilitate comparison across pre-
stock split prices, we partition our sample of forward stock splits into three pre-stock split price 
groups: pre-stock split price less than $50, pre-stock split price between $50 and $100, and pre-
stock split price greater than $100. To the extent that higher pre-split price levels prohibit retail 
investors from trading the stock, we hypothesize that a higher pre-stock split price level will 
result in greater retail trading activity.  
Table 7 provides the changes in retail trading around forward stock splits grouped by 
their pre-stock split price. Consistent our prediction that higher pre-stock split levels constrain 
retail trading, we find more retail trading following the stock split date for splits with a higher 
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pre-stock split price. In columns (5) and (6), we find positive estimates for both Split
t+1
, Split
t+2
, 
and Split
𝑡+3,,𝑡+10
. For example, we document a coefficient estimate of 0.0074 and 0.8044 for 
Split
t+1
 in columns (5) and (6). In columns (3) and (4), we show that only the coefficient estimate 
for Split
t+1
 is positive, indicating a higher retail trading. Further, the results in columns (1) 
through (4) indicate no change in retail trading in the event period following the effective stock 
split-date. In columns (1) and (2), we find that retail trading participation is lower than pre-stock 
split levels for forward splits with a lower pre-stock split price range. If stock splits reduce stock 
prices from prohibitively high pre-stock split price levels, resulting in an optimal price for retail 
trading, then our findings in Table 7 suggest that this is only true for stocks with higher pre-stock 
split price levels.  
We next analyze retail trading around forward stock splits, grouped by their pre-stock 
split price levels. Consistent with our findings in Table 7, we expect greater retail buying 
following the stock split-date for forward stock splits with a higher pre-stock split price level. 
Table 8 provides the estimates from regressing retail trading imbalances around the stock split-
date, sorted via the stock’s pre-stock split price level. We find positive estimates for variables 
Split
t+1
 and Split
t+2
 across all forward stock splits. However, the coefficient estimate for 
Split
𝑡+3,,𝑡+10
 is not significant for stock splits with pre-stock split price level less than $30. In 
columns (3) through (6), we show a positive coefficient estimate for Split
𝑡+3,,𝑡+10
, indicating that 
stock splits with a higher pre-stock split price level result in long-term participation. The results 
provided in Table 7 and 8 suggests that pre-stock split price levels affect the long-term 
participation of retail traders following the split. Our evidence demonstrates that stock splits, 
particularly those with higher pre-split levels, appear to align the stock price to favorable range, 
resulting in greater retail participation.  
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We next focus on the role of pre- and post-stock split price levels in affecting the relation 
between reverse splits and retail trading. Consistent with our earlier tests, we examine retail 
trading around reverse stock splits with a pre-split price around $1.00, but now investigate 
whether the pre-stock split price affects retail buying. In Table 3, we provided evidence 
consistent with hypothesis 1 that retail trading declined, although only for reverse stock splits 
with a pre-stock split price less than $1.00. In Table 9, we show that retail trading imbalances are 
negative around all reverse stock splits, regardless of the pre-stock split price. The decline in net 
retail trading imbalances following the reverse stock splits is consistent with our contention that 
reverse stock splits push prices away from the preferred, lower levels of retail investors, resulting 
in greater selling pressure from retail investors. We also observe in Table 9, that order 
imbalances computed via executed trades provide support for our prediction that reverse stock 
splits results in greater retail selling, while imbalances computed via executed trade volume does 
not yield similar findings. 
 Figure 5 provides graphical illustrations of how retail trading imbalances change around 
forward and reverse stock splits. In Panel A, we show that retail trading imbalances increases 
around the stock split-date. Consistent with hypothesis 3 that the effects of stock splits on retail 
trading is transitory, we find that the increase in retail trading imbalances subsides in the 
subsequent 5 days after the stock split. In Panel B, we show the decline in retail trading 
imbalances around reverse stock splits. In Panels C and D, we provide the changes in retail 
trading imbalance for reverse stock splits with a pre-stock split price below or above $1.00. The 
results in both panels indicate that retail trading imbalances are not affected by the pre-stock split 
price level. The visual depictions in Figure 5 indicate support for hypothesis 2 that retail traders 
are net buyers (sellers) following forward (reverse) stock splits. Further, the results confirm our 
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expectation that the effects of stock splits on retail trading are transitory, at least for forward 
stock splits.  
In Table 10, we explore the changes in retail trading imbalances around reverse stock 
splits, partitioning the sample of reverse stock splits based on their post-stock split price. Many 
of the reverse stock splits have a post-split price between $1 and $5, consistent with many firms 
using a reverse stock split to avoid delisting requirements. To better analyze if the post-stock 
split level affects retail trading around reverse splits, we create three categories formed via the 
stock’s post-split price: post-stock split price less than $2, post-stock split price between $2 and 
$5, and post-stock split price greater than $5. The three post-stock split price categories are 
consistent with those used by Koski (2007). To the extent that higher post-stock split price levels 
prohibit retail investors from trading the stock, we hypothesize that a higher post-stock split price 
level will result in less retail trading activity. The results in Table 10 indicate support that a 
higher post-stock split price for reverse stock splits results in less retail trading. In column (4) 
and (6), we show that retail trading decreases following the stock split-date for reverse stock 
splits with a pre-stock split price between $2 and $5 and as well as stock splits with a pre-stock 
split price above $5. For reverse stock splits with a post-stock split price below $2, we find a 
decline in retail trading on stock split date but no significant change in retail trading in days 
following the stock split date. The finding provided in Table 10 suggest that changes in retail 
trading around reverse stock splits is conditional on post-stock split price levels.  
 Our last test analyzes the changes in retail trading imbalances around reverse stock splits, 
conditioning the post-stock split price level. We posit that a higher post-stock split price for 
reverse stock splits will result in greater retail selling following the stock split date. The results 
provided in Table 11 confirm more retail selling around reverse stock splits with a higher post-
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stock split price. In columns (3) and (4), we find that retail trading imbalances, scaled and 
standardized, are negative following the stock split-date. We find similar evidence in columns 
(5) and (6), indicating more retail selling for reverse stock splits with higher post-stock split 
prices. However, in columns (1) and (2), we find no significant change in retail trading 
imbalances around reverse stock splits with a lower post-stock split price. Overall, our results 
suggest that conditioning on pre-stock split price levels as well as post-stock split price levels 
affects the participation and buying behavior of retail investors around reverse stock splits. 
However, consistent across all our sample cuts, we find that retail trading participation as 
measured by the either market share or buy-sell imbalances is transitory. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, we analyze the effects of stock splits on retail trading. Previous literature 
suggests that stock splits, both forward and reverse, provide an optimal price range for retail 
investors, resulting in long-term retail participation following the stock split. Minnick and 
Raman (2014) suggest that changes in direct retail ownership contributes to the decline in stock 
splits over the last several decades, citing that retail investors no longer use stock splits to 
diversify their holdings. We use Minnick and Raman’s assertion on retail investor diversification 
tendencies to analyze if stock splits still induce greater retail trading participation. Further, we 
examine if retail investors are active long-term in the stock following the stock split date. Our 
evidence indicates that retail trading increases (decreases) around forward (reverse) stock splits. 
However, we find that increases in both retail trading participation and retail trading imbalances 
are transitory around the stock split date, only lasting for several days following the effective 
stock split-date. We further test if our results are dependent on the pre- and post-stock split levels 
of the stock, finding evidence that retail trading increases more for stock splits with higher pre-
stock split prices but not for lower post-stock split prices. We also provide similar findings after 
partitioning the sample of reverse stock splits via pre- and post-stock split price levels. Our 
results provide additional evidence to the declining relevance of stock splits in creating long-
term retail trading participation, casting doubt on the optimal price range hypothesis of stock 
splits. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics on 694 stock splits of firms from 2007 and 2016. The split factor 
refers to the number of shares of stock an individual would own after the stock split for each pre-stock 
split share. For reverse stock splits, the split factor refers to the reciprocal of the split factor. The pre-stock 
split price range is derived on the average trade price for the stock for the period−40 to−1 days prior the 
stock split. The post-stock split price range is derived on the average trade price of the stock for the 40 
days after the stock split. Frequency is the number of firms in the specified category. Panel A reports the 
frequency of stock splits, forward and reverse, by year. Panel A also reports the frequency of reverse 
stock splits by year, partitioned by the pre-stock split price level around $1.00. Panels B and C report the 
frequencies of forward and reverse stock splits by split factor, pre-stock split price range, and post-stock 
split price range.  
Panel A. Number of Stock Splits, By Year 
Year Forward Reverse >$1.00 <$1.00 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
95 
28 
8 
24 
42 
27 
25 
35 
21 
10 
19 
26 
30 
37 
32 
49 
42 
18 
49 
77 
6 
5 
14 
10 
9 
8 
12 
9 
8 
10 
13 
21 
16 
27 
23 
41 
30 
9 
41 
67 
Total 315 379 91 288 
Panel B. Forward Stock Splits 
Split Factor Freq Pre-Stock Split Price 
Range 
Freq Post-Stock Split Price 
Range 
Freq 
2 
3 
4 
5 
>5 
283 
20 
7 
3 
2 
$0 to $15 
$16 to $20 
$21 to $25 
$26 to $30 
$30 plus 
4 
4 
3 
9 
295 
$0 to $15 
$16 to $20 
$21 to $25 
$26 to $30 
$30 plus 
25 
23 
26 
42 
199 
Panel C. Reverse Stock Splits 
Split Factor Freq Pre-Stock Split Price 
Range 
Freq Post-Stock Split Price 
Range 
Freq 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 – 10 
11 – 20 
21 – 30 
31 – 50 
51 – 100 
>100  
11 
21 
42 
48 
176 
61 
11 
6 
2 
1 
< $1 
$1 to $5 
$6 to $10 
$11 to $15 
$16 to $20 
$21 to $25 
$26 to $30 
$31 to $40 
$41 to $50 
$50 plus 
292 
72 
7 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
0 
< $1 
$1 to $5 
$6 to $10 
$11 to $15 
$16 to $20 
$21 to $25 
$26 to $30 
$31 to $40 
$41 to $50 
$50 plus 
5 
171 
87 
35 
24 
11 
6 
14 
8 
18 
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Table 2: Event Window of Retail Trading Around Forward and Reverse Stock Splits 
Table 2 presents results from a 21-day event study around the ex-stock split date. In Panel A, we provide the levels of retail trading for forward 
and reverse stock splits. In Panel B, we provide the levels of retail trading for reverse stock splits, grouped via the pre-stock split price. The t-tests 
tests whether the standardized retail trading measure is significantly different from zero. *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, 
respectively.  
 
Panel A. Forward and Reverse Stock Splits 
Forward Stock Splits Reverse Stock Splits 
 RetailTrdRatio SRetailTrdRatio RetailVolRatio SRetailVolRatio RetailTrdRatio SRetailTrdRatio RetailVolRatio SRetailVolRatio 
-10, -6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
Split Date 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
+6, +10 
0.0391 
0.0425 
0.0405 
0.0423 
0.0391 
0.0380 
0.0407 
0.0458 
0.0437 
0.0416 
0.0403 
0.0398 
0.0375 
-0.0561** 
-0.0204 
-0.0264 
-0.0392 
-0.0702 
-0.0805 
-0.0523 
0.4128*** 
0.1287** 
0.1072** 
0.0110 
0.1201** 
-0.0443* 
0.0555 
0.0585 
0.0549 
0.0556 
0.0532 
0.0550 
0.0526 
0.0680 
0.0650 
0.0625 
0.0593 
0.0591 
0.0570 
-0.1087*** 
-0.1208** 
-0.1065* 
-0.1291** 
-0.1620*** 
-0.1016* 
-0.1594*** 
0.4517*** 
0.1868*** 
0.1730*** 
0.0970* 
0.1392*** 
0.0520** 
0.1634 
0.1622 
0.1581 
0.1698 
0.1686 
0.1573 
0.1470 
0.1564 
0.1548 
0.1531 
0.1574 
0.1512 
0.1495 
0.0652*** 
0.0858* 
-0.0009 
0.1012** 
0.0874* 
-0.0213 
-0.1207** 
0.0373 
0.0348 
-0.0153 
-0.0140 
-0.1229*** 
-0.0852*** 
0.2237 
0.2272 
0.2155 
0.2337 
0.2265 
0.2045 
0.2085 
0.2060 
0.2049 
0.2057 
0.2091 
0.1983 
0.2086 
0.1114*** 
0.1567*** 
0.0176 
0.1615*** 
0.0565 
-0.0590 
-0.0857 
-0.0848* 
-0.0897** 
-0.0820* 
-0.0410 
-0.1784*** 
-0.0797*** 
Panel B. Reverse Stock Splits with Pre-Stock Split Price Above (Below) $1.00 
Reverse Stock Splits, < $1.00 Reverse Stock Splits, > $1.00 
-10, -6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
Split Date 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
+6, +10 
0.1931 
0.1921 
0.1887 
0.2020 
0.2012 
0.1843 
0.1714 
0.1814 
0.1808 
0.1780 
0.1812 
0.1750 
0.1752 
0.0922*** 
0.1131* 
0.0067 
0.1496*** 
0.1776*** 
0.0279 
-0.1604*** 
-0.0291 
-0.0084 
-0.0463 
-0.0651 
-0.1479*** 
-0.1054*** 
0.2576 
0.2619 
0.2499 
0.2684 
0.2658 
0.2316 
0.2402 
0.2355 
0.2343 
0.2360 
0.2375 
0.2249 
0.2404 
0.1196*** 
0.1593*** 
0.0285 
0.1837*** 
0.1372** 
-0.0421 
-0.1170* 
-0.1098** 
-0.1392*** 
-0.0855* 
-0.0962* 
-0.2108*** 
-0.0749*** 
0.0714 
0.0694 
0.0642 
0.0663 
0.0630 
0.0695 
0.0696 
0.0754 
0.0646 
0.0686 
0.0761 
0.0744 
0.0667 
-0.0040 
-0.0011 
-0.0242 
-0.0532 
-0.2045** 
-0.1808* 
0.0055 
0.2524** 
0.1840* 
0.0901 
0.1607 
-0.0420 
-0.0202 
0.1187 
0.1193 
0.1097 
0.1222 
0.0991 
0.1165 
0.1081 
0.1103 
0.1032 
0.1026 
0.1121 
0.1126 
0.1062 
0.0859* 
0.1487 
-0.0158 
0.0907 
-0.2044** 
-0.1137 
0.0138 
-0.0038 
0.0814 
-0.0701 
0.1476 
-0.0743 
-0.0955** 
  
188 
 
APPENDIX 3: RETAIL TRADING AROUND FORWARD AND REVERSE STOCK 
SPLITS 
 
  
189 
 
Table 3: Retail Trading Around Forward and Reverse Stock Splits 
This table reports the regression results from equation (2). Columns [1] and [2] provide the results for forward stock 
splits only. Columns [3] and [4] provide the results for reverse stock splits only. Columns [5] and [6] provide the 
results for reverse stock splits, grouped via the pre-stock split price. The dependent variable refers to our scaled 
measure of retail trading, where retail trading is measured via either executed trades or trade volume. All retail 
trading ratios are measured for stock i on day t across the event window where Split
t
 is equal to one if day t is the 
ex-stock split date. Five separate dummy variables are included to capture the five days around the stock’s split date. 
Other independent variables include firm size, price volatility, share turnover, percentage bid-ask spread, and split 
factor. Both industry and year fixed-effects are included in the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels. 
 Stock Splits Reverse Stock Splits Only 
 Forward Reverse 
Pre-Stock 
Split Price 
<$1.00 
Pre-Stock 
Split Price 
>$1.00 
 RetailTrd(%) RetailVol(%) RetailTrd(%) RetailVol(%) RetailTrd(%) RetailTrd(%) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Split
t-2
 
 
Split
t-1
 
 
Split
t
 
 
Split
t+1
 
 
Split
t+2
 
 
Split
t+3,,t+10
 
 
Intercept  
 
Adjusted R² 
Controls 
Industry FE 
Year FE 
0.0008 
(0.43) 
-0.0025 
(1.33) 
0.0025 
(1.27) 
0.0051*** 
(3.03) 
0.0000 
(0.02) 
-0.0012 
(1.07) 
0.0027 
(0.28) 
 
35.06% 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0005 
(0.21) 
-0.0005 
(0.18) 
-0.0011 
(0.46) 
0.0130*** 
(5.14) 
0.0031 
(1.09) 
0.0020 
(1.25) 
0.0098 
(0.70) 
 
31.26% 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0070 
(1.52) 
-0.0058 
(1.54) 
-0.0200*** 
(3.53) 
-0.0180*** 
(2.99) 
-0.0101** 
(2.02) 
-0.0091** 
(2.45) 
0.1476*** 
(8.64) 
 
20.07% 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0002 
(0.03) 
-0.0191*** 
(3.26) 
-0.0217*** 
(2.92) 
-0.0362*** 
(4.92) 
-0.0256*** 
(3.88) 
-0.0181*** 
(3.83) 
0.1296*** 
(5.73) 
 
0.1854% 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0029 
(0.34) 
-0.0243*** 
(3.48) 
-0.0229** 
(2.41) 
-0.0304*** 
(3.77) 
-0.0280*** 
(3.51) 
-0.0261*** 
(4.51) 
0.1706*** 
(9.06) 
 
0.1210% 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0185** 
(2.47) 
-0.0078 
(0.94) 
-0.0087 
(0.80) 
-0.0135 
(1.20) 
-0.0067 
(0.69) 
-0.0017 
(0.27) 
0.0983** 
(2.12) 
 
30.15% 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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Table 4: Retail Trading Imbalances Around Forward and Reverse Stock Splits 
This table reports the regression results from equation (2). Columns [1] through [4] report the results for retail trading and standardized retail 
trading using both executed trades and trade volume around the stock split date of forward stock splits. Columns [5] through [8] report the results 
for retail trading and standardized retail trading using both executed trades and trade volume around the stock split date of reverse stock splits. All 
retail trading ratios are measured for stock i on day t across the event window where Split
t
 is equal to one if day t is the ex-stock split date. Five 
separate dummy variables are included to capture the five days around the ex-stock split date. Other independent variables include firm size, price 
volatility, share turnover, percentage bid-ask spread, and split factor. Both industry and year fixed-effects are included in the regression. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Forward Stock Splits Reverse Stock Splits 
 OIBTRD SOIBTRD OIBVOL SOIBVOL OIBTRD SOIBTRD OIBVOL SOIBVOL 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Split
t-2
 
 
Split
t-1
 
 
Split
t
 
 
Split
t+1
 
 
Split
t+2
 
 
Split
t+3,,t+10
 
 
Intercept  
 
 
Adjusted R² 
Controls 
Industry FE 
Year FE 
-0.0568*** 
(3.27) 
-0.0254 
(1.64) 
-0.0187 
(1.15) 
0.1635*** 
(11.24) 
0.0794*** 
(5.10) 
0.0292*** 
(3.07) 
-0.1698*** 
(2.58) 
 
0.0654 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.1529** 
(2.42) 
-0.0943 
(1.65) 
-0.0187 
(0.30) 
0.7683*** 
(12.56) 
0.3975*** 
(6.25) 
0.1381*** 
(3.80) 
-0.0703 
(1.21) 
 
0.0380 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0497** 
(2.35) 
-0.0328* 
(1.67) 
-0.0380* 
(1.90) 
0.1485*** 
(8.76) 
0.0627*** 
(3.67) 
0.0277*** 
(2.61) 
0.0080** 
(2.07) 
 
0.0369 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.1082* 
(1.67) 
-1.0777* 
(1.75) 
-0.0584 
(0.93) 
0.6030*** 
(10.36) 
0.2777*** 
(4.77) 
0.1020*** 
(3.03) 
-0.05881 
(1.11) 
 
0.0234 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0426* 
(1.86) 
0.0291 
(1.47) 
-0.0210 
(1.14) 
-0.0812*** 
(4.06) 
-0.0810*** 
(4.05) 
-0.0467*** 
(4.02) 
-0.1362* 
(1.87) 
 
0.0247 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1025 
(1.57) 
0.0773 
(1.36) 
-0.0579 
(1.08) 
-0.2075*** 
(3.73) 
-0.1950*** 
(3.53) 
-0.1301*** 
(4.06) 
-0.0781 
(1.09) 
 
0.0094 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0138 
(0.55) 
0.0186 
(0.78) 
0.0227 
(1.05) 
-0.0170 
(0.76) 
-0.0071 
(0.32) 
0.0074 
(0.59) 
-0.2718*** 
(4.48) 
 
0.0114 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0443 
(0.70) 
0.0298 
(0.51) 
0.0557 
(1.05) 
-0.0057 
(0.11) 
-0.0090 
(0.17) 
0.0334 
(1.08) 
-0.1287** 
(2.00) 
 
0.0014 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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Table 5: Retail Trading Around Stock Splits by Post-Stock Split Price 
This table reports the regression results from equation (2). Columns [1] through [4] report the results for retail trading and standardized retail 
trading using both executed trades and trade volume around the split date of forward stock splits with a post-stock split price less than $30. 
Columns [5] through [8] report the results for retail trading and standardized retail trading using both executed trades and trade volume around the 
stock split date of forward stock splits with a post-split price greater than $30. All retail trading ratios are measured for stock i on day t across the 
event window where Split
t
 is equal to one if day t is the ex-stock split date. Five separate dummy variables are included to capture the five days 
around the ex-stock split date. Other independent variables include firm size, price volatility, share turnover, percentage bid-ask spread, and split 
factor. Both industry and year fixed-effects are included in the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses.  *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 Post-Stock Split Price <$30.00 Post-Stock Split Price >$30.00 
 RetailTrdRatio SRetailTrdRatio RetailVolRatio SRetailVolRatio RetailTrdRatio SRetailTrdRatio RetailVolRatio SRetailVolRatio 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Split
t-2
 
 
Split
t-1
 
 
Split
t
 
 
Split
t+1
 
 
Split
t+2
 
 
Split
t+3,,t+10
 
 
Intercept  
 
Adjusted R² 
Controls 
Industry FE 
Year FE 
-0.0022 
(0.54) 
-0.0064* 
(1.74) 
0.0027 
(0.60) 
0.0028 
(0.72) 
-0.0021 
(0.75) 
-0.0065*** 
(2.62) 
0.3156*** 
(5.35) 
 
0.4692 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.1697* 
(1.68) 
0.0319 
(0.29) 
-0.0293 
(0.29) 
0.2557** 
(2.42) 
0.0519 
(0.47) 
-0.1843** 
(2.48) 
-0.0325 
(0.22) 
 
0.0170 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0062 
(1.39) 
-0.0012 
(0.24) 
-0.0053 
(0.94) 
0.0138** 
(2.44) 
0.0019 
(0.35) 
-0.0049 
(1.49) 
0.3967*** 
(5.39) 
 
0.4610 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.2116** 
(2.01) 
0.1009 
(0.92) 
-0.1640 
(1.65) 
0.3431*** 
(3.20) 
0.1283 
(1.19) 
-0.0797 
(1.13) 
-0.1359 
(0.93) 
 
0.0160 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0005 
(0.61) 
-0.0002 
(0.18) 
0.009 
(0.69) 
0.0058*** 
(4.98) 
0.0027* 
(1.86) 
0.0018** 
(2.58) 
-0.0323 
(1.47) 
 
0.5065 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0818 
(0.97) 
-0.0701 
(0.97) 
0.0075 
(0.09) 
0.6154*** 
(6.82) 
0.2581*** 
(2.85) 
0.1987*** 
(3.70) 
  -0.2381** 
(2.37) 
 
0.0257 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0001 
(0.07) 
0.0001 
(0.01) 
-0.0006 
(0.32) 
0.0120*** 
(2.90) 
0.0062*** 
(2.90) 
0.0059*** 
(4.49) 
-0.0429 
(1.48) 
 
0.3931 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0588 
(0.72) 
-0.0181 
(0.25) 
0.0256 
(0.33) 
0.7548*** 
(8.96) 
0.3854*** 
(4.67) 
0.3618*** 
(7.37) 
-0.3756*** 
(3.89) 
 
0.0543 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes  
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Table 6: Retail Trading Imbalances Around Stock Splits by Stock Split Price 
This table reports the regression results from equation (2). Columns [1] through [4] report the results for retail trading and standardized retail 
trading imbalances using both executed trades and trade volume around the stock split date of forward stock splits with a post-stock split price less 
than $30. Columns [5] through [8] report the results for retail trading and standardized retail trading using both executed trades and trade volume 
around the stock split date of forward stock splits with a post-stock split price greater than $30. All retail trading imbalances are measured for 
stock i on day t across the event window where Split
t
 is equal to one if day t is the ex-stock split date. Five separate dummy variables are included 
to capture the five days around the ex-stock split date. Other independent variables include firm size, price volatility, share turnover, percentage 
bid-ask spread, and split factor. Both industry and year fixed-effects are included in the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively 
 
 Post-Stock Split Price <$30.00 Post-Stock Split Price >$30.00 
 OIBTRD SOIBTRD OIBVOL SOIBVOL OIBTRD SOIBTRD OIBVOL SOIBVOL 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Split
t-2
 
 
Split
t-1
 
 
Split
t
 
 
Split
t+1
 
 
Split
t+2
 
 
Split
t+3,,t+10
 
 
Intercept  
 
Adjusted R² 
Controls  
Industry FE 
Year FE 
-0.1125*** 
(3.49) 
-0.0522* 
(1.75) 
0.0372 
(1.23) 
0.1634*** 
(6.66) 
0.0560* 
(1.84) 
0.0227 
(1.28) 
0.0238 
(0.20) 
 
0.0832 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.3333*** 
(3.21) 
-0.1563 
(1.61) 
-0.0208 
(0.21) 
0.5805*** 
(7.00) 
0.2157** 
(2.07) 
0.0911 
(1.53) 
-0.0649 
(0.56) 
 
0.0280 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0973** 
(2.38) 
-0.0482 
(1.31) 
-0.0889** 
(2.46) 
0.1272*** 
(4.02) 
0.0291 
(0.87) 
0.0119 
(0.59) 
  -0.0160 
(0.11) 
 
0.0517 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes  
-0.2703** 
(2.43) 
-0.1353 
(1.33) 
-0.1660* 
(1.82) 
0.3945*** 
(4.79) 
0.1249 
(1.27) 
0.0272 
(0.48) 
-0.0807 
(0.82) 
 
0.0116 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0261 
(1.30) 
-0.0115 
(0.65) 
-0.0084 
(0.44) 
0.1629*** 
(8.90) 
0.0953*** 
(5.45) 
0.0338*** 
(3.04) 
-0.1875** 
(2.55) 
 
0.0729 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0499 
(0.63) 
-0.0591 
(0.83) 
-0.1809 
(0.22) 
0.8703*** 
(10.53) 
0.5041*** 
(6.23) 
0.1648*** 
(3.56) 
-0.1105 
(1.41) 
 
0.0471 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0230 
(0.96) 
-0.0252 
(1.09) 
-0.0081 
(0.34) 
0.1604*** 
(8.00) 
0.0836*** 
(4.35) 
0.0378*** 
(3.10) 
-0.0153 
(0.20) 
 
0.0414 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0160 
(0.20) 
-0.0921 
(1.18) 
0.0035 
(0.04) 
0.7171*** 
(9.27) 
0.3685*** 
(5.09) 
0.1454*** 
(3.45) 
-0.0255 
(0.34) 
 
0.0311 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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Table 7: Retail Trading Around Stock Splits by Pre-Stock Split Price 
This table reports the regression results from equation (2). Columns [1] through [2] report the results for 
retail trading and standardized retail trading ratios using executed trades around the stock split date of 
forward stock splits with a pre-stock split price less than $50. Columns [3] through [4] report the results 
for forward stock splits with a pre-stock split price greater than $50 and less than $100. Columns [5] 
through [6] report the results for forward stock splits with a pre-stock split price greater than $100. All 
retail trading imbalances are measured for stock i on day t across the event window where Split
t
 is equal 
to one if day t is the ex-stock split date. Five separate dummy variables are included to capture the five 
days around the ex-stock split date. Other independent variables include firm size, price volatility, share 
turnover, percentage bid-ask spread, and split factor. Both industry and year fixed-effects are included in 
the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, 
**, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 Pre-Split Price < $50.00 $50.00 < Pre-Split Price < 
$100.00 
Pre-Split Price > 
$100.00 
 RetailTrd(%) SRetailTrd(%) RetailTrd(%) SRetailTrd(%) RetailTrd(%) SRetailTrd(%) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Split
t-2
 
 
Split
t-1
 
 
Split
t
 
 
Split
t+1
 
 
Split
t+2
 
 
Split
t+3,,t+10
 
 
Intercept  
 
Adjusted R² 
Controls  
Year FE 
Industry FE 
-0.0006 
(0.09) 
-0.0060 
(1.23) 
0.0031 
(0.49) 
-0.0003 
(0.04) 
-0.0003 
(0.07) 
-0.0094** 
(2.17) 
0.1721** 
(2.15) 
 
0.5071 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes  
-0.1365 
(1.03) 
0.0916 
(0.70) 
-0.0741 
(0.52) 
0.0720 
(0.55) 
0.0689 
(0.47) 
-0.2590*** 
(2.71) 
-0.0546 
(0.16) 
 
0.0266 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0000 
(0.02) 
-0.0008 
(0.68) 
0.0008 
(0.44) 
0.0052*** 
(4.22) 
0.0004 
(0.22) 
0.0002 
(0.30) 
0.0630** 
(2.27) 
 
0.3954 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0034 
(0.04) 
-0.0339 
(0.40) 
0.0129 
(0.15) 
0.5095*** 
(5.64) 
0.1479 
(1.64) 
0.1012* 
(1.81) 
-0.1791** 
(2.22) 
 
0.0161 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0004 
(0.32) 
-0.0012 
(1.07) 
0.0023 
(0.80) 
0.0074*** 
(3.59) 
0.0037** 
(2.23) 
0.0026* 
(1.92) 
-0.0508 
(1.47) 
 
0.6726 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1041 
(0.80) 
-0.1481 
(1.32) 
0.0172 
(0.14) 
0.8044*** 
(4.98) 
0.3800** 
(2.30) 
0.2496** 
(2.51) 
-0.4546** 
(2.21) 
 
0.0466 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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Table 8: Retail Trading Imbalances Around Stock Splits by Pre-Stock Split Price 
This table reports the regression results from equation (2). Columns [1] through [2] report the results for retail trading and standardized retail trading 
imbalances using both executed trades and trade volume around the stock split date of forward stock splits with a pre-stock split price less than $50. 
Columns [3] through [4] report the results for forward stock splits with a pre-stock split price greater than $50 and less than $100. Columns [5] through 
[6] report the results for forward stock splits with a pre-stock split price greater than $100. All retail trading imbalances are measured for stock i on day t 
across the event window where Split
t
 is equal to one if day t is the ex-stock split date. Five separate dummy variables are included to capture the five 
days around the ex-stock split date. Other independent variables include firm size, price volatility, share turnover, percentage bid-ask spread, and split 
factor. Both industry and year fixed-effects are included in the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses.  *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
  Pre-Split Price < $50.00 $50.00 < Pre-Split Price < $100.00 Pre-Split Price > $100.00 
 OIBTRD SOIBTRD OIBTRD SOIBTRD OIBTRD SOIBTRD 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Split
t-2
 
 
Split
t-1
 
 
Split
t
 
 
Split
t+1
 
 
Split
t+2
 
 
Split
𝑡+3,,𝑡+10
 
 
Intercept  
 
Adjusted R² 
Controls  
Industry FE 
Year FE 
-0.1404*** 
(3.03) 
-0.0868** 
(2.00) 
-0.0494 
(1.26) 
0.1308*** 
(3.46) 
0.0889** 
(2.06) 
0.0154 
(0.60) 
-0.0578 
(1.04) 
 
0.1046 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.3862*** 
(2.66) 
-0.2701** 
(2.07) 
-0.0554 
(0.46) 
0.4144*** 
(3.44) 
0.3214** 
(2.33) 
0.0794 
(0.96) 
-0.1564 
(1.05) 
 
0.0297 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0558** 
(2.39) 
-0.0107 
(0.55) 
-0.0287 
(1.27) 
0.1655*** 
(8.64) 
0.0723*** 
(3.40) 
0.0318** 
(2.44) 
-0.1030 
(0.89) 
 
0.0624 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.1696** 
(2.02) 
-0.0626 
(0.83) 
-0.1050 
(1.19) 
0.7393*** 
(9.90) 
0.3479*** 
(4.04) 
0.1207** 
(2.47) 
-0.0757 
(1.22) 
 
0.0357 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0179 
(0.71) 
-0.0084 
(0.31) 
0.0426 
(1.63) 
0.1810*** 
(6.44) 
0.0933*** 
(4.13) 
0.0388*** 
(2.71) 
-0.2023 
(1.08)   
 
0.1580 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1058 
(0.83) 
-0.0188 
(0.16) 
0.2362* 
(1.85) 
1.1358*** 
(7.55) 
0.5847*** 
(4.33) 
0.2367*** 
(3.15) 
-0.3673** 
(2.34) 
 
0.0722 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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Table 9: Retail Trading Imbalances Around Reverse Stock Splits by Pre-Stock Split Price 
This table reports the regression results from equation (2). Columns [1] through [4] report the results for retail trading and standardized retail 
trading imbalances using both executed trades and trade volume around the split date of reverse stock splits with a pre-stock split price less than 
$1. Columns [5] through [8] report the results for retail trading and standardized retail trading using both executed trades and trade volume around 
the stock split date of reverse stock splits with a pre-stock split price greater than $1. All retail trading imbalances are measured for stock i on day t 
across the event window where Split
t
 is equal to one if day t is the ex-stock split date. Five separate dummy variables are included to capture the 
five days around the ex-stock split date. Other independent variables include firm size, price volatility, share turnover, percentage bid-ask spread, 
and split factor. Both industry and year fixed-effects are included in the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.  
 
 Pre-Stock Split Price <$1.00 Pre-Stock Split Price >$1.00 
 OIBTRD SOIBTRD OIBVOL SOIBVOL OIBTRD SOIBTRD OIBVOL SOIBVOL 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Split
t-2
 
 
Split
t-1
 
 
Split
t
 
 
Split
t+1
 
 
Split
t+2
 
 
Split
𝑡+3,,𝑡+10
 
 
Intercept  
 
Adjusted R² 
Controls  
Industry FE 
Year FE 
0.0579** 
(2.10) 
0.0344 
(1.45) 
-0.0193 
(0.89) 
-0.0908*** 
(3.77) 
-0.0791*** 
(3.30) 
-0.0443*** 
(3.19) 
-0.2818*** 
(3.39) 
 
0.0273 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes  
0.1380* 
(1.84) 
0.0817 
(1.27) 
-0.0340 
(0.58) 
-0.2016*** 
(3.10) 
-0.1704*** 
(2.69) 
-0.1040*** 
(2.87) 
-0.1959* 
(1.96) 
 
0.0091 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0127 
(0.42) 
0.0301 
(1.04) 
0.0316 
(1.22) 
-0.0183 
(0.68) 
0.0115 
(0.43) 
0.0084 
(0.55) 
-0.3304*** 
(3.72) 
 
0.0129 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0324 
(0.45) 
0.0504 
(0.76) 
0.0878 
(1.49) 
0.0325 
(0.53) 
0.0460 
(0.78) 
0.0436 
(1.24) 
-0.1766* 
(1.90) 
 
0.0019 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0011 
(0.03) 
0.0115 
(0.33) 
-0.0369 
(0.96) 
-0.0546 
(1.54) 
-0.0850** 
(2.38) 
-0.0544** 
(2.59) 
0.3052* 
(1.68) 
 
0.0913 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0011 
(0.01) 
0.0600 
(0.49) 
-0.1487 
(1.17) 
-0.2331** 
(2.04) 
-0.2853** 
(2.51) 
-0.2234*** 
(3.17) 
0.1531 
(0.85) 
 
0.0144 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes  
0.0173 
(0.39) 
-0.0179 
(0.44) 
-0.0157 
(0.40) 
-0.0093 
(0.23) 
-0.0567 
(1.36) 
0.0103 
(0.50) 
0.0807 
(0.52) 
 
0.0499 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0801 
(0.61) 
-0.0396 
(0.31) 
-0.0683 
(0.55) 
-0.1240 
(1.09) 
-0.1877 
(1.50) 
-0.0018 
(0.03) 
-0.0500 
(0.34) 
 
0.0040 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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Table 10: Retail Trading Around Reverse Stock Splits Post by Stock Split Price 
This table reports the regression results from equation (2). Columns [1] through [2] report the results for retail trading and standardized retail trading ratios using 
executed trades and trade volume around the stock split date of reverse stock splits with a post-stock split price less than $2. Columns [3] through [4] report the 
results for retail trading and standardized retail trading ratios using executed trades and trade volume around the stock split date of reverse stock splits with a 
post-stock split price greater than $2 less than $5. Columns [5] through [6] report the results for retail trading and standardized retail trading ratios using executed 
trades and trade volume around the stock split date of reverse stock splits with a post-stock split price greater than $5. All retail trading imbalances are measured 
for stock i on day t across the event window where Split
t
 is equal to one if day t is the ex-stock split date. Five separate dummy variables are included to capture 
the five days around the ex-stock split date. Other independent variables include firm size, price volatility, share turnover, percentage bid-ask spread, and split 
factor. Both industry and year fixed-effects are included in the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
*, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
  Reverse Stock Splits – Post-Stock Split Price 
 Post-Split Price < $2.00 $2.00 < Post-Split Price < $5.00 Post-Split Price > $5.00 
 RetailTrd(%) RetailVol(%) RetailTrd(%) RetailVol(%) RetailTrd(%) RetailVol(%) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Split
t-2
 
 
Split
t-1
 
 
Split
t
 
 
Split
t+1
 
 
Split
t+2
 
 
Split
𝑡+3,,𝑡+10
 
 
Intercept  
 
Adjusted R² 
Controls  
Industry FE 
Year FE 
0.0097 
(0.46) 
-0.0274 
(1.56) 
-0.0599*** 
(2.74) 
-0.0112 
(0.53) 
-0.0098 
(0.44) 
-0.0072 
(0.47) 
0.2479*** 
(3.47) 
 
15.31% 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0100 
(0.48) 
-0.0268 
(1.52) 
-0.0593*** 
(2.72) 
-0.0101 
(0.48) 
-0.0085 
(0.39) 
-0.0061 
(0.40) 
0.2419*** 
(3.37) 
 
15.19% 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0045 
(0.55) 
-0.0172*** 
(2.83) 
-0.0217** 
(2.44) 
-0.0186** 
(2.55) 
-0.0124 
(1.60) 
-0.0200*** 
(3.39) 
0.1363*** 
(10.10) 
 
13.63% 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0028 
(0.23) 
-0.0339*** 
(3.59) 
-0.0097 
(0.76) 
-0.0301*** 
(2.85) 
-0.0295*** 
(2.99) 
-0.0252*** 
(3.44) 
0.1478*** 
(7.18) 
 
13.39% 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0014 
(0.30) 
0.0053 
(0.97) 
-0.0131* 
(1.94) 
-0.0030 
(0.42) 
-0.0067 
(1.13) 
-0.0071 
(1.46) 
0.0716*** 
(2.91) 
 
27.95% 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0102 
(1.40) 
-0.0036 
(0.52) 
-0.0182* 
(1.84) 
-0.0257*** 
(2.57) 
-0.0233*** 
(2.78) 
-0.0200*** 
(3.32) 
0.1431*** 
(4.02) 
 
26.93% 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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Table 11: Retail Trading Imbalances Around Reverse Stock Splits by Post-Stock Split Price 
This table reports the regression results from equation (2). Columns [1] through [2] report the results for 
retail trading and standardized retail trading imbalances using executed trades around the stock split date of 
reverse stock splits with a post-stock split price less than $2. Columns [3] through [4] report the results for 
reverse stock splits with a post-stock split price greater than $2 less than $5. Columns [5] through [6] report 
the results for reverse stock splits with a post-stock split price greater than $5. All retail trading imbalances are 
measured for stock i on day t across the event window where Split
t
 is equal to one if day t is the ex-stock split 
date. Five separate dummy variables are included to capture the five days around the ex-stock split date. 
Other independent variables include firm size, price volatility, share turnover, percentage bid-ask spread, and 
split factor. Both industry and year fixed-effects are included in the regression. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denotes significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 
levels, respectively. 
 Post-Split Price < $2.00 $2.00 < Post-Split Price < 
$5.00 
Post-Split Price > $5.00 
 OIBTRD SOIBTRD OIBTRD SOIBTRD OIBTRD SOIBTRD 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Split
t-2
 
 
Split
t-1
 
 
Split
t
 
 
Split
t+1
 
 
Split
t+2
 
 
Split
𝑡+3,,𝑡+10
 
 
Intercept  
 
Adjusted R² 
Controls  
Industry FE 
Year FE 
0.0615 
(0.94) 
0.0555 
(0.91) 
-0.0250 
(0.46) 
-0.0309 
(0.47) 
-0.0624 
(1.02) 
-0.0586 
(1.51) 
-0.0574 
(0.16) 
 
0.0671 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.1695 
(1.01) 
0.1813 
(1.19) 
-0.0234 
(0.18) 
-0.0142 
(0.09) 
-0.0930 
(0.63) 
-0.1135 
(1.10) 
-0.5593* 
(1.68) 
 
0.0125 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.0921** 
(2.48) 
0.0305 
(0.99) 
0.0214 
(0.75) 
-0.0711** 
(2.19) 
-0.0690** 
(2.19) 
-0.0325* 
(1.80) 
-0.2141* 
(1.78) 
 
0.0349 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes    
0.2161** 
(2.15) 
0.0601 
(0.71) 
0.0660 
(0.84) 
-0.1658* 
(1.93) 
-0.1456* 
(1.74) 
-0.0820* 
(1.69) 
-0.2373* 
(1.86) 
 
0.0095 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0126 
(0.41) 
0.0163 
(0.56) 
-0.0644** 
(2.42) 
-0.1070*** 
(4.02) 
-0.0941*** 
(3.34) 
-0.0532*** 
(3.30) 
0.1874 
(1.44) 
 
0.0625 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-0.0297 
(0.30) 
0.0579 
(0.64) 
-0.2020** 
(2.33) 
-0.3235*** 
(3.93) 
-0.2832*** 
(3.29) 
-0.1884*** 
(3.78) 
0.1274 
(1.19) 
 
0.0148 
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APPENDIX 12: STOCK SPLITS OF S&P 500 COMPANIES
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Figure 1: Stock Splits of S&P 500 Companies 
This figure shows the decline in number of stock splits by S&P 500 companies between 1990 and 2017. 
These figures were first reported by the Wall Street Journal in an article published on May 26th, 2017. The 
article is accessible at https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazons-brush-with-1-000-signals-the-death-of-the-
stock-split-1495791009 .  
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APPENDIX 13: FREQUENCY OF STOCK SPLITS
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Figure 2: Frequency of Stock Splits  
Figure 2 reports the frequency of stock splits between 2007 and 2016.  Panel A reports the frequency between forward and reverse stock splits. 
Panels B reports all reverse splits, sorted via the pre-stock split price levels above (below) $1.00.  
Panel A. Forward and Reverse Stock Splits    Panel B. Reverse Stock Splits, Split Price > (<) $1.00 
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APPENDIX 14: RETAIL TRADING AROUND FORWARD STOCK SPLITS
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Figure 3: Retail Trading Around Forward Stock Splits 
Figure 3 reports retail trading activity around the ex-stock split date for forward stock splits across a 21-day event window. Panel A reports both 
the retail trading ratio and standardized retail trading ratio using executed trades for all forward stock splits. Panel B reports both the retail trading 
ratio and standardized retail trading ratio using executed trade volume for all forward stock splits. 
Panel A. Retail Trading Ratio – Forward Stock Splits   Panel B. Retail Volume Ratio – Forward Stock Splits 
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APPENDIX 15: RETAIL TRADING AROUND REVERSE STOCK SPLITS
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Figure 4: Retail Trading Around Reverse Stock Splits 
Figure 4 reports retail trading activity around the ex-stock split date for reverse stock splits across a 20-day event window. Panel A reports both the 
retail trading ratio and standardized retail trading ratio using executed trades for all reverse stock splits. Panel B reports both the retail trading ratio 
and standardized retail trading ratio using executed trade volume for all reverse stock splits. Panels C (D) report both the retail trading ratio and 
standardized retail trading ratio using executed trades for reverse stock splits with a pre-stock split price below (above) $1.00. 
Panel A. Retail Trading Volume – Reverse Stock Splits  Panel B. Retail Volume Ratio – Reverse Stock Splits 
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APPENDIX 16: RETAIL TRADING IMBALANCES AROUND FORWARD AND 
REVERSE STOCK SPLITS
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Figure 5: Retail Trading Imbalances Around Forward and Reverse Stock Splits 
Figure 5 reports retail trading imbalances around the ex-stock split date for forward and reverse stock splits across an 11-day event window. Panel 
A reports both the retail trading ratio and standardized retail trading imbalances for all forward stock splits. Panel B reports both the retail trading 
ratio and standardized retail trading imbalances for all reverse stock splits. Panels C (D) report both the retail trading ratio and standardized retail 
trading imbalances for reverse stock splits with a pre-stock split price below (above) $1.00. 
Panel A. Forward Stock Splits     Panel B. Reverse Stock Splits 
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